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ABSTRACT
My thesis focuses on the perceptive afflictions caused by alteration of  the normal biological 
functioning  of  sight  and  memory.  These  afflictions  are  related  to  the  redefinition  and 
disgregation  of  the  classical  and  postclassical  cinematographic  characters,  and  affect 
cinematographic  language,  establishing  a  dialectical  relation  with  the  filmic  image  that 
contaminates our spectatorial perception. 
In the first chapter I propose a different reading of  a few moments in film history, turning 
points in which a modification of  the ordinary sensorial patterns has been introduced. From 
the German Expressionism to the late authorial  experiments  of  the 60s,  there is  a sort of 
hidden history of  film that passes through the continuous redefinition of  the audience sensory 
activity.  The  different  perspective  upon  broadly  studied  topics  leads  to  the  analysis  of 
contemporary cinema: my thesis tries to investigate the reasons that led cinema to continually 
increase the representation of  perceptive afflictions during the last years, and theses “affected” 
narratives  of  afflictions  and dysfunctions  have interesting  effects  upon so  called “normal” 
perception of  the reality surrounding us. 
The chapters  2 and 3 respectively  analyze memory disorders  and different  dysfunctions  of 
sight: these elements determine alterations in the ‘normal’ and ‘sensory’ perception of  reality. 
They work as narrative factors changing the visual filmic instruments and redefining the role of 
the subject (and his/her uncertain definition of  identity) in contemporary narratives that show 
how  new  technologies  are  profoundly  transforming  (and  enhancing)  the  perceptive 
mechanisms involved in our spectatorial activity.
In this work I analyze those films that are mostly committed to a clear and readable narration.  
My study primarily concentrates on American  cinema of  the last 30 years – with particular 
attention to popular Hollywood productions – because Hollywood has become the privileged 
‘laboratory’  for the negotiation of  gaze and images in the contemporary mediascape (while 
during  the  classical  era  experimental  and  avant-garde  cinema  were  the  “place”  in  which 
audience experienced the most important redefinitions of  the boundaries between different 
types of  mediated perception. 
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Introduction
This  work  focuses  on the  perceptive  afflictions  caused  by the  alteration  of  the  normal  biological  
functioning  of  the  body.  These  afflictions  are  related  to  the  definition,  transformation  and 
disaggregation of  film characters and affect cinematographic language, establishing a dialectical relation 
with the filmic image which contaminates our spectatorial perception. 
Memory disorders and dysfunctions of  sight are—among others—elements that determine alterations  
in the ‘normal’ and ‘sensory’ perception of  reality. They work as narrative factors which change the 
visual filmic instruments and transform the role of  the subject (and his/her uncertain definition of  
identity) in contemporary narratives. 
There is a double movement that this research tries to perform: I investigate the reasons why cinema 
has continually increased its representation of  perceptive afflictions in recent years, and, at the same 
time, I reflect upon the effects that this focus on afflictions and dysfunctions has had upon the so-
called “normal” perception of  the reality surrounding us. 
I argue that, following the intuitions of  Walter Benjamin, one of  the links between the subject and the  
medium is that every new technology carries within it a new perceptive affliction. It is a relationship 
that directly leads me towards the analysis of  the transformations brought about by new technologies  
upon our daily perceptive mechanisms. And cinema, especially those films that are committed to clear 
and readable narration, is feeling the necessity of  rethinking itself  in a visual-scape in which images are  
produced, reproduced and seen in a completely different way. In the realm of  new media, cinema is 
disappearing  as  a  collective  experience:  our  relation  with  images  is  becoming  more  and  more 
fragmented. 
Contemporary  film  and  cinema  studies  cannot  ignore,  in  my  opinion,  the  increasing  importance 
assumed by these perceptive afflictions as central narrative elements in mainstream cinema. It is not  
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only the traditional subject  which appears besieged by these new forms of  narration which are so  
deeply determined by the transformations of  our sensory perception; in a study devoted to cinema, it is 
inevitable to also reflect upon the new status of  images, focusing both on the nature, the (completely  
transformed, radically modified, or perhaps absolutely vanished) “ontology of  the image” in the age of 
digital creation, and on the social and cultural effects caused by this same transformation of  the image  
itself. 
Even though there are numerous studies, volumes and essays about the movies and the filmmakers I 
investigate, I believe that there is somewhat of  a theoretical and analytical void in contemporary film 
studies regarding this topic—a topic that, as I firmly believe, could reveal a lot about the visual-scape in  
which we live, about the context in which images are produced, reproduced, seen and perceived. It is a  
topic  that  should  not  be  considered  only  as  a  curious  infraction  of  common narrative  rules,  but 
primarily as a creative instrument that allows both the creators and the viewers of  these images to 
reinvent their relation with sight, vision, consciousness, and our sensory communication with the reality  
surrounding us.
A very interesting essay appeared in November 2007; Anna Powell’s  Deleuze, Altered States and Film, a 
book which has the same primary philosophical influence as my research (for example, the works of  
Gilles Deleuze and its relation with film and cinema studies), but that differs from my theses in three  
key-points. Firstly, Powell chooses to deal with altered states which are determined by external elements  
(drugs and hallucinogens) and dream activity as an autonomous form of  alteration, whereas I analyse 
only perceptive dysfunctions caused by an uncommon and atypical functioning of  memory and sight  
(deriving  only  from  internal,  biological  factors  that  can  be  provoked  by  trauma).  I  choose  these 
particular forms of  affliction because I intend to study them not only as symptoms of  a pathological  
state, but especially as cognitive and perceptive enhancements. 
Secondly, the position of  Deleuze and Guattari is predominant in Powell’s work; in my thesis, Deleuze 
is  the cornerstone,  though I  attempt  to put his  pivotal  works in  dialogue with other  thinkers and  
philosophers whose writings are equally relevant for my analyses. Lastly, and this is a very important 11
difference, Powell does not establish historical and geographical limits to the range of  filmmakers and 
movies she analyses, and, moreover, she deals with many great auteurs of  experimental cinema (from 
Anger to Brakhage); instead, my study primarily concentrates on American cinema of  the last 30 years
—with  particular  attention  to  popular  Hollywood  productions—because  I  strongly  believe  that 
Hollywood,  understood  as  the  “place”  of  the  most  diffused  and  shared  visual  narratives,  is  the  
privileged laboratory for the negotiation of  the gaze and images in the contemporary mediascape. 
There  are  moments  in  film  history  during  which  an  image  becomes  abstracted  from its  physical  
properties and generates a metaphorical meaning or when cinema (somehow following a path that joins  
the reflections of  Hugo Munsterberg and Bernard Stiegler) seems replicate some of  the activities of 
human mind, transforming cinema itself, in the words of  Munsterberg, as a “technical simulation of  
the unconscious”. Nowadays, it seems we have entered a realm in which metaphorical meaning has 
almost completely disappeared, leaving all the possible space to a connection between mind and cinema 
that is becoming “self-reflexive and meta-cinematographic: mind, cinema and consciousness relate to  
each other through the fact that a certain image makes the spectator aware of  the act of  perceiving  
images, growing conscious of  the processes of  consciousness itself ” (Elsaesser – Hagener, 2010, p. 
153).
The analysis of  such movies as those discussed in this research leads towards a territory in which 
metaphor simply does not exist as we have known and studied it before. The meta-narrative nature of  
an amnesiac or blind character does not stand as mirror in which a society suffering memory or sight  
disorders can watch itself  for purposes that  are  consolatory or  self-investigative.  Rather,  cinema is 
helping develop the contemporary cognitive frame for a diagnosis that identifies, with great sharpness  
and accuracy, the critical points of  our ongoing processes of  relation with so-called reality. 
Quite  the  same phenomenon is  occurring  in  Western literature.  The  increasing  number of  novels 
related to a various sets of  mental and psychiatric disorders is certainly influenced by recent scientific  
discoveries, but it is also connected with the logics of  an entertainment industry which is increasingly 
aware of  the perceptive and psychological conditions of  our times. 
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If  a novelist such as Richard Powers decides to build one of  his novel,  The Echomaker (2006), around 
facial agnosia and Capgras syndrome, this choice needs to be read not as a metaphor of  a social disease, 
but rather as a  manifestation of  condition which,  in  a  cultural  way,  seems to affect  contemporary 
narratives and their negotiations with the audience. In the first chapter of  this work, I try to imagine a 
sort of  parallel history of  cinema and movies, trying to individuate a path in which—from the pioneer 
days of  the brothers Lumière—film works as a radical instrument for the reshaping of  the human mind 
and for the continual updating of  the psychology and physiology of  the audience. This “affected film 
history” follows a chronological path punctuated by historical avant-gardes, by thinkers and theorists 
(such as Benjamin, Eisenstein, Artaud and Bergson) that revolutionised the approach towards cinema 
and  images,  by  directors  and  schools  whose  efforts  were  directed  toward  the  productive  conflict 
between the structure of  images and the brain activity of  the viewer. In his widely cited and praised  
books about cinema, Deleuze identifies the turning point of  his analysis as the passage to the period  
after  the  Second World  War:  a  divide  that  seems  to  be both  historical  and  geographical,  since  it  
coincides  with  the  passage  from  a  mainly  American  and  classical  “movement-image”  to  a  more 
European and experimental  “time-image.” In the last  few decades,  there has been,  in  my opinion, 
another geographical shifting that has brought the most intriguing and challenging cinematographic 
narratives primarily to the grey zone between independent and mainstream American cinema; these 
ways of  imagining movies, their plots and their visual characteristics, that try to force the limits of  the 
audience’s  attention  and  participation,  very  often  through  the  narrative  construction  of  affected 
characters with deranged minds and perceptions, are ways of  telling stories that could be identified as 
the possible “post” of  both post-classical and the post-modern cinema. Since it is more difficult to  
clearly define what is independent cinema and what is the mainstream as we have become used to 
knowing  it,  I  refer  to  a  more  subtle  zone  in  which  producers,  screenwriters  and  directors  can  
experiment with new forms and new themes, adopting eccentric and disruptive points of  views that—
as I try to demonstrate in the second part  of  the first  chapter—use perceptive afflictions not as a 
merely  disadvantaging  condition  that  limits  and  impoverishes  the  characters  but,  rather,  as  an 
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enhancement  for  a  subject  that  is  positioned  inside  the  screen  and  in  front  of  the  movie  itself.  
Characters  and  audiences  find  themselves  imbricated  in  a  complex  visual-scape  in  which  the 
modification of  one’s perception of  the world is related to the extreme transformation connected to 
the human body and technologies of  representation. Key concepts such as hypertextuality, interactivity  
and modular narratives seem to be connected with the technological  innovations  that  are radically  
transforming cinema: its rhetoric, the multifaceted experience we can make of  cinematographic images,  
the structures of  the narratives that are becoming ever more complex and challenging. 
The  signs  of  the  transmutation  of  cinema  pass  through  a  wide  and  profound  use  of  affected 
psychologies and sensory apparatuses. The same phenomenon seems to interest other contemporary 
narratives,  such as novels  and videogames,  showing that  the  present-day  experience  of  reality  (or,  
better, of  realities) also involves the ways in which media and fiction shape the complex architecture of  
the perceivable. There are reasons, of  course, that explain why contemporary cinema is increasingly 
adopting  themes  and  subjects  that  somehow  seem  to  be  explanted  from  neurological  pathology 
manuals, brain surgery diaries and analyses of  dysfunctions that were rarely chosen in the classical and  
“post-modern”  eras.  These  are  reasons  that,  in  my  opinion  are  both  internal  and  external  to  
cinematographic language and which appear to be economic, social, technological and communicative. 
The solid and clear distinction between the subjective and objective, diagnosed by Deleuze, appears to 
be the central issue in new contemporary forms of  narrative. The void created by the permanent and  
enduring crisis of  a subject besieged by complex realities is partially filled in by narratives in which the 
imaginary and the real became indiscernible and in which the pathologies experienced by the characters  
seem to be, as Thomas Elsaesser affirms (2009, p. 31), “productive pathologies” that both enhance the 
boundaries of  the human-ness of  the characters and enrich the spectatorial spectrum of  re-activity, 
imagining complex structures of  storytelling and challenging visual solutions. 
Subsequently,  cinematographic  audiences  experience  a  process  of  perceptive  decrease  and  their 
subjectivity needs ever-increasing strategies of  experience and meaning formation in order to achieve a 
temporary balance in  the ongoing consolidation of  an identity.  The task of  the viewer (or of  the 
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reader),  when confronted with such deranged narratives in  which  the usual  and classical  forms of  
perception  are  completely  subverted,  appears  to  be  more  difficult.  What  is  undeniable  is  the 
disappearance of  an organized plan of  perception that leaves its place to a rapidly shifting and adapting 
structure of  attendance.
The passage we are witnessing includes a shift in the cinematographic image, a transformation that 
leaves behind the widely-acknowledged audio-visual immersive aesthetics and projects the perception of 
the audience towards a more complex and subtle level in which the frame itself  opens its boundaries,  
and the narratives are profoundly transformed by the new experience of  time and space that have 
emerged in the last few decades: modular narratives, puzzle movies, mind-game films, characters who 
appear to lose their subjectivities, crises of  perception and of  a direct relationship with the outside 
world.  There  are  many  different  signals  that  show  how  contemporary  mainstream  cinema  is  
experiencing a profound reconsideration of  the structures and rhetoric of  its products, focusing on the  
weakening of  the characters (now that even super-heroes seems to be affected by physiological and 
psychological disturbances) as it converges with the radical renewal of  the strategies and mechanics of  
spectatorship.
Memory and sight are identified as two human capacities that are extremely relevant in the visual- and 
narrative-scapes that I analyse in this work. Memory, for instance, as I highlight in Chapter 2, seems to  
be the key issue in many films that have been produced in the U.S. in the last twenty years, films that 
belong to the uncertain territory of  what was called “independent cinema” before the 1980s as well as 
to bigger and more expensive productions of  Hollywood studios. One of  the most exploited and well-
developed topics of  contemporary cinema is the bad or incoherent functioning of  human memory.  
The classical depiction of  memory and its relevance for the formation and consistency of  characters is,  
without a doubt, derived from a Lockean inheritance that makes memory coincide with identity. Of 
course, there are many film theorists and scholars who link memory and cinema, moving from the  
mnemonic material that remains after (and long after) the projection of  the movie to the awareness of  
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the spectator that remembers in a very particular way that s/he is watching a movie, that what s/he sees is 
a representation. But the memory I focus on in the second chapter is the memory that is radically 
transformed by the prosthetic nature of  the devices we rely on in order to achieve a quantitative and 
qualitative  enhancement  of  our  mnemonic  capacities.  This  extreme process  of  physical  separation 
between the self, the body and memory itself  is narrated in contemporary cinema through a series of  
films centred on characters whose memories are depicted as fallacious, uncertain, completely erased, in 
the process of  being constantly rewritten without  any preservation of  previous events,  and so on. 
Memory  troubles,  amnesiac  disorders,  partial  or  complete  erasures  of  mnemonic  data:  we  are 
witnessing a continuously increasing number of  titles dedicated to various kinds of  memory afflictions.  
The second chapter of  this work tries to understand the reasons behind this notable trend, identifying  
the symptoms of  this movement, first of  all, in the crisis of  the primary linguistic element classically  
related to memory: the flashback.
Moving from the experiments of  Alain Resnais and arriving at the destruction of  the flashback enacted 
by  such  directors  as  Abel  Ferrara  and  David  Fincher,  the  analysis  focuses  on  the  transformation  
experienced by the process of  memory that starts to show its renewed functioning: memory somehow 
becomes a self-regulating function that profoundly alters the traditional rhetoric of  actualization that 
has been adopted by cinema in both the classical and post-modern periods. We are witnessing a radical  
modification in the description and narrativization of  memory that becomes, in a long series of  movies 
related to the new status of  this human (and not only human) activity, a kind of  self-governing device 
that employs the sensory activity of  the characters as a mere passage for achieving a form of  visibility.  
The self-regulating activity of  memory transforms the cinematic rules of  actualisation in two different 
ways: it determines profound transformations in the definition of  the subject and, insisting on a more 
linguistic  point  of  view,  determines  a  shift  in  the  substantial  effectiveness  of  the  flashback  that 
becomes a fragmented,  drifting image that  cannot help its “owner” and the audience decipher the  
meaningfulness of  remembered events.
Quite  obviously,  the  redefinition  of  what  memory  is  (or  is  becoming)  and  of  its  rhetorics  of 
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cinematographic representation converge in the consistent and stimulating series of  films whose nuclei  
are amnesia and related memory disorders. In recent years, there have been many titles centered on 
amnesia, and this topic has become one of  Hollywood’s most exploited themes. After the huge and  
unexpected  success  of  the  independent  movie  Memento  (2000),  within  just  a  few cinematographic 
seasons, an astounding number of  movies brought amnesia and other memory alterations to the very  
centre  of  the  attention  of  the  audience.  What  is  at  stake,  here,  is  not  the  scientific  or  medical  
correctness of  the representation of  brain afflictions, memory disorders, partial or total amnesia; the  
key issue,  instead,  is  the cultural and social  importance that contemporary narratives (even in such 
popular productions as mainstream TV series) are giving to memory and its modifications. 
The representational and sensorial transmutations shown and diffused/disseminated by such successful  
titles as  Memento  or  Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind (2004) (the movies that are at the theoretical 
centre  of  the  second chapter  of  this  research)  are  highly  important  in  order  to  comprehend  our 
understanding of  both the psychological and bodily mutation our networked and “all remembering” 
society  is  undergoing.  These  shifts  are  also  undoubtedly  moulded  by  the  fact  that  the  narrative 
structures  that  are  mostly  exploited  in  Hollywood  cinema  are  modifying  the  connections  existing 
among all the topics that are somehow related to memory and amnesia. This is also happening because,  
apart  from  fictional  narratives,  our  biological  and  technologically-empowered  memory  has  gone 
through  a  decisive  modification  that,  as  stated  previously,  is  connected  with  the  technological  
instruments and devices that have transformed and are still transforming the biology and the cultural 
value of  mnemonic processes and activities.
The point of  view of  this research insists on questioning the widely accepted metaphor of  the human 
brain as a computer hard disk. Analyzing Michel Gondry’s Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind, we both 
try to underline the cinematographic structure of  memory and its processual activity. Memory, rather 
than being intended as a tabula rasa upon which rememberings and recollections find a place in which 
be mummified and stored, is filmic: it works with a continuous superimposition of  time levels, wild and  
sometimes unjustified combinations of  images, voices and sounds that confound the dimensions of 
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past and present. The filmic nature of  memory also involves the presence of  a spectator that happens 
to be the same remembering subject, who is a part (often a fundamental part) of  the recalled event,  
who participates in it and sees him/herself  as a character (from Cronenberg’s Spider (2002) to the main 
character  of  Gondry’s  movie  to  agent  Olivia  Dunham  of  the  TV  series  Fringe (2008-present)). 
Remembering does not mean selecting a preserved memory from a drawer but rather building a new 
shape for the same event that changes every time the subject remembers. A memory is not untouchable 
and unmodifiable: it is something that continuously doubles the “event” in a process of  formation and, 
as Philip K. Dick suggests, falsification. What he defines as a “spurious memory” is a memory in which 
the remembering subject fills the voids and alters the content and the frame of  the remembered event.  
An unreliable reminiscence modifies and fakes the real remembered circumstances and annihilates the 
differentiation between actual and counterfeit memories, flinging the subject into a reality that does not  
allow any form of  certainty and that denies the presence of  a stable and univocal subjectivity. 
The filmic structure of  memory, foreseen by Bergson and recently demonstrated by the impressive 
work  of  Bernard  Stiegler,  tells  us  something about  the  intrinsically  prosthetic  “nature”  of  human 
memory, a biological and chemical process that has migrated from the boundaries of  our actual body  
and organs and has become a disseminated activity that involves technological devices in which our 
memory data are stored and processed. Alison Landsberg’s theory of  “prosthetic memories” opens the  
field  to  the  hypothesis  of  conceiving  memories  as  not  being  recognized  exclusively  by  the  actual 
experience  of  the  person who  remembers.  Memories  become replaceable  and  shareable  experiences 
thanks to tools and instruments of  mediation (from language and narratives to external devices such as 
memory cards and VR representations), but it is in the contemporary passage that mass media and 
radically renewed technologies can create forms of  experience which become part of  what the audience  
(cinematic audience, for instance) possesses. 
What is questioned,  according to the main tendencies of  twentieth-century thought and, especially,  
within the post-modern horizon, is the difficulty of  making the real be a part of  collective and all-
embracing  narrative  structures;  the  atomization  of  perception  and  the  singularity  of  proliferating 18
realities leads to a disruption of  linear time and to the idea of  reality as the result of  a controversial  
sum of  individualities that share some memories and cohabit individual realities. Prosthetic memories  
radically question the assumption of  the total possession of  private memories as private properties:  
they are, according to Landsberg, “memories that no individual can own, that individuals can only share  
with  others,  and  whose  meanings  can  never  be  completely  stabilised”  (Landsberg,  1995,  p.  151). 
Cinema, of  course, is one of  the most important media to have generated substitute experiences that  
have been implanted into the memories of  viewers without ever being lived by them. The production 
of  mediated recollections generates processes of  identity construction that pass through “memories  
which become experiences that film consumers both possess and feel possessed by” (p. 191). 
The  renewed  negotiation  of  memory  and  subjectivity  seems  to  find  in  the  metaphorical  and 
physiological space of  amnesia a perfect synthesis that allows a better understanding of  what certain 
narratives are trying to diagnose, describe and, somehow, re-project in the perceptual field. One of  the 
most  interesting  phenomena,  in  this  direction,  could  be  déjà-vu,  increasingly  shown,  narrated  and 
investigated  in  contemporary  Western  fiction  and  perfectly  fitting  the  coordinates  of  memory 
representation and investigation. The centrality of  déjà vu is quite evidently connected to the intrinsic  
and Bergsonian duplicity of  every moment that splits itself  in a perceived now and a remembered now. 
There is an excess of  visibility that could be related to the experience of  the virtual that stands at the  
core of  contemporaneity. The virtual is intended, according to Deleuze, not as opposite to the real but  
to the actual bringing reflection towards a multifaceted “experience of  the possible” that shows how 
déjà vu and other afflictions of  memory have moved from being the merely pathological and intimate  
levels  and  have  become symptoms  of  a  collective  and  perhaps  social  condition  that  needs  to  be 
discussed.
In the third and final chapter of  this research, the profound rethinking of  the cinematographic medium 
that is explored historically in the first chapter and through the lenses of  memory and amnesia in the 
second, is analysed according to the afterthought that involves the linguistic and communicative level of  
film following the radical innovation in the field of  digital images and visual special effects. Cinema is 19
experiencing an undeniable revolution that is  changing the way we understand the very nature and  
functioning of  the medium. The vertiginous acceleration in the use of  digital film-making technology 
involves not only the mechanisms and rituals of  collective or private projections or the transformation 
of  the cinematographic object in itself.  The exceptional  presence of  digitally  created images inside  
almost every movie we happen to watch is a phenomenon that leads directly towards an isomorphism 
between visual operations and mental representations as an unavoidable touchstone in contemporary 
reflections on visual communication. Human vision is not the only possible vision nowadays, and the  
utopia of  a unmediated vision crashes against the digital realm we are immersed in; systems of  visual 
communication are invested with the intriguing task of  both representing the altered reality that human 
sight  cannot  comprise  and  building,  through images,  an exteriorisation  of  some  human cognitive 
processes  in  digital  machines,  computers  and,  through  those  tools,  cinematic  systems  of 
communication.
There  is  more  to  it  as  well:  recent  medical  discoveries  have  led  scientists  to  scrutinize  the  inner 
workings of  the body and the reactions of  the brain during visual processes. This possibility has led to  
a drastic and radical subversion of  theories of  human mental faculties connected to the eye and the  
perceptual apparatus as a whole. Connections between the eye and brain sectors related to sight re at 
the  centre  of  contemporary  neurology  and  neurocognitive  science:  the  conclusion  seems  that, 
fundamentally, the eyes do not actually see. Vision is a composite operation pertaining to various areas 
of  the brain, and there are several parts of  the brain involved in the registration and refinement of  the 
unprocessed data acquired by the visual apparatus. We have relatively recently discovered that every  
section of  the brain that participates in visual processes has both a receptive and transmissive function:  
a modular activity that implies no hierarchy and that is based on the fact that various parts of  the brain 
both receive and transmit data and information. An image is a construction because it is the product of 
the process that begins with the opening of  an eye. Medical scientists, supported by such machines as  
the fMRI and the CAT scan, have affirmed this complex nature of  images, and digital images seem to 
be an involuntary consequences of  recent developments in medical technology because they are part of  
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a bigger and theoretically more devastating process that involves the production of  images, not only 
their reception or perception. The shift regards the relationship between images and what used to be 
called  “reality.”  Images  are  correctly  considered  not  as  extractions  from  the  real  or  as  visual  
manifestations of  the distinct shape of  things; what is challenging the theoretical assumptions about  
images and their functioning is the complex position of  digital images that are redefining the spatial  
relationship between the self, its context and the visual  domain. The dissolution of  the concept of  
“representation,”  linked  to  the  dissolution  of  the  humanistic  perspective,  brings  with  it  a  more 
articulated crisis of  the notion of  sameness, of  resemblance. The extraordinary developments in visual  
technology have brought about the end of  the prominence of  thee aforementioned notions and, more 
significantly,  have  enhanced  the  virtual  capacities  of  the  medium and,  consequently,  have  pushed 
physiological boundaries to unthinkable limits. The obsolete concept of  mimesis has disappeared from 
our cultural landscape, even though there has been a sort  of  cryptic reappearance linked to digital  
graphics and the cultural implications of  hyper-realism. Thus, digital images reaffirm the principle of 
the “constructed image” that analogical photography had partially hidden. 
Even  though  debates  regarding  digital  images  have  evolved  around  a  difference  in  the  ontology  
between the analogical and the digital, I think that we should shift the borders and the content of  our  
reflection towards what we do with  these images. Forgetting whether they are digitally or analogically 
produced, it remains the fact that images have a cultural and social value that regards their function; in 
contemporary cinema, we notice that we judge digitally created special effects paradoxically according 
to their adherence to sensorially perceived reality. The re-creation of  a world otherwise perceivable with 
the aid of  our five senses is the frame inside which we look and judge the digital synthesis: we look for  
the sharpness  of  the  details,  the fluidity of  the movement,  the  realism of  these visual  inventions,  
forgetting that our eyes do not perceive this level of  detail. Cinema insists on the “reality effect” that  
somehow gives an image a sort of  realist certification, even when we are staring at enormous gorillas  
and extinct dinosaurs. The contradiction of  a gaze that searches for a realism in images that are built to  
integrate and reinvent the planes of  possible realities pushes our reflection and forces an interrogation 
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of  the renewed relationship that exists between the screen (any screen) and our perceiving body. In the  
last chapter of  this thesis, I try to read the technologies of  the visual not as tools that allow a (realist,  
faithful, adherent, mimetic) replication of  the real, but as occasions we have to push the boundaries of  
the visible and of  the imaginable further. This is one of  the main places of  conflict in our imaginary. It  
is a brand new experience that digital images contribute to the creation of. For this reason, technologies 
of  the (re)creation of  images can become instruments of  meaning making only when they cease to be  
machines  of  representation  (obliged  to  a  couple  with  an  external—real  or  imaginary—referent)  and 
become a key for reaching a different perspective upon mechanisms of  vision, upon transformations 
regarding sight and its cognitive value. 
Just as there are many titles dedicated to amnesia and other afflictions of  sight, there are several films 
that feature blind or visually impaired characters. These movies not simply exploit the blind or almost-
blind character with a metaphorical  intention (for example,  the becoming-blind rabbi in  Crimes and 
Misdemeanors, directed by Woody Allen in 1990, that evidently represents the blindness of  God in an evil  
and unfair world in which sins are not punished) but try to imagine new boundaries for the field of  the 
visible and analyse in a narrative (and often entertaining) way the transformations of  the sight of  the 
audience itself. 
Self-generated  digital  images,  produced  without  an  effective  openness  to  the  external  world,  can 
become, according to our consciousness, very similar to hallucinations because the spatial-temporal  
relationship  that  involves  the  subjects  in  the  visual  process  does  not  exist  as  such  anymore.  A 
hallucination is the real perception of  something that is not in front of  us; it is an image we see which  
is not generated by anything that stands before our eyes, or something erroneously imagined to be 
perceived with the other senses. Hallucinations and blindness can become useful metaphors for telling 
us something more about digital cinema and images. The most relevant consequence of  the explosion 
of  digitally-made  images  certainly  is  the  possibility  of  creating  images  from nothing,  without  any 
connection to a source, to an origin that is situated outside the machine that produces and builds these 
images. The creation of  a non referential cinema replicates the experience of  the hallucination: a very  
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specific  one,  not connected to a  malfunctioning of  our brain,  that opens our eyes (metaphorically 
speaking, of  course) to a particular activity carried out by our brain in certain moments. During some 
hallucinatory  phases,  for example the hypnagogic,  the human being is  perfectly  aware of  the false 
nature of  the images s/he is  seeing;  at  the same time,  s/he remains inside a  perceptual  experience 
entirely linked to images. Observing the dinosaurs in  King Kong  (2005, Peter Jackson) or the Na’Vi in 
Avatar (2009, James Cameron) means being perfectly aware of  the fact that these are images of  living 
beings generated with the aid of  software, but, at the same time, this activity remains inscribed inside a  
perceptual  scope  in  which  the  distinction  between  analogical  and  digital  has  no  meaning.  As  
cinematographic spectators, we trust the camera, we rely on it as a camera whose eye has never really  
“seen” what we are watching on the screen. The revolution is a decisive one: before the digital era, our  
eyes coincided with the eye of  the camera that had caught the visual material. Nowadays, our eyes have  
completely overtaken the eye we relied on, and cinema seems to have become an eye that produces 
images without having ever “seen” them. 
There is a resemblance between our always increasing use of  a “sightless vision” (Virilio, 1988/1994)  
and the importance of  digitally created images in film and for cinema. In order to obtain visible images,  
nothing has to happen in front of  the eye of  the camera. Hallucinations are the result of  blindness;  
they are not only  metaphorical  frames that  witness the decline of  the eye and the arrival  of  new 
mechanisms of  vision, but also rhetorical models for the discursive practices of  many contemporary 
films. The eye of  the camera, transformed into a sort of  “bachelor machine,” abdicates its role and tells  
us a lot about a more general crisis of  the visible that could be one of  the partially hidden themes of  
this research. It seems we are continuing to keep our “eyes wide shut,” as Stanley Kubrick has foreseen, 
living  a  condition  that  strongly  summarizes  the  position  of  the  contemporary  cinematographic 
spectator: a position that is suspended between one reality and others (not between  the reality and its 
opposite) and in which the eyes happen, paradoxically, to be both open and shut at the same moment,  
in the same movement.
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1 Where Is My Mind?
The history of  cinema is marked by a series of  technological innovations which both represent and 
cultivate certain perceptual possibilities and relations between the subject and an external reality.  In  
order  to  better  appreciate  the  state  of  contemporary  cinema  and  its  emphasis  on  perceptual  
pathologies, it is necessary to situate it in relation to a larger series of  transformations which have  
driven, and been driven by, changing ideas of  film’s relation to reality and to its audience. From its early  
days, and across a series of  movements and experiments, cinema’s evolution has been closely linked to  
the  changing  technologies  of  the  medium.  The  following  outlines  some  of  the  more  important 
moments  that  have  transported  contemporary  cinema  to  where  it  is  today,  with  its  focus  on  the 
evolution of  the body and its multifaceted responses when confronted with states of  consciousness, 
perceptions and meaning-making.
 
- The audience and the reaction to the Lumière Brothers’ first experiments
When Auguste and Louis Lumière showed their first cinematographic experiments to an audience, a 
strange reaction occurred among the viewers. Some of  them were strongly affected by their experience 
of  the action happening in front of  them on the screen; upon the arrival of  the train at the station,  
some audience members—afraid that they were about to be run over by the train—ran away from the 
theater,  demonstrating  their  complete  lack  of  a  representative  frame.  The  experience  was  direct,  
immediate. It could be easily said that the shocking experience of  the first cinema spectators was the 
first step in an ongoing process that has never stopped menacing the safety of  a simply indexical or 
realist perception of  the spectacle with the possibility that the screen-world is not just a simple, parallel  
reality juxtaposed to the experiential one, but a transversal world able to question the essence of  the 
so-called reality itself. 
One of  the most-cited anecdotes regarding the strong experiences of  the first film viewers is Béla 
Balász’s (1952) account of  a Siberian girl’s first cinematic experience in Moscow. She was well-educated 24
and clever, but she was left alone by the cousins who brought her there. She left the theater evidently 
shocked, even though the movie was only a burlesque. Asked how she liked the film, she admitted that  
it had been a really horrible experience for her, marked by the abomination of  the things she had seen 
and which she had somehow connected to the decadence of  a big city  such as Moscow in which 
“dreadful things” are shown to the audience. Her cousins wondered about these dreadful things, and 
the Siberian girl expressed her revulsion, explaining that: “Human beings were torn to pieces and the 
heads thrown one way and the bodies the other and the hands somewhere else again” (p. 35).
This is the kind of  extreme experience that besieged many viewers who, simply, could not connect  
their consciousness with the complexity of  a fragmented representation. As Balász (1952) summarizes: 
We ourselves no longer know by what intricate evolution of  our consciousness we have 
learnt our visual association of  ideas. What we have learnt is to integrate single disjointed 
pictures  into  a  coherent  scene,  without  even  becoming  conscious  of  the  complicated 
psychological  process  involved.  It  is  amazing  to  what  extent  we  have  in  a  couple  of 
decades,  learnt to see picture perspectives, picture metaphors and picture symbols,  how 
greatly we have developed our visual culture and sensibility. (p. 35)
- From German Expressionism to the French School: inorganic and liquid perception 
The first relevant fracture during the evolution of  cinematic language happened in Germany after the 
end of  World War I. Built around the simple principle of  making the interior dimension of  expression 
come  outside,  German  Expressionism  attempted  to  imagine  a  different  way  to  access  the  inner 
workings  of  perception.  Moving  toward  a  complete  overturning  of  the  balanced  visual  strategy 
deployed in Hollywood, Expressionist cinema extracted the secret and hidden forces of  individuality  
from the spectator rather than tickling the retina with the chromatic effects of  Impressionist paintings. 
There were viscera, nerves, anxieties and fears involved, and Expressionist theorists and directors tried  
to find the  most  effective  way to draw out these  embodied  and psychological  elements from the 
viewers of  their movies. According to Deleuze (1983/1986): 
The non-organic life of  things, a frightful life, which is oblivious to the wisdom and limits of 
the organism, is the first principle of  Expressionism, valid for the whole of  Nature, that is,  
for the unconscious spirit, lost in darkness, light which has become opaque, lumen opacatum. 
(pp. 50-51)
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In the Expressionist movement,  art  was considered a powerful cognitive tool capable of  activating 
certain  human  abilities  which  are  often  hidden  and  kept  deactivated.  The  transformation  of  the 
represented reality implies an effort to deform the existing, sensory reality. The experience requested of 
the audience is to subvert the equation of  reality, representation and work of  art. It is a sort of  parallel  
world, a hidden universe that becomes visible. Theater, painting and cinema redefine the conceptual 
limits and the figurative perimeter of  Western visuality, pushing the boundaries of  human perception 
and adopting  the  only  strategy  they  are  allowed  to  adopt:  the  transformation  of  the  dimensional  
structure of  the visible,  which erases its depth in order to reach a perception of  two dimensional 
spaces, creating an altered perception, a diffraction in the usual relation between the self  and artistic 
representation.  Robert  Wiene,  shaping  the  visual  structure  of  Das  Kabinett  des  Dr.  Caligari  (1920), 
redefines the inner nature of  cinematographic representation, transforming the mechanical vitality of  
inanimate  objects  and  spaces  and  offering  a  self-reflexive  analysis  of  spectatorial  perception  and 
experience.  Caligari underlines the  complex  inner  structures  of  the  traumatic  cinematic  experience, 
reinforcing doubts about the wholeness of  the psychological awareness involved in the spectatorial act. 
It  is  the  depicted  reality  that  shifts  toward  a  dimension  in  which  the  human  part  is  erased  or  
unnecessary,  in  which  human  nature  shows  itself  caught  in  the  middle  of  a  mutation.  German 
Expressionism is the moment in which, for the first time, the visual and perceptual virus which moves  
from the screen toward the audience is not determined exclusively by the narrative or the inner nature 
of  the characters; it is the invention of  a totally new mise en scène that transforms reality in order to 
evoke  shocking  emotions  in  the  audience.  The  mutual  exchanges  among  bodies  and  spaces  and 
psychological tensions are immersed in a new perceptual realm in which the oblivion of  reality (that 
characterizes the ordinary relationship between audience and movie)  becomes an alteration of  the 
perception of  reality.  The representation of  a  distorted environment,  of  estranged behaviours,  of 
characters somehow suspended between the instincts of  the living and the automatism of  non-vital  
living, inevitably conducts the viewer toward a surprising condition in which the mind still recognizes  
the appearances of  the cinematic spectacle while losing touch with the certainties conquered in the 
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first years of  cinema-going. This is perhaps the first attempt in film history to consider the viewer’s 
mind as an active force that interacts with the visual event, as a dynamic agent in which the equilibrium 
between subject and screen could also be subverted: the emotional and psychological realm of  the  
audience becomes a soft element that can be continuously shaped and reshaped by the visual and  
narrative elements.
Around the same time in France, other directors and philosophers were using cinematography as a way 
of  redefining human perception:  after  the  canonization of  the  subjective  and  objective  image made by 
previous  cinematic  schools  in  Europe  and  by  a  few  directors  in  the  United  States,  these  French 
theorists focused on the con-fusion between these two dialectic  forms of  image-construction.  The  
seeds of  a different form of  vision are planted, a form that tries to affirm the autonomous power of  its  
intensity  and  its  eccentric  position,  beyond  the  subjective  and  objective.  Deleuze  (1983/1986) 
recognizes that Pier Paolo Pasolini gave a better definition of  this theoretical and practical effort:
A character acts on the screen,  and is  assumed to see the world in a certain way.  But 
simultaneously the camera sees him, and sees his world, from another point of  view which 
thinks, reflects and transforms the viewpoint of  the character. Pasolini says: the director 
‘has replaced wholesale the neurotic’s vision of  the world by his own delirious vision of 
aestheticism’. It is in fact a good thing that the character should be neurotic, to indicate 
more effectively the difficult birth of  a subject into the world. But the camera does not 
simply give us the vision of  the character and of  his world; it imposes another vision in  
which  the  first  is  transformed  and  reflected.  […]  We  are  no  longer  faced  with  the 
subjective or  objective images; we are caught in a correlation between a perception-image 
and a camera-consciousness which transforms it (the question of  knowing whether the 
image was objective or subjective is no longer raised). (p. 74)
Pasolini’s reflection insists on a crucial issue: poetic cinema (identified with the formal solution of  the 
“free indirect subjective” that became his formal trademark), for its continuous effort toward escaping 
the logic of  traditional exposition, is somehow related (even if  at only a symbolic or metaphorical level)  
to the alteration of  perception, and this subversion of  the usual rules of  the visual experience is the  
ultimate goal of  these images, with the spectator becoming a subject who is caught in the middle of  
this evolution, kept in a state of  cognitive and reflective suspension by images that deny a simple and 
univocal identification.
Henri  Bergson proposes a representational  model of  perception that is  selective,  that chooses and 
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refuses,  admits  and denies:  this intuition leads  Bergson to superimpose human perception and  the 
essence of  the cinematographic mechanism. As De Gaetano (2002) points out, not all cinema works on 
the principle of  conscious perception:
Natural perception and the classical cinema’s one that corresponds to it is an abstracting, 
selective and purely functional perception. Objects and qualities, substances and attributes 
make themselves perceivable only in function of  their practical use. Perception […] does 
not need to be measured only according to its conscious and human feature, but can also 
extend the horizon of  ‘pictures’ and ‘representations’ in order to capture the plan of  matter-
images. And this is possible only through the aesthetic perception, not the natural one. The 
extension of  the perceivable is the mere object of  art, writes Bergson in  La perception du 
changement. The main goal of  the artist is to make perceivable what we had perceived without 
perceiving. (p. 48)
This  is  exactly  the  theoretical  point  in  which  cinema  could  work  as  an  enhancement  of  human 
perception, as an integration of  the natural one. Given that a certain, classical cinema works perfectly as  
a replica of  human perception (in its abstracting and selective functioning), it is possible to imagine a  
cinema that allows the expansion of  the viewer’s perceptual boundaries, that brings human perception  
into the realm of  the unperceivable. Obviously the system of  natural perception necessarily maintains  
its centrality, but only as a potentially enhanced instrument that permits the biological system to escape  
its finite borders and become something different: a non-human, inorganic perception. 
- Towards a de-humanization of  the eye: the importance of  the apparatus (Gance, Vertov, Eisenstein, Artaud)
The work  of  Abel  Gance,  for  instance,  is  a  continuous  attempt  to  surpass  the  visual  boundaries 
inherently linked to the specificity of  the apparatus. Gance started from a consideration of  the point of  
view which cinema imposes on its audience: a spectator necessarily sees what the director decides s/he 
has to see.  In  La Roue (1923), Gance tries  to transform sight, showing a character whose eyes are 
damaged and then showing his affected point of  view through a soft focus effect that communicates to  
the audience the feeling of  having a disturbed and altered perception. Here, we witness a continuous  
movement  of  tension  towards  an  outside  beyond  the  cinematic  frame.  Altering  the  focus  is  an 
experiment conducted inside the margins of  the frame, somehow respecting the  inviolability of  the 
limits that represent an inextricable issue for cinematic language. But Gance always felt that cinema was  28
to be searched for, and eventually found, in an outside, that the boundaries imposed by the specificity  
of  the  frame  needed to  be  broken  through editing.  For  this  reason,  in  Napoleon  (1927)  he  made 
extensive use of  the split screen (up to nine images composed in the same frame), superimpositions  
and extremely rapid montage, trying to multiply the sensory unities and perceptual relations between 
viewer and image: the individual perspectives contained in the split-screen cast doubt on the normative 
and absolute value of  the single point of  view. The final result is a sort of  jigsaw puzzle in which every  
single piece has a narrative and formal unity that could tell a story and contain a structural coherence; it 
is a puzzle that has a sort of  bigger narrative imperative, a meaning unit that reaches its goal when it  
communicates a perceptual event to the viewer that is the result of  a multiplicity of  visualizations. In  
this way, the condition of  perceptual disturbance becomes not a relational disorder, but a different way 
of  thinking and feeling. 
Insisting on the specificities of  the apparatus, Russian director Dziga Vertov, pretending to play with 
words but actually subverting the meaning of  things, created the concept of  the cine-eye, the kinoglaz. 
Deleuze (1983/1986) writes: 
In Vertov the interval of  movement is perception, the glance, the eye. But the eye is not the  
too-immobile human eye; it is the eye of  the camera, that is an eye in matter, as it extends 
from a point where action begins to the limit of  the reaction, as it fills the interval between  
the two, crossing the universe and beating in time to its intervals. (pp. 39-40) 
According to Vertov, the kinoglaz is not only an improvement on, or upgrade of, the human eye. It is 
also a process (with a duration and temporality) of  the de-humanization of  the eye, given that what  
disappears is the condition of  possibility itself  of  an abstract and objective vision. The cine-eye is the 
way of  freeing humans from their condition of  limitation, from their restricted ability to make sense of  
the  chaos  surrounding the  perceptual  apparatus.  Life,  according to Vertov,  is  not  fully perceivable 
without the complexity of  artificial recording mechanisms and the mobility that characterizes them. So 
humans must become machinic in order to construct a clear vision of  the chaos, to extract knowledge  
from the amorphous matter that remains inexplicable due to the limited functionality of  the perceptual  
system. For all of  these reasons, Vertov imagines cinema as a prosthetic element that supplements the 
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In the USSR, Eisenstein worked in a different direction in order to achieve almost the same results. The 
point  of  departure  for  Eisenstein’s  theories  is  the  radical  re-conceptualization  of  the  spectator’s  
function. In his account, the spectator’s brain is not simply a passive device able to decode signals and  
absorb narrative structures.  It  is  instead  an active and productive unit  that  continually  creates and 
determines meaning strictly connecting the sensorium and the brain. 
As has been widely acknowledged,  montage is the pivotal element in Eisenstein’s cinematic activity. He 
proposed a theoretical system in which the film works as a stimuli-creator, proposing visual and editing 
patterns that continuously  influence the spectator’s  reflexes  and mould his/her consciousness.  The 
most simplistic formulas of  perception consider the shown images to be the same as the perceived 
images; Eisenstein radically subverts this apparently logical (and false, as scientific inquiries later in the  
century  would  demonstrate)  rule  and  re-launches  the  possibilities  of  cinematic  images  that  act 
differently  inside  the  viewer’s  brain,  determining new forms and new meanings  for  the  raw visual  
material.  Eisenstein  is  very  clear  about  film’s  ability  to  ignite  the  possibility  of  the  perception of 
something that is actually more than what the eyes have seen because an image is not only the shown 
elements but a global structure whose essence may not directly appear but can be communicated by the  
artist.  Sight  is  thus  not  inadequate,  but  rather  seems insufficient  in  the  complete  meaning-making 
process of  images. 
Eisenstein’s complex and multifaceted theories clearly attempt to move beyond the merely perceptual  
and physiological dimension of  perception in favour of  a more intellectual use of  the human faculties  
in relation to images. In his later work, he also considered the role of  emotions in generating meaning  
in his intuitions regarding the complex process of  ecstasy. Eisenstein’s concept of  ecstasy is rooted in 
‘pathos,’ “conceived of  as that which would enthuse and energise the spectator, and bring him or her  
into a dynamic connection with  the work of  socialist  realist  art.  It  is  this more dynamic,  catalytic  
conception of  pathos which Eisenstein drew on when developing his ideas on film form” (Aitken, 
2002,  p. 41).  For Eisenstein,  the ‘dynamic connection’  means a sort of  being outside the self  that  
directly involves the emotional condition of  the viewer, in a process that seems inverted if  compared to 
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the  one theorized  by Antonin  Artaud,  relegating  the neurological  and physiological  dimensions  of 
Artaudian discourse to the background. ‘Pathos,’ in Eisenstein, leads directly to an analysis of  ecstasy  
that necessarily means escaping the limited perimeter imposed by sensorial perception and entering into 
a perceptual realm similar to the one experienced by the great mystics of  human history. He connects 
ecstasy to the activity of  grasping a broader meaning and more general truth in images, a truth that 
goes beyond the limits of  the shown image and reaches the intimate essence of  the ‘global image’: it is  
the possibility of  a single architecture that contains and exceeds its individual elements, bringing the 
spectator beside and outside him/herself, through the emotional impact of  the pathetic impression.
Escaping from the dictatorship of  objectivity is also one of  the cores of  Artaud’s words and works 
which redefined the mutual influences between visual and verbal language and the innermost reality of 
the brain—a reality intended not as a unity, but as a fissure, a crack. Cinema, according Artaud, is not 
just entertainment or distraction; rather, it must be seen as a “dissociative force” which introduces a  
“figure of  nothingness”, a “hole in appearances” (Deleuze, 1985/1989, pp. 167-168). Artaud, literally, 
sees  all the virtual possibilities of  cinematic language,  foresees the enormous potentialities of  creating a 
connection between images and the spectator’s brain. The movement of  images, the altered dimensions 
of  the depicted objects, the uniqueness of  the spatial relation in which images overwhelm the eye and 
the sensory apparatus of  the viewer: these are the conditions identified by Artaud in his diagnosis of 
what cinema was and, more importantly, what cinema could and should be. 
Artaud considers cinema a language that limits itself  to the ordinary work of  the  representation of  the  
visible. This limitation is related to the unexpressed potentialities of  an instrument that fails to reach the 
hidden activities of  the spirit. Narrative cinema distracts the perception, in Artaud’s view, and the mere 
presentation of  things, objects and relations leads to a forgetting of  the inner aspects and potentialities 
of  the human being. The hidden life of  the interior is not revealed through “pure cinema”, with its  
tendency to worship the visual form. Instead, cinema needs to be “capable of  transcending illusion and 
acting directly upon (and altering) the viewer’s perception of  material reality” (Jamieson, 2007), thus  
creating  the  psychic  and  sensory  conditions  for  altering  perception.  Images  have  to  work  toward  
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subverting language itself,  the necessary condition for the explosion of  the authentic and unstable 
forces hidden beneath what he called “the human skin of  things, the derm of  reality”.  Artaud wants to 
cut this skin of  things, and his ideas lead to the eruption of  a psychic and spiritual reality. So the figure  
of  the cut,  the fissure,  becomes metaphorically  central in the  elaboration of  his pivotal  reflections 
about cinema.
Artaud’s denial of  narrative cinema and serious attempt at joining the activity of  the brain and the 
cinematic spectacle in the same visual event recalls Eisenstein’s ideas regarding cinema’s  relation with 
the  brain,  the  transformation  of  cinematic  language  according  to  this  almost  biological  and 
psychological goal, the modification of  the brain’s functioning by the cinematic experiences borne by 
new forms of  spectatorship. But, as Deleuze (1985/1989) notes, a remarkable difference needs to be 
pointed out:
In spite of  a superficial similarity of  words, there is, therefore, an absolute opposition 
between Artaud’s project and […] Eisenstein’s. It is indeed a matter, as Artaud puts it,  
‘of  bringing  the  cinema together  with  the  innermost  reality  of  the  brain’,  but  this 
innermost reality is not the Whole, but on the contrary a fissure, a crack. As long as he 
believes in cinema, he credits it, not with the power of  making us think the whole, but 
on  the  contrary  with  a  ‘dissociative  force’  which  would  introduce  a  ‘figure  of 
nothingness’, a ‘hole in appearances’. […] In short it is the totality of  cinema-thought 
relations that Artaud overturns: on the one hand there is no longer a whole thinkable 
through montage, on the other hand there is no longer an internal monologue utterable 
through image. It might be said that Artaud turns round Eisenstein’s argument: if  it is  
true  that  thought  depends  on a  shock which gives birth  to  it  (the  nerve,  the  brain 
matter), it can only think one thing, the fact that we are not yet thinking, the powerlessness to 
think the  whole and to think oneself,  thought which is  always fossilized,  dislocated,  
collapsed. (pp. 167-168)
- Bergson and La perception du changement: the extension of  the perceivable as the object of  art
After only a few years of  life, cinema was already seen as not only a medium of  mass entertainment,  
but also a technological instrument capable of  redefining the audience’s relations with external reality,  
their  abilities  and  perceptions,  and  the  human  biological  machine  as  a  functioning  whole  under 
continuous external and artificial stimuli. 
According to Bergson and Benjamin, such effects are not due to specific experimental techniques by 
individual  artists  seeking  to enhance  cognition  but  are,  rather,  intrinsic  effects  of  the  medium of  
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cinema itself  as it transforms the functioning of  both perception and the brain. For them, cinema is the 
language  of  the  new century  and,  like  every  technologically  important  transformation,  leads  to  a  
profound modification in conscious perception. 
In  his complex reflections on time, memory and perception, Bergson never tires of  explaining how 
human perception is strongly linked to the functioning of  the cinematic machine—an aspect of  his 
work  that  is  especially  important in  the  chapter  devoted  to  memory  disturbances  and  alterations. 
According to Bergson, the extension of  the perceivable is the key objective of  art. In The Perception of  
Change (1997) he writes: “What is the aim of  art if  not to show us, in nature and in the mind, outside of 
us and within us, things which did not explicitly strike our senses and our consciousness” (p. 135). 
Questioning the status of  perception and the centrality of  the concept of  reality, he builds a sort of 
visionary metaphysics, underlining how the limits of  our sensory perception could be enhanced by 
another form of  perception, aesthetic perception. Bergson hypothesizes that our conscious perception 
works  within  a  perimeter  constructed  by  the  conjunctures  of  particular  circumstances  (our  direct 
interests, our passions). The movement of  perception is one of  cutting and strongly resembles the 
functioning of  cinema: the frame implies a drastic separation between what is seen and what remains 
hors champ, and the movement of  the camera is simply the shifting in space and time of  a tool intended 
as a  dividing device that limits itself  to the visible part of  the spectacle. But what primarily interests  
Bergson is the functioning of  the cinematographic apparatus, its ability to recompose the movement of  
the shapes using only still frames by exploiting the mobility that does not exist in the images but in the  
machine; as he writes in Creative Evolution (1907/1944), 
The process […] consists in extracting from all the movements peculiar to all the figures 
an impersonal movement abstract and simple, movement in general, so to speak: we put  
this into the apparatus, and we reconstitute the individuality of  each particular movement 
by combining this nameless movement with the personal attitudes. Such is the contrivance 
of  the  cinematograph.  And such is  also that  of  our knowledge.  Instead  of  attaching 
ourselves to the in- ner becoming of  things, we place ourselves outside them in order to 
recompose their becoming artificially.” (p. 332)
So, it is precisely in the last chapter of  Creative Evolution (1907/1944) that Bergson discusses his theories 
of  cinematography in a more direct manner, analysing the “cinematographical apparatus” as a sort of 33
equivalence for discussing the path followed by the brain in its approach towards reality. The intellect,  
in  Bergson’s  view,  operates  through  several  spatializing  operations  which  continuously  fragment 
external stimuli in order to reach a (partial or complete) awareness of  them. This process is an incessant  
transformation of  the moving reality into a series of  static elements, because the intellect is able to  
express the movement of  reality only in fixed terms, as a chain of  single snapshots that allow us to 
recognize and metabolize every difference of  state. It is our attention, our cognition, that permits us to  
recompose these dispersed fragments into a perceptual whole. Our intellect is able to give movement to  
a reality in which all the single parts are disjointed; it constructs the illusion of  change as a continuity,  
even when the whole reality is a collection of  discontinuities. As the mechanical process of  cinema 
consists in splitting the fleeting reality into static snapshots, creating a series of  isolated fragmented,  
and static frames whose movement is created by the projector, Bergson finds it an apt analogy for the 
perceptual process itself, stating that:
Instead of  attaching  ourselves  to  the  inner  becoming of  things,  we place  ourselves 
outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it  
were, of  the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of  the reality, we have only to 
string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of  the 
apparatus of  knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this 
becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general.  Whether we 
would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than  
set going a kind of  cinematograph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have 
been saying in the conclusion that the mechanism of  our ordinary knowledge is of  a 
cinematographical kind. (p. 332)
As John Mullarkey (2009) writes, “Here is where the real irony lies, for Bergson has used film to model 
the ordinary mind even though he is interested in transcending the ordinary in inhuman forms of 
consciousness” (p. 97). 
The metaphor of  human knowledge and perceptual activities profoundly relates to the hierarchy of  the 
senses and leads to an analysis of  physical and mechanical perceptions as substantially indifferent. As 
Martin Jay (1993) notes: “In invoking this metaphor, Bergson seems to be making especially extreme 
claims about the tyranny of  the eye. Not only intellection, but all perception through whatever sense, 
he appears to be arguing, is inherently cinematographic in its ‘ordinary’ cognitive modes” (p. 198).
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and a misshapen, distorted and artificial one. This co-mingling of human and mechanical, organic and 
artificial, is one of  the main lines of  reflection that the arrival of  cinema put at the centre of  twentieth 
century  Western  thought.  It  seems  that  the  fundamental  legacy  of  Bergson’s  intuition  has  an 
inescapable point of  conclusion: human perception is not diminished by the concurrent development 
of  mechanical instruments; rather, art can enhance our perception by transforming it into something  
else, inscribing it in a process of  becoming that separates it from the contingency of  the present. This  
becoming other of  human perception is not related to an intrinsic difference with the cinematographic 
one; Bergson writes about a “difference of  nature” (describing the dissimilarities between the two kinds 
of  perception) that becomes a “difference of  degree” when the analysis is applied to works of  art. 
Each work of  art fires up distinct perceptual processes in us. This is what explains the differences 
between  classical  Hollywood and the  European schools  discussed  in  this  chapter:  while  American 
classics insist on proposing a model of  perception that limits itself  to the replication of  the common 
human one, the line that runs from Expressionism to some Russian and French directors (and that 
finds its apotheosis in the Sixties with such authors as Fellini, Antonioni or Resnais) tries to propose a  
model of  perception that becomes almost inhuman and that leads to an inorganic relation between  
images and the self. One of  the main goals of  this present work  is to analyse the geographical and 
historical inversion that happened with the end of  classical Hollywood and with the last eruptions of 
auteurism in Europe; after those years, it seems that a part of  American cinema started to deal with 
inorganic and de-humanized perception while the dictatorship of  auteurism pushed European cinema 
towards  the  normalization  of  narrative  and representational  models  extremely  similar  to  those  of 
mainstream classical American cinema.
- Walter Benjamin: the development of  cinema changes the perceptual apparatus
In  one  of  the  most  cited  passages  of  “The  Work  of  Art  in  the  Age  of  Its  Technological 
Reproducibility”, Benjamin writes: “Just as the entire mode of  existence of  human collectives changes  
over  long  historical  periods,  so  too  does  their  mode  of  perception.  The  way  in  which  human 
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perception is organized—the medium in which it occurs—is conditioned not only by nature but by 
history” (1936/2008, p. 23).  Here, he acknowledges how mechanical  and technological instruments 
transform the way human bodies perceive objects, forms and movements and thus almost necessarily  
affect the functioning of  the organic matter, developing completely different relations among senses 
and between senses and brain decrypting activity. 
Moreover, given that the formation of  subjectivity depends on the functioning of  our relational models  
with the outside world, a new structure of  the senses leads to a redefinition of  our subject formation.  
The  rise of  new  technologies  thus  implies  new  models  of  self-formation  and,  simultaneously,  a 
different  way  of  decoding  and  interpreting  the  surrounding  reality.  Benjamin,  analysing  the  new, 
primarily visual technologies of  photography and cinema, argues that:
in most cases the diverse aspects of  reality captured by the film camera lie outside only  
the  normal  spectrum of  sense impressions. Many of  the deformations and stereotypes, 
transformations and catastrophes which can assail the optical world in films afflict the 
actual world in psychoses, hallucinations, and dreams. Thanks to the camera, therefore, 
the  individual  perceptions  of  the  psychotic  or  the  dreamer  can  be  appropriated  by 
collective perception. The ancient truth expressed by Heraclitus, that those who are awake 
have a world in common while each sleeper has a world of  his own, has been invalidated 
by film—and less by depicting the dream world itself  than by creating figures of  collective 
dream. (1936/2008, pp. 37-38) 
Not  only  does  the  camera  alter  the  boundaries  of  subjectivity,  but  it  changes  the  boundaries  of  
consciousness/unconsciousness within the subject. Benjamin goes back to similar topics in his “Little  
History of  Photography”, when he writes:
For it is another nature that speaks to the camera rather than to the eye; “other” above all in 
the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to one informed by the 
unconscious. While it is common that, for example, an individual is able to offer an account 
of  the human gait (if  only in general terms), that same individual has no knowledge at all of 
human posture  during  the  fraction  of  a  second when a  person begins  to  take  a  step. 
Photography, with its devices of  slow motion and enlargement, reveals this posture to him. 
He first learns of  this optical unconscious through photography, just as he learns of  the 
instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis.  The nature that speaks to the camera is a 
different nature from the one that speaks to the eye […]: instead of  a space consciously  
elaborated by man, there is a space elaborated in an unconscious way. We are sure aware of 
how people walk, of  their gait; but we don’t know anything of  their behavior in the very 
second in which they quicken their pace. Photographs can show it to us in many ways. Only  
through  photographs  can  we  discover  this  optical  unconscious,  as  we  do,  through 
psychoanalysis, of  the instinctive unconscious. (1936/2008, pp. 277-279)
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Benjamin clearly refers to a totally different nature that is constructed through the activity determined 
by the specific features that distinguish cinema from other means of  communication. When he analyses 
the distinctive functioning of  such cinematic tools as close-up or slow motion, Benjamin highlights that 
– respectively –the psychological enlargement of  space and the widening of  the movement do not 
appear just as a magnifying glass of  known and learned moments and occurrences; it is an entirely 
unsuspected and unfamiliar facet: “Clearly, it is another nature which speaks to the camera as compared  
to the eye. ‘Other’ above all in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a 
space informed by the unconscious” (1936/2008, p. 37). 
Investigating the effects of  cinema on the realm of  human perception, Benjamin explains that with  
cinema, and through cinema, human beings are learning and enhancing a different mode of  vision, a 
changed perceptual grammar. Cinema is not only an instrument for the mirroring of  reality or, rather,  
for the visual duplication of  sensible data; it is a more sophisticated medium that gives shape to the 
historical period and plays an important role in determining its visual aspects and relations with visual  
perception.  This  fundamental  aspect  derives  directly  from the  way  cinema very  quickly  became  a 
popular shared medium of  communication, a part of  everyday life for an enormous portion of  the 
population.  The  wide  diffusion  of  cinemas,  the  relatively  low cost  of  tickets,  the  popularity  of  a  
medium that was both innovative and affordable, all these factors determined a perceptual fracture that 
spread across Western culture at the beginning of  the twentieth century. This decisive fracture was 
determined by two distinctions that cinema brings to the cultural arena:
1. cinema,  as  a  communicative  system that  seems  to  work  in  continuity  with  other  previous 
languages (photography and painting, but also literature and theater), brought a decisive fracture 
in cultural history, offering itself  as a technological evolution of  a discourse developed over 
time;
2. at the beginning of  its history, cinema did not propose itself  as art, and when some theorists 
introduced the artistic issue into this new discourse, the logics of  reproducibility elucidated by 
Benjamin shifted the ground of  analysis to its nature as a “medium” rather than an “art”.
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Obviously there is also a technological value that cinema contains and, simultaneously, injects into the 
perceptual negotiations of  the century. Recognizing that cinema is a technologically structured medium 
implies that several transformations are determined in the biological systems of  perception; being an  
exclusively visual medium in its first thirty years, sight became the privileged sense. The relation with  
perception and, in particular, with sight is of  great importance and determines a double transformation,  
a double movement, that contains both a constant bombing of  the spectator’s nervous system and a 
creation of  a distracted perception. Again in “The Work of  Art”, Benjamin explains: 
Reception in distraction - the sort of  reception which is increasingly noticeable in all areas of  art and is a  
symptom of  profound changes in apperception - finds in film its true training ground. Film, by virtue 
of  its  shock effects,  is  predisposed to this form of  reception.  In this  respect,  too,  it  
proves to be the most important subject matter, at present, for the theory of  perception 
which the Greeks called aesthetics. (1936/2008, pp. 40-41) 
Moving in the uncertain ground in which the medium and the artistic object are confused, Benjamin 
seems to introduce a paradoxical affirmation, insisting on the contradictory nature of  two opposite  
tendencies such as distraction (the suspension of  perception, its floating in an undetermined flow of 
unconsciousness) and shock (the acute, extremely focused contraction of  the perceptual system). He 
reconceives the nature of  human perception itself,  exploring the dynamic nature of  a transformed 
visual relation with the cinematic medium in which being exposed to a constant flow of  perceptual  
shocks necessarily  leads to a vague anaesthesia.  Benjamin obviously intends this idea of  shock not 
exclusively  as  a  personal  or  individual  modification  of  sensorial  perception,  but  as  a  collective 
occurrence  in  which  spectators  experience  a  more  radical  historical  mutation.  Benjamin  uses  the 
Dadaist avant-garde as an example for a better understanding of  the disruptive value of  a renewed 
conception of  artistic or communicative mediation, insisting on the revolutionary issues particular to 
film:
From an alluring  visual  composition  or  an enchanting  fabric  of  sound,  the  Dadaists 
turned the artwork into a missile. It jolted the viewer, taking on a tactile [taktisch] quality. 
It  thereby fostered the  demand for  film,  since  the  distracting element  in  film is  also 
primarily  tactile,  being based on successive changes of  scene and focus which have a 
percussive effect on the spectator.  Film has freed the physical shock effect—which Dadaism had  
kept wrapped, as it were, inside the moral shock effect - from this wrapping. (1936/2008, p. 39)
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The effect of  this analysis is immeasurable: the emphasis is on the audience, its reactions, the physical  
and psychological effects caused by sensorial contact with the new medium. The political value of  this  
cultural tendency is necessarily inscribed in all the moments of  fracture that punctuate the history of  
culture. And every technical revolution is the moment in which this usually hidden aspect becomes 
extremely visible and disruptive. In “Reply to Oscar A. H. Schmitz”, Benjamin writes: 
Among the points of  fracture in artistic formations, film is one of  the most dramatic.  
[…] with film a new realm of  consciousness comes into being. […] film is the prism in which 
the spaces of  the immediate environment—the spaces in which people live, pursue their 
avocations, and enjoy their leisure - are laid open before their eyes in a comprehensible, 
meaningful, and passionate way. In themselves these offices, furnished rooms, saloons, 
big-city streets, stations, and factories are ugly, incomprehensible, and hopelessly sad. Or 
rather, they were and seemed to be, until the advent of  film. The cinema then exploded 
this entire prison-world with the dynamite of  its fractions of  a second, so that now we 
can  take  extended  journeys  of  adventure  between  their  widely  scattered  ruins.  
(1936/2008, p. 329)
Benjamin  here  clearly  describes  a  radical  transformation:  what  film—as  a  medium—brings  to  the 
collective  perception  is  a  profound  modification  of  its  imagery.  Film  reshapes  the  audience’s  
relationship with the medium itself  and, in doing so, also alters the perceptual correspondence with  
reality. Film introduces a shifting in the common grounds of  perception, manifesting its nature as a 
constant and consistent medium that affects ordinary perception,  conducting the attention and the  
imagery to unprecedented symbolic places. 
To measure the actuality of  Benjamin’s intuitions we should re-contextualise his discourse with regard 
to the very profound transformations cinema has been going through in recent decades.  Benjamin  
formed his  analysis  with an eye to the  total  subversion of  the  optical  and theoretical  experiences 
introduced by the avant-gardes and by the intuitions of  Soviet directors and theorists.  If  Benjamin 
clearly affirms that film is a medium that determines subject formation through the inner structures of 
its  apparatus  and transformations  in  the  bases  of  perception,  then  the  updating  of  this  intuition 
necessarily  passes  through  the  redefined  physicality  of  contemporary  cinema.  The  passage  from 
analogical  to digital  implies  an evident subtraction of  the physical  level,  given that  the triumph of 
digital images necessarily contains a separation from the traditional physicality of  analogical images. 
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Nowadays we are witness to a cinema that has lost the materiality of  its reference; this loss increases 
expressive autonomy but also establishes new forms of  sensorial  relations. This  phenomenon of  a  
renewing of  perceptions has implication for the narrative dimension, as well. The frequent presence of  
perceptually dysfunctional characters in the movies analysed in this thesis is one of  the consequences of  
this  rethinking  of  perceptual  limits  and  possibilities.  The  condition  of  the  characters  becomes  a  
metaphor of  the audience’s experience if  we reflect upon the new hierarchies among the senses or on 
the new forms and modalities of  perception. 
One of  the first steps towards updating Benjamin’s intuitions came with the dawn of  sound cinema and 
the consequent definition of  the classicality of  American cinema. The advent of  a structured industry 
implied the recognition and the (economically determinant) fulfilment of  the audience’s tendencies and  
desires. The industrial nature of  film led to the formation of  a new spectatorial subjectivity, directly 
modelled  upon  the  communicative  and perceptual  paradigms  imposed  by  the  dominant  forms  of 
classical Hollywood. 
Benjamin was able to comprehend the nature of  this new spectator, a subject who understands just 
how porous the basis of  her/his subjectivity is; however, the mere acknowledgement of  this transitory 
condition means that  the spectator knows that  any possible  completeness  of  subjectivity  is  only a 
provisional condition that makes the viewer a fluid and unstable presence, continuously redefining the 
limits and activities of  her/his subjectivity and often responding to the stimuli arriving from the screen 
in a dialectical relationship that seems to be one of  the turning points of  contemporary culture.
Having arrived at the decisive turning point of  the Second World War,  it  is  possible to grasp the 
rationale for the approach taken in the first part of  this chapter. Among the theories and revolutionary  
approaches described in this sort of  parallel film history, there is a great absence which is, of  course,  
psychoanalysis and the myriad formulations derived from Freud. The absence of  any psychoanalytical  
analysis of  film-making or cinematic reception is connected to a theoretical effort that leads toward a 
primarily  cultural  analysis  of  such  issues  as  perceptual  modification  and  the  affirmative  use  of 
perceptual  afflictions  in  the  process  of  forming  a  dynamic  relationship  with  the  cinematographic 
40
medium. Since the first pioneering projections, cinema as an apparatus has always had the capacity to 
enter and modify the nervous system and the psychological organization of  the viewer. So, if  cinema 
has always worked – explicitly or not – as a cultural and psychological device that regulates a significant 
part of  the processes of  subject formation, a question arises as we analyse contemporary cinema and  
its  extensive  use  of  characters  suffering  from  perceptual  afflictions  and  subjects  whose  sensory 
relations to the external environment seem to be deeply informed by a vicious connection with the 
perceivable  realm: what kind of  subject  formation is  determined in these  movies? What image of 
reality and of  ourselves are these movies giving back to their audience? Which mental processes are 
enabled for the first time with images and narrative constructions that openly deal with afflicted beings 
and psyches? 
- After the Second World War: classic American cinema vs. European cinema 
According to Deleuze (1985/1989), the turning point of  twentieth century cinema comes with Italian 
Neorealism  which  emerged  during  and just  after  the  Second  World  War.  Following  André Bazin,  
Deleuze argues that the importance of  Neorealism lies not only in its political and social content, but 
especially  in  its  aesthetic  value  in  relation  to  “the  crisis  of  the  action-image”.  The  fundamental  
innovation of  directors such as De Sica and Rossellini is a redefinition of  the boundaries of  perception 
as perception becomes detached from the action and instead linked directly to thought. The roaming, 
ceaseless wandering of  Neorealist characters unhooks the image from the influence of  action, making 
it  directly  correlate  with  thought.  While  classical  realism  was  marked  by  a  precise  location,  a 
determinate setting disclosed by a certain action that is adjusted to or that alters it, Deleuze finds in 
Italian Neorealism the first attempt at a liberation of  sensory-motor concatenation and the ultimate 
moment of  crisis for the action-image. 
This shift  inaugurates a different approach to narrative cinema, beginning with the mechanisms of  
identification.  In  the  classical  age,  the  audience was  strongly  connected  to characters  whose main 
feature was the possibility of  a reaction to the situations they encountered; the spatial position of  the  
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viewer  was  strictly  outside  the  image,  and  the  only  possible  bridge  was  the  traditional  form  of  
identification in which the reaction that belonged to the characters was somehow shared by an emotive 
response or opposition. In the new approach inspired by Neorealism:
the identification is actually inverted: the character has become a kind of  viewer. He shifts, 
runs and becomes animated in vain, the situation he is in outstrips his motor capacities on  
all sides, and makes him see and hear what is no longer subject to the rules of  a response  
or an action. He records rather than reacts. He is prey to a vision, pursued by it or pursuing 
it, rather than engaged in an action. (Deleuze, 1985/1989, p. 3)
What interests us, however, is the peculiar perspective that Deleuze opens up when he notes that, in  
Neorealism,
the sensory-motor connections  are  now valid only  by virtue of  the  upsets  that  affect,  
loosen, unbalance, or uncouple them: the crisis of  the action-image. […] There is a new 
breed of  signs [that] refer to very varied images, memories of  childhood, sound and visual  
dream  or  fantasies,  where  the  character  does  not  act  without  seeing  himself  acting,  
complicit viewer of  the role he himself  is playing. (pp. 5-6)
What is subjected to the most radical evolution here is the human body, something that is reduced to  
being  little more than a sensory receptor, whose wandering is not directly determined by a physical  
reaction  but  rather  by  a  thought  mechanism that  is  triggered  by  mental  and interior  activity.  The  
movement ceases to merely be a spatial displacement and instead becomes a mental transfer, so the  
subject is transformed into a modulating element that is continuously metamorphosed depending on 
external stimuli and the surrounding environment. 
Thus,  according  to  Deleuze,  the  epistemological  crisis  of  the  Second  World  War  passed  through 
Western  cinema,  determining  a  transformation  that  was  subsequently  radicalized  by  the  French 
Nouvelle Vague and by the American directors commonly grouped under the label of  “Movie Brats” 
who were profoundly inspired by the Neorealist revolution and the subject-transformation experience.  
The  French  Nouvelle  Vague,  with  its  “politique  des  auteurs”,  represents  a  sort  of  resistance  of 
traditional  cinema  against  the  new position  in  which  the  medium found  itself  in  the  late  Fifties,  
besieged by television and forced to confront an economic and symbolic crisis that was transforming  
cinema and its relationship with the audience. Instead of  dealing with the possible evolutions contained 
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in cinematic structures and augmented by technical innovations, the Nouvelle Vague continued to focus  
on the specificity of  cinema, trying to maintain the best intuitions of  the previous European schools  
and avant-gardes. While television begins to work as the “cultural laboratory of  modern individuality” 
(Morin, 1957/2005), replacing the centrality of  cinema in the process of  specular subject formation, 
the “politique des auteurs” is positioned as the last form of  opposition to a certain kind of  cinema-
making and to considering the implications of  visual communication. 
The Nouvelle Vague, despite being the remains of  a fading cultural and social tradition in which cinema 
is the sun around which other media revolve, functions as a bridge between two different histories of 
cinema and two separate geographic groupings.  Before, with Truffaut,  Godard and their comrades, 
European cinema had always meant the power of  experimentation and the freedom to pursue sensory 
exploration  that,  starting  with  German  Expressionism and  culminating  in  Italian  Neorealism,  had 
adopted all  possible  strategies  in  order  to map and transform the obvious  mechanisms of  vision, 
reception and response. The threshold represented by the historical passage of  the late Fifties was a  
sort of  suggestion sent to the other side of  the ocean, soon taken up by a generation of  young film-
makers,  who  would  begin  new  exploratory  and  innovative  paths  inside  Hollywood—the  same 
Hollywood which, before the radical turn of  the late Sixties, had always stood for classical cinema.  
While  European  cinema  would  continue  in  the  comforting  and  somehow  deceptive  utopia  of 
auteurism, Hollywood would reinvent itself  and take a new course, developing many of  the intuitions  
that had been at the core of  the most provocative and challenging work of  European cinema in the 
first part of  the century. Of  course, many European directors (such as Antonioni and Robbe-Grillet)  
would  explore  these  expressively  revolutionary  motives,  and mainstream Hollywood cinema would  
continue to be the place where the canons and rules were handed down with well-known social and 
economic implications. But the tendencies became inverted, and even inside the mainstream studios’  
production a new approach towards cinema and perception emerged after the Sixties. 
Here, precisely at this turning point, the body ceases to be a mere receptor, a simple container for the  
senses and nerves, and becomes an active system that interacts with images in order to construct and 
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redefine individuality, states of  consciousness, different perspectives on reality and on itself. Time is the 
key factor, a factor which, released from the contingency of movement, finds a new task to complete: 
that  which Deleuze defines  as  the  construction  of  the  pure  and direct  image-time that  offers  the 
absolute perception of  unmediated time to the experience of  the viewer. Neorealism served as the 
catalyst  for  a  tendency  and  a  necessity  that  led  to  what  may  seem  an  impossible  objective,  the  
visualization of  time. As Roberto De Gaetano (2002), writes, “the power of  time can be injected into  
images only by means of  dissolving the organicity of  shapes: deframings, false link shots, aberrant 
movements are  just  some of  the possible  procedures through which to  convey,  through images,  the 
paradox of  an un-temporal time” (p. 169). 
What Deleuze detects in this time that is disengaged from movement has a decisive consequence: the 
pure manifestation of  time is the possibility for the image to be a simple presence liberated from the  
obligation of  representation. Of  course, giving a visual density to time means exploring all the paths 
that do not pursue the transparency of  time itself  (see also Bazin on transparent editing), which is one  
of  the most distinctive traits of  classical cinema. In order to show it in its unconditioned pureness, time 
needs  to  be  expunged  from  the  logics  of  fluidity  and  chronology;  time  has  to  emerge  with  its  
absoluteness forcing the linearity of  the assumed and shared representational forms and giving space to 
a  broken  narrative  from  whose  fissures  cinema  can  certify  the  death  of  objectivity.  Deleuze 
(1985/1989) writes:
As for the distinction between subjective and objective, it also tends to lose its importance, 
to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the motor action. We 
run in fact into a principle of  indeterminability, of  indiscernibility: we no longer know what 
is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but 
because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask. It is  
as if  the real and the imaginary were running after each other, as if  each was being reflected 
in the other, around a point of  indiscernibility. (p. 7)
Moreover, cinema’s loss of  its hegemonic cultural position after the Second World War, due to the 
multiplication of  different visual media, brought about profound changes in the function and position 
of  the  spectator.  Human  perception  was  reorganized,  moving  from  a  dictatorship  of  sight  to  a  
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other media. As Fabio Denunzio (2004) notes, during the first half  of  the twentieth century there had 
been an inexorable strengthening of  spectatorial subjectivity that allowed a continuous interaction with 
media under the supremacy of  cinema and the development of  a powerful cognitive domination over 
media objects; after 1945, however, the
cinematographic spectator […] is subjected to a process of  perceptive weakening and his 
subjectivity is increasingly in need of  an interaction with other forms of  medial perception 
(especially with a spectatorship that is mainly related to television and other forms deriving 
from digital elaboration) in order to reach its own individuality. (p. 169) 
There  emerged  a  cinema  that  somehow  certifies  the  impossibility  and,  more  significantly,  the  
unnecessariness of  a single and solidly structured plan of  perception, passing to the rethinking of  the  
whole sensory apparatus after the trauma of  the Second World War. The most radical consequence of 
all these transformations comes from a cinema that changes the habit of  watching into a perceptual  
disarticulation  in  which  the  senses  need  to  be  re-modulated  in  order  to  reach  a  higher  level  of  
awareness in regard to a visual language that ceases to communicate through only two senses and that  
reaches (or, better, strives to reach) a synaesthesia that erases the  hierarchy of  the senses itself. The 
disjointing of  the perceptual  mechanisms implies a stratified and multifaceted relationship with the 
visual and aural material. And this is exactly the point pursued by Deleuze when he writes about the  
indiscernibility of  imaginary and real, a moment of  sensorial incandescence in which cinema works as 
both the cause and the solution, being both the venom and the antidote. Cinema attests to this split 
between the self  and the world and, at the same time, strains to restore the erased relation in new forms 
and according to new epistemological rules. 
We are not far from some of  the intuitions that characterize Kracauer’s Theory of  Film (1960), explicitly 
the ones related to the weakening of  the spectator’s awareness in the peculiar realm of  perception that  
is the darkened movie theater. According to Kracauer, movies, and their specific mode of  projection, 
represent a reduction of  the audience’s relationship to a reality that, paradoxically, through cinematic  
representation, is  ransomed by the presence of  humanity.  In its  attempt at restructuring the world 
through images, cinema somehow returns to a timeless dimension in which pure sensation allows the 
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viewer to experience a different form of  reality, to participate in “the murmur of  existence” (p. 165).
It is precisely in this epochal passage that the foundation of  a completely new way of  thinking about 
cinema  was  incubated  in  Europe.  The  insistence  on  eccentric  and  unusual  themes  such  as 
hallucinations, memory disturbances, hypnosis, dream activity, forces the boundaries of  cinema and—
according to Deleuze—erases the restrictions of  classical  American cinema,  favouring a visual  and 
narrative composition in which the characters and the audience are caught in a perceptual environment 
of  “visual  and sound sensations (or tactile ones, cutaneous or coenaesthetic) which have lost their 
motor extension” (Deleuze, 1985/1989, p. 55). What distinguishes these kinds of  images is also their 
complete separation from any form of  objectivity because the starting point for these perceptions is 
not memory as a system of  recollection and, above all, recognition; this happens because the temporal 
perimeter of  this image-generation is characterized by a precarious and constantly changeable set of  
images which do not respond anymore to determined sound and optical symmetry but which, rather,  
move freely as in dreaming activity or in a condition abandoned to pure sensation. Time seems to have 
been freed from the dictatorship of  coherence and continuity, and perceptions and sensations seem to  
exist almost independently from mnemonic persistence or reliability.
- Cinema as a perceptual tool: affliction as enhancement 
There  are  several  reasons  for  the  strong  tendency  of  cinematic  language  towards  narrative  and 
perceptual realism; for example, Bazin (1958/1967) notes that the arrival of  sound implied a forced 
shift in the nature of  the cinematic image itself. The purity and absoluteness offered by the “naked”  
image was replaced by a constructed visual narrative in which, according to Bazin, editing was primarily  
responsible for a cinema that decided to go towards realism. The sound image, “far less flexible than 
the visual image, would carry montage in the direction of  realism, increasingly eliminating both plastic  
expressionism and the symbolic relation between images” (p. 33). Analyzing the difference between 
editing and decoupage (the latter being the visual mark of  the visual image), Bazin locates the key  
difference between the two great periods of  film history in the different techniques and procedures  
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related to the combination of  images and sequences: as Elsaesser and Buckland (2002) point out, 
The difference is that editing (unlike montage) is analytic, dramatic, and descriptive, that is,  
analyses  and  describes  the  filmed  event  according  to  its  inner  dramatic  logic.  Unlike 
montage, editing does not attempt to impose expressionistic meanings or distort the logic  
or spatio-temporal unity of  an event; it serves simply to alter emphasis and viewpoint. (p. 
197) 
Thus, we arrive at a tendency that seems to intimately belong to cinema and that goes beyond its mere 
material representation. It is the inner structure of  cinema, as understood by Benjamin, Bergson (and,  
as it will shown in the following chapter, in the works of  Bernard Stiegler), that can determine an 
experiential movement that gets ahead of  any signification and enters the realm of  the image.
The experiential approach insists precisely on this shift from image-action to pure optical situations in 
a complex redefinition of  spectatorial functions in which perception is subject to a deterritorialization 
caused by the automatism of  cinema. For this reason, “Anomalous states of  consciousness can be 
celebrated  rather  than  pathologised,  both  for  their  stylistic  innovations  and  their  impact  on  the 
audience who partakes of  their effective contagion” (Powell, 2007, p. 22). Cinema ceases to be a mirror  
in which the ordinary so-called reality is represented, transformed, sweetened or brutalized. As many 
avant-garde and experimental authors have demonstrated in previous decades, cinema can be a sort of 
perceptual switch that can permit entry into different temporalities and that can trigger the activation 
of  anomalous states in the mind of  the viewer. The main question is, again, about the appearance of  a  
time  whose  consistence  and  thickness  are  no  longer  measured  by  the  visual  obviousness  of  a  
movement that becomes action. Deleuze interrogates this suspension and opens up a fundamental  
distinction  that  explains  most  of  the  chronological  transgressions  and  infringements  which  are 
widespread in contemporary cinema. As Anna Powell (2007) points out, 
Deleuze  distinguishes  two  kinds  of  time.  Chronos  –  actual,  spatialised  time-  is  both 
measured and produced by the humanly invented clock. Aeon is the virtual existence of 
duration itself. Its transpersonal force is powered by the élan vital of  evolving life. Chronos 
organises on the present moment as basic unit and measures out the action of  bodies and 
causes. Aeon is the unlimited flow of  past into future. The present instant is  never fully 
present because it becomes past even as we try to grasp it. Aeon, which is always ‘already  
passed and eternally yet to come’ is the ‘pure empty form of  time’. We travel through the layers 
of  duration each time we seek to recall past events. (p. 140)
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“Duration” is the keyword, the main entrance to an experience unhooked from the contingency 
of  representation;  what  Deleuze  and  other  theorists  have  shown  is  the  substantial  
superimposition of  the human perceptual apparatus and the cinematic apparatus. It is not just a 
simple biological adaptation that forces human beings to readjust the borders of  their activities in  
order to remain anchored to the advancement of  time which brings innovations and progress (see 
also Cavell, 1979). It is the medium itself  that, when discovered and exploited, commands new 
instances and forces perception to enter inside the mechanism of  the device. As Serafino Gubbio  
(the  fictional  cinematograph  operator  in  Pirandello’s  novel  Si  gira,  1915/2006)  testifies,  the 
estrangement of  the spectator in front of  the screen is a different kind of  alienation, a subtle 
form  of  co-mingling  between  the  self  and  the  machine,  between  the  inner  rules  of  a  
technological element and a body that, besides having updated some of  its biological rules, alters 
its consciousness and comes to a suspended condition in which images are not simply images  
anymore. 
What is at stake in this discourse within and about contemporary cinema is, of  course, a description 
centred upon the crisis of the subject. The term “subject” itself  seems truly insufficient to describe the 
composite and unstable nature of  what we have become. Subject implies  a positionality, a solidification 
of  some aspects. Subjects are nowadays the transitory sites of  psychic and physical elements that find  
ephemeral  points  of  aggregation  around  a  body  that,  paradoxically,  is  the  result  of  a  continuous  
process  of  hybridization  with  the  mechanical  and  the  virtual.  Thus  we  have  travelled  far  from 
Aristotle’s principium individuationis to the actual condition of  mere support that receives and holds all the 
transitory states of  transformation determined by our relation with the technological environment, with  
a  sort  of  extra  subject  that  is  the  result  of  the  transitory  structure  of  every  single  state  of  
consciousness we experience.
Apart from considering the body as a physical and biological entity, the
body is a cultural construct lived by men according to imaginary modalities: it always suffers 
a  social  and  technological  determination  that,  ultimately,  also  becomes  a  historical  
determination. The awareness of  the body changes according to the epochs, but if  we 
would like to identify a regularity in this development, we could say that the man’s entire 48
history  can be described as the history  of  the progressive  artificialization of  the  body.  
(Caronia and Gallo, 1997, p. 98)
The new processes involving the radical modification of  the perception of  the world are also related to 
the extreme transformation connected to the human body: as cinema has often shown, there is always a  
direct  relationship  between  the  evolution  of  a  technology  and  the  perspective  constructed  and 
determined by the same technology and experienced by human beings. Cinema, according to Casetti’s  
Eye of  a Century (2005/2008),
taught us to look at the world as we had never been able to before […]: if  film reconquered  
and recast our manner of  seeing,  it  was not only because it  embodied the gaze of  the 
human  eye,  but  because  it  embodied  the  gaze  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  camera 
captured what lay before it in forms that revealed the attitudes and orientations with which 
people were compelled to look at the world around them”. (p. 8)
- The rhetoric of  contemporary cinema: an immersive visual experience 
Contemporary  cinema  is  marked  by  a  momentous  shift  that  is  usually  superimposed  onto the 
postmodern  turn;  in  his  important  book  L’ecran  post  moderne (1997),  Laurent  Jullier  identifies  the 
evolution  of  postmodern  cinema  with  the  advent  of  a  totally  different  relationship  between  the 
audience and  the screen. He argues that, in the Eighties, mainstream cinema was characterized by a 
tendency towards the solicitation of  the senses and to a stronger, more physical involvement of  the  
viewer. Cinema thus passed from a solid and well-established frontality of  cinematic spectacle to an 
“immersion” that gives the viewer the sensation of  drifting inside a realm of  images and sounds that 
ceases to relate only to sight and hearing, seeking to implicate the viewer with a whole-body stimulus. 
In his analysis, Jullier identifies significant innovations in the sound design of  cinema as one of  the  
main elements involved in this perceptual transition. The race for more complex sound in the movie 
theater leads from Dolby to DTS to THX, sound systems seem to reset  the spatial  and sensorial  
relationship between the movie and the viewer: 
Sound  is  the  principal  factor  in  turning  essentially  2D viewing  into  a  3D  experience. 
Following  on  from  the  introduction  of  a  Dolby  Stereo  in  the  mid  1970s,  other  
developments such as THX and digital sound systems have worked in extending the so-
called ‘off-screen’ space of  cinema, providing sound with depth and direction enough to 
make audiences feel as though the action is happening all around them. (Keane, 2007, p. 18)49
Jullier also notes a switch from “communication” to “fusion” (p. 71) in which the audience is immersed  
within the image itself, conveying a sense of  total envelopment within the visual environment without  
the need for explanation or to be shown more than necessary. This immersion offers the perceiver the 
possibility of  moving from a passive and merely receptive function to an engagement that leads to a 
“feeling of  first personness” (pp. 90-91). Indeed, the chain of  technological innovations over the century, 
from the advent of  sound cinema to Cinerama, CinemaScope and 3D in the 1950s, moved toward the 
direct and more effective solicitation of  the senses. The economic policies of  the studios and other  
leading companies in film production was marked by a constant effort to create a stronger emotional  
involvement of  the audience, an emphasis which often coincided with an increase of  the size and scale  
of  images and screens. 
Throughout the Eighties and the first part of  the following decade, Hollywood developed a uniform 
and  structured  language  that  radically  changed  the  way  of  communicating  with  the  audience:  
spectacular and mainstream productions, seen from the distance of  the time that has passed, show a 
similar explosive visual style, an effort that tries to put everything on screen and to offer the viewer a  
dimensionally stronger experience. The experiments with I-Max and Omnimax are just the tip of  an  
iceberg that is built around the goal of  surprising, shocking and immersing the viewer  inside a visual 
field in which there is no space for reflection or thought; all the emotions, every single action, need to  
be shown with a dimensional relevance and with a final effect that stuns and astounds the spectator 
who is sometimes surprised by the coexistence of  elements that were once linked together though 
montage inside a bigger frame. 
One of  the results of  the so-called postmodern transition of  cinematic language was a redefinition of  
the process of  cinematic identification. No longer is there the need to identify with a character who can 
mediate  the  experience  of  the  narrative,  providing  an  insider  perspective  to  facilitate  a  better  
understanding of  the events. Instead, there is a different mechanism of  identification, a process that  
becomes overwhelmed  by an excess of  visual and aural material and in which the quest for strong 
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emotional responses appears to be a necessary rule of  the game. In Jullier’s analysis, visual and sound 
dimensions work together in postmodern cinema in order to avoid a state of  anedonia, the absence of 
emotive  responses  in  the  viewer,  that,  according  to  several  theorists  as  well  as  trend  setters  in 
Hollywood, raises the potential menace of  an inured spectator who attends the narrative ceremony in a 
movie theater having already learned all the rules and tricks passed down from classical cinema. A new  
aesthetics is needed in order to shift the focus from comprehension to emotions, from a “you see”  
approach to a “you feel” one. 
This “in-your-face” intensity completely alters the linearity of  the connection between the viewer and 
the object.  As predicted by Benjamin and confirmed by Marshall  McLuhan years  later,  the radical  
modification of  the modes, the times, the possibility of  medial fruition are connected to technological 
transformations specific to each medium. If  theater was intended as a communicative event in which  
the spectator needed to be separated from the spectacle, then the conceptual line that ties together  
television,  virtual  reality and, consequently,  contemporary cinema (itself  deeply influenced by other 
visual  media)  tells  us  the  story  of  a  progressive  process  of  bringing  the  spectator  back  into  the 
spectacle. The symmetrical relation between creator and spectator, mediated by the eye, has collapsed,  
and the visual event is now a sort of  cognitive crash in which external stimuli overwhelm the perceptual  
apparatus.  
Perhaps  this  is  the  logical—and  provisional—ending  of  a  path  in  which  the  extension  and 
augmentation of  physical and perceptual capabilities and limits have run in parallel with the rules of  the  
market and economic necessities. The recent explosion of  digital 3D technology brings with it a series 
of  aesthetic and epistemological implications, but it is also very clearly an attempt by the film industry 
to bring spectators back to movie theaters in an epoch of  multiple viewing platforms. 
In  the  last  thirty  years,  cinema has  been  characterized  by  a  paradoxical  tendency:  a  palpable and 
profound crisis of  the entire dramaturgic and narrative system, a determinate impoverishment of  the  
mythopoetic  power  of  the  medium  and  its  protagonists,  which  has  been  overwhelmed  by  an 
extraordinary reinforcement of  the technological and structural elements of  the shooting, projection 
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and commercialization  phases  in  the  process  of  film-making.  Diminishing  inventiveness  has  been 
balanced by an extremely vertiginous progress in the forms of  exhibition, and this shift is the main 
element in a different approach towards images and cinema which is more focused on the viewer’s 
experience and its implications. 
Though various discourses and reflections on contemporary cinema converge in this diagnosis of  crisis,  
a more finely-grained analysis leads us to the genetic transformation experienced by the frame. The 
frame, the basic element of  the motion picture, has undergone a radical transformation that has led to 
new rules and new aesthetic imperatives: the influence of  digital technology and its visual implications  
implies a redefinition of  the margins of  the frame and the material contained within it as they seem to 
obey the law of  extreme filling.
The  influence  of  visual  special  effects,  the  possibility  of  continuous  transformations  in  the  post- 
production phase,  gives the frame a new status as an impermanent unity that somehow  knows that 
everything can be changed, transformed, erased with the aid of  digital effects. It is like an invisible  
haunting  that  inevitably  transforms  the  same roots  of  cinematic  language,  offering  the  chance  to 
conceive of  the frame as a mutant visual organism, as a protean element  that scientists are going to 
transform. 
The frame ceases to be a bounded unity, a closed space, a complete meaning platform, and becomes a 
single part of  a larger hypertext, virtually linkable to other images that exist somewhere else but not in  
the physical space of  the shooting stage. This happens, obviously enough, in the restricted forms of  a  
superficial hypertextuality, the only possible variation of  hypertext in cinema being the coexistence of  
different chronologies inside the same story, the multiplication of  virtual narrative levels, plots always 
more submerged in nonlinear sequences of  events. Titles such as Sliding Doors (Peter Howitt, 1998), The 
Usual  Suspects  (Bryan Singer, 1995) or  Amores Perros  (Alejandro González Iñárritu, 2000) show how 
cinema has moved beyond the realm of  merely technological contaminations, showing that something  
is happening at the narrative level as well. The digital database has exported the conceptual frame of  its  
structure, influencing the way we now consider narrative.
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The perception of  time and reality are strictly related, particularly because of  how variations of  time 
can infect every idea or perspective on reality or realities. From a specifically narrative standpoint, the  
transformation of  time as a variable element of  the fictional universe strictly relates to the appearance  
of  other,  differently  structured  medial  objects  inside  the  cultural  horizon.  The  modularity  of  its 
diversified occurrences is the direct effect on narrative strategies, a transformation that, of  course, has 
profound repercussions for the experience of  the audience. As Allan Cameron (2008) writes, 
The  characteristic  structures  of  modular  narratives  can  be  created  through  temporal  
fragmentation, through the juxtaposition of  conflicting versions of  events or through the 
organization of  narrative material  by non-narrative principles. In these films, narrational 
order […] may differ radically from story order […]. These divergences may even impede 
audiences’  efforts  to establish causal,  spatial  and temporal  relations within the story.  In 
many cases, they offer ‘flashforwards’ (rare in classical cinema) or flashbacks that are not,  
strictly speaking,  motivated by characters’  memories.  Arguably,  non-narrative spatial  and 
temporal systems are granted a role in structuring these films. In this respect,  the term 
‘modular narrative’ could be applied to digital media including computer games, hypertext 
narratives and the Internet, all of  which provide a more literal instance of  modularity. (pp. 
4-5)
Narrative cinema is absorbing the modular features of  other media, paradoxically maintaining its linear 
form  but  also  adopting  the  strategy  of  multiple  connections  among  different  discrete  temporal  
portions that are structured according a nonlinear path.
The  idea  of  a  nonlinear  and  malleable  time  is  not  exclusive  to  contemporary  narration  and 
epistemology. From Leibniz to Borges, time has often been the subject of  multi-layered fictional and 
theoretical  reflections:  the  incompossibility  theorized  by  Leibniz  or  the  forking  paths  of  Borges’s 
garden are there to communicate a complex truth: nothing is real anymore; there are no authentic or 
fake  perceptions,  only  perceptions,  and  the  tracks  of  linear  time  are  disappearing,  leaving  many 
narrations suspended in an absoluteness that misses every point of  contact with a representation of  
reality like the one the audience was used to during the classical period. When cinema (and narration in  
general)  loses  the  certainty  of  chronological  linearity,  the  consequence  is  the  disappearance  of 
truthfulness, though not because of  a relativism that is connected with the trite formula “each has its 
own truth”. Rather, 
It is a power of  the false which replaces and supersedes the form of  the true, because it 
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true pasts. Crystalline description was already reaching the indiscernibility of  the real and 
the imaginary, but the falsifying narration which corresponds to it goes a step further and 
poses  inexplicable  differences  to  the  present  and  alternatives  which  are  undecidable  
between true and false to the past. (Deleuze, 1985/1989, p. 131)
Undoubtedly, the  notable shift away from the norms and canons of  the classical age of  cinema has 
been centred on different thematizations and visualizations of  time and the alteration of  the experience 
of  spectatorship.  The  participation  required  of  the  new  generation  of  viewers  demands  basic 
knowledge of  different narration techniques and exploits the cultural evolution of  a society that has  
assumed the general logics of  the digital database and rhizomatic movement inside the hypertextual 
grid  as  a  spontaneous  activity.  Of  course,  there  has  been  a  notable  mutation  in  the  themes  that 
contemporary mainstream cinema deals with: there is more violence, more sex, more extreme situations 
and emotions. But it  is the overwhelming sensory stimuli  and the necessity of  an involvement that 
conveys inside the frame a new relationship between the audience and the movie itself.  As Elsaesser 
and Buckland (2002) highlight:
Advocates of  a ‘post-classical’ break would add that it is special effects, new sound design, 
and the bodily sensations of  the theme park and roller coaster ride which most clearly 
typify the aesthetics of  New Hollywood, and that horror, violent death and explicit sex 
have migrated from the B-movie  (and pornography) margin to the  mainstream centre. 
Together, these sensory stimuli and thematic preoccupations have changed the way films 
are designed and visualized, with the result that they are differently interpreted (or used) by 
audiences.  ‘Spectacle’  in this context would connote that such movies are ‘experienced’ 
rather than watched,  that  they offer a  fantasy space to ‘inhabit’,  rather than opening a  
window onto reality. The emphasis on sense impact and emotional contact makes it easy to  
think that story-telling no longer mattered in the way it used to during the period of  the 
so-called classical style. (p. 23)
- The mind becomes the brain: why contemporary cinema makes wide use of  perceptual dysfunctions
The same balance between stylistic  implications  and fictional  recreation  shows its  relevance  in the 
noticeable rise of  a sort of  a literary sub-genre, one that some critics have defined as the “neuronovel”  
(see Roth, 2009). These works share the narrative element of  one or more characters suffering from 
some form of  brain disease. What was once identified with the psychological novel or the novel of  
consciousness has now become—with a significant shift—the neurological novel, which is transversing 
diverse genres in recent  American and English literary  production.  The malfunctioning of  a  brain 54
becomes, for these writers, an opportunity to reflect upon the normal functioning of  the sane brain, in  
an inversion that is linked to the cultural shift determined by the emergence of  such disciplines as  
neurochemistry and the study of  consciousness.  Such titles  as Ian McEwan’s  Enduring  Love  (1997), 
Jonathan Lethem’s Motherless Brooklyn  (1999) or Mark Haddon’s  Curious Incident of  the Dog in the Night-
Time (2003) are just some of  the many novels devoted to different neurological anomalies and which, 
despite  dealing  with  different  syndromes  and  varied  literary  genres,  mark  a  turning  point  for  the 
narrative horizon of  contemporary fiction. 
The personal and individual  condition of  having a brain  disorder often becomes an allegory  of  a 
generalized condition, and the pathologies are developed both as metaphors for a universal state of 
suffering  and as  privileged perspectives  for  the  analysis  of  the  human condition as  a  whole.  The 
conditions described in these novels are often rare, so that the suffering of  the individual characters  
avoids any simplistic or reductionist interpretation, and, at the same time, point straight to neurology, to 
a  biologically  atomic  circumstance  where  individuality  becomes  impossible  to  close  within  a 
hermeneutic frame.
Of  course, the cognitive lack suffered by the characters is not shared by the readers, but some authors, 
such as Richard Powers (The Echomaker) or Rivka Galchen (Atmospheric Disturbances, 2008), try to balance 
scientific description with an accurate construction that pushes the reader’s point of  view towards the 
same “places” inhabited by the characters. The use of  language pushes the limits of  everyday rhetoric  
and follows experimental  paths with the intention of  building a mental  frame containing both the 
characters and the readers.
The  substantial  loss  of  the  subject  becomes  the  new  focus  of  novels  that  have  abandoned  the 
modernist perspective of  the psychological novel informed by Freudian theories. The cultural trend of 
contemporary  mythmakers is  to absorb scientific  intuitions  and transform them into narrative and 
fictional coordinates. Marco Roth (2009) writes:
What’s strange is that science, as it moves in the direction of  a total redescription of  the 
mind in terms of  the brain, may merely be replicating and systematizing the earlier insights 
of  the psychological novel. […] Surely the way for a novelist to be a neuroscientist today is 
still to anticipate rather than follow the discoveries of  brain science. It would be no surprise  
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if  a  novelist  could  still  describe  and mimic  traits  of  cognition that  neurology can’t  yet 
experimentally confirm.
What Scott Bukatman (1993) describes as the three ego-smashing historical moments (the Copernican 
revolution, Darwin’s theories, Freud’s theories—all of  them regarding a discontinuity between man and 
nature) were followed by a profound discontinuity that put the status of  the body in a condition of 
permanent crisis, between man and machine. Narrative reacts to this condition of  crisis by entering a  
state  in  which new relational  mechanisms need to be explored.  According to  Bukatman,  we  have  
entered a  historical  phase  in  which  the  human body  still  determines  most  of  our  perceptual  and  
cognitive relations with so-called reality while, at the same time, experiencing a definitive crisis, a crisis  
that is related to its functioning, to its very being as a tangible ‘object’, to its loss of  relevance in the  
processes and procedures of  the technoscape. The embodiment  of  the mind (see Lakoff  and Johnson, 
1999)  radically  redefines  the  hierarchical  structures  of  subject-formation  or,  rather,  of  subject-
dissolution: 
The  body,  here,  exists  only in  phenomenological  terms:  it  perceives  and  it  moves  (a 
reductive and utopian version of  Merleau-Ponty’s model of  subject-construction, which 
eliminates the mortal  limitations of  a physical  body).  Through the construction of  the 
computer  itself,  there  arises  the  possibility  of  a  mind  independent  of  the  biology  of 
bodies, a mind released from the mortal limitations of  the flesh. (Bukatman, 1993, p. 208) 
A new body requires new representations, new narrative strategies focused on the redefinition of  the 
boundaries  of  what  we  can  still  call  ‘human’.  And it  is  exactly  along  these  boundaries  that  new 
discourses about the body, subjectivity and failures of  perception are arising. In contemporary cinema, 
bodily pathologies are primarily pathologies of  the self  and mainly coincide with a perceptual apparatus  
that needs to re-organize its procedures while contemplating the impossible task of  a complete and 
wholly  comprehending  relationship  to  the  outside  world.  This  presents  problems  concerning  the 
characters of  these narratives and, in many instances, the spectators who find themselves caught in a 
subverted and extended relationship with the screen and the usual practices of  viewing. This difficulty 
explains the aforementioned “rise of  the neuronovel” and the impressive number of  films made in the 
last twenty years which are directly linked with pathologies and perceptual afflictions. These illnesses  56
and disturbances do not simply build a damaged subject whose consciousness or identity is merely 
fragmented or devastated but, rather, can also work as a new perspective on the surrounding context.  
As Thomas Elsaesser (2009) points out,
these apparently damaged minds and bodies are capable of  displaying remarkable faculties  
at  times,  being  in  touch  with  agents  from  another  world  (The  Sixth  Sense),  intuiting 
imminent disaster (Donnie Darko), or starting popular protest movements (Fight Club). Their 
disability functions as empowerment, and their minds, by seemingly losing control, gain a  
different kind of  relation to the man-made, routinized, or automated surroundings, but 
also to the more “cosmic” energies, which usually center on the new physics of  time travel,  
curved  spaces,  stochastic  systems,  and  warps  in  the  universe.  In  other  words,  these 
pathologies are presented to the spectator in some sense as productive pathologies. (p. 31)
Perhaps these bodies and minds are simply repositioning their own selves inside a highly technologized  
environment, trying to renegotiate the issues intimately connected with the boundaries of  the self  and 
the  surrounding  world.  The  possible  readings  of  this  transformation  can  be  different  and  not  
necessarily exclude each other. It is extremely evident how Benjamin’s intuitions about the disciplinary 
systems which cinema helps build  are  becoming implemented. The senses  have been “trained” by 
classical cinema to adapt to a defined relation between the self  and the world, and just when the socio-
economic condition of  cinema production and distribution are being profoundly rethought, the great  
Western narratives gain a new meaning by adopting a large number of  pathologies involving the mind 
and consciousness. This seems to be a simple updating of  a strategy that we can find throughout the 
entire history of  Western cinema. Benjamin certainly affirmed that one of  the main aims of  cinema is  
to protect the subject from the extreme shock produced by the contact with technologized civilization:  
the  duplication  of  the  external  reality  and  its  pleasurable  repetition  on  the  screen  facilitate  the  
continuous adjustment of  our senses. Cinema, taking on the work of  tutoring our perception, avoids  
extreme traumas and upheavals.
Nowadays, the perceptual and sensorial storm that marks the present condition of  communication is  
somehow canalized in distorted and displaced narratives that reinforce the sense of  menace and, at the 
same time, seem to offer the subject the possibility of  new forms of  mirroring, of  different strategies  
for relating to external reality, of  new hierarchies among the senses and between mind and body. 
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It  is  not  unexpected  that  great  narrations  of  contemporaneity  are  welcoming  such  important 
transformations experienced by the concept of  identity. As Stuart Hall (1996) writes,
identities are about questions of  using the resources of  history, language and culture 
in the process of  becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came  
from’, so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how 
that bears on how we might represent ourselves. Identities are therefore constituted 
within, not outside representation. […] They arise from the narrativization of  the 
self,  but the necessarily fictional  nature of  this process in no way undermines its 
discursive,  material  or political  effectivity,  even if  the belongingness,  the ‘suturing 
into the story’ through which identities arise is, partly, in the imaginary (as well as the 
symbolic) and therefore, always,  partly  constructed in fantasy, or at least  within a  
fantasmatic  field.  Precisely  because  identities  are  constructed  within,  not  outside, 
discourse,  we  need  to  understand  them  as  produced  in  specific  historical  and 
institutional  sites  within specific  discoursive  formations and practices,  by specific 
enunciative strategies. (p. 4)
The disappearance of  one of  the fundamental issues related to the essence of  cinema, the signature of 
reality impressed on film, inevitably leads to the sense of  an absence, of  a void. Cinema has always 
worked as an apparatus in which reality leaves its marks, giving the medium both a spatial and temporal  
meaning. The space of  the frame as a duplication of  the reality built in front of  the camera, or simply  
existing  behind  it,  offers  the  most  obvious  and  still-relevant  example  of  the  direct  relationship 
constructed  by the  intrinsic  structure  of  photographic  and analogical  specularity.  Moreover,  when  
Bazin  (1958/1967)  wrote  about  the  mummification  of  time  permitted  by  cinematic  language,  he 
intended to fix the essence of  an art that could arrest the indistinct flow of  time, capturing the passing  
of  time and offering the illusion of  control above and beyond chronologies and history. Nowadays, at a 
historical  moment  in  which  cinema  thrives  on  an  absence  of  reality,  a  disappearance  of  all  the 
ontological  contaminations from reality,  the lack of  a depicted reality  is  reversed in a fundamental 
question: what kind of  connection with the external  and surrounding reality could be offered by a 
cinema in which space and time have undergone such a significant overturning? When cinema is not 
contaminated by reality at any ontological level, what kind of  image of  reality can cinema give back to  
us? Following the main shift towards a visual language totally separated from reality, it seems almost 
spontaneous  that  contemporary  cinema offers  a  misperception  of  reality,  or,  at  least  a  conflictual  
relationship  with  those  parameters  of  reality  which,  in  the  pre-digital  age  of  cinema,  were  rarely 58
questioned or subverted.
As  Deleuze  explains,  the  relationship  between  the  categories  “cinema”  and  “reality”  requires  an 
updating in which it becomes clear that reality is not a stable and unified entity but rather a continuous  
becoming in which cinema represents a modulation of  the real. This is what leads to the conclusion 
regarding  the  intrinsic  coincidence  between  image  and  reality.  Image  is  reality,  because  reality  
“differentiates  itself  in  the  actuality  of  movement-image and in  the  virtuality  of  time-image”  (De 
Gaetano, 2002, p. 39).
One of  the main keys to this brand new mutual relationship is offered by the complexity of  narrative  
lines,  or  by  the  dispersion  of  chronologies  throughout  the  plot.  Telling  stories  about  traumatized 
characters  and  affected  senses,  these  movies  constantly  try  to  redefine  the  limits  of  identity  and 
consciousness,  both subverting the senses’  hierarchies beyond the screen and among the audience. 
While the phrase “losing the plot” usually refers to a condition of  suffering related to memory and its 
activities,  it  could also be an appropriate  label  for a strong tendency in contemporary Hollywood, 
something that derives from its European avant-garde inheritance and that was brought to its apogee  
by the world wide success of  Quentin Tarantino’s  Pulp Fiction  (1994). American independent cinema 
has  often  adopted  a  narrative  strategy  built  upon  a  systematic  violation  of  the  mainstream rules,  
privileging a fragmentary structure of  time and a combinative logic of  image and plot composition.  
The death of  Vincent Vega in the middle of  Pulp Fiction and his narrative resurrection in the last part of 
the movie mark the acceptance of  a once-limited narrative strategy within the main field of  popular 
and mass culture.
The passage toward increased complexity is marked by a transformation that affects both cinema and 
other mass media, such as television, videogames and, to a smaller degree, literature. The passion for 
textual complexity automatically leads to the requirement of  a different effort from the audience. The 
reasons of  this epic shift are varied and multi-faceted: the emergence of  different visual systems of 
communication and entertainment forces cinema, around the beginning of  the Nineties, to rethink its 
position inside the mediascape,  focusing obsessively on complex plots and puzzling narratives. The 
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totally  new mediascape  updates  Benjamin’s  intuitions  about  the  connection  between  technological 
innovations and the biochemical transformations of  human body. Moreover, while the classical age of 
cinema in the United States is indelibly marked by the transparency of  its  mise en scène and the self-
sufficiency of  its plots, films related to characters whose cognition and senses fail to achieve their usual 
and ordinary mission insert a hole into the story and—if  the director decides to risk it—make the  
audience share this lack that is the frame of  the entire operation. Filling in the void and closing the hole  
is a strong trend in contemporary Hollywood, and a passive and non-receptive viewer inevitably fails if 
s/he tries to follow and experience such complex and puzzling images using an outdated approach. As  
Steven Johnson (2005) notes, “Like those video games that force you to learn the rules while playing, 
part of  the pleasure in these modern […] narratives comes from the cognitive labor you’re forced to do 
filling in the details” (p. 77). 
Hollywood  has  always  relied  on  the  audience’s  fascination  with  stories  revolving  around  a  certain 
ambiguity or with different levels of  meaning-making: the accessibility of  classical Hollywood texts was  
a precise strategy aimed at the fulfillment of  all of  the audience’s expectations and desires. The growth  
of  a totally renewed context of  reception, determined by the massive multiplication of  media, and the 
subsequent adaptation of  human cognitive structures to the transformed visual environment is one of 
the main causes of  the industry’s attempts to regain its lost position of  prominence and hegemonic  
power over the representational noesis of  a large part of  the audience. The emergence of  videogames, 
television and the Internet as platforms in which narrative strategies are remediated and spectatorial  
contracts are re-stipulated has made it necessary for Hollywood: to update its own narrative strategies  
in order to remain the leading media commodity in contemporary world. 
- Every new technology carries within it a new perceptual affliction. The crisis of  contemporary cinema in the 
contemporary visual-scape
The modification of  the visual environment and of  the technology itself  has always meant a constant  
rethinking of  the dramatic and linguistic frames adopted by cinema. The crisis of  the subject finds its  
visual representation in the transformation of  subjective vision, a perspective upon reality that becomes 
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ambiguous,  fragmented,  uncertain.  Perhaps  it  was  with  David  Cronenberg’s  Videodrome  (1983)  that 
cinema embarked on a different  path from among the possibilities for representing consciousness:  
adopting  technology  as  an  extension  of  the  actual  perimeters  of  consciousness  means  the 
transformation of  the  dynamics  for  cinematic  representation  of  the “human-reality”  relation.  The 
explosion of  new technologies and the effort made using cinematic language and productive structures  
in  order  to  keep  pace  with  contemporary  innovations  meet  in  the  profound  transformations  of 
strategies for subject-narration. 
There are certainly political, socio-economic implications in such processes, perhaps chief  among them 
Hollywood’s  desire  to keep the  audience’s  attention  by offering  challenging representations  of  the 
subject  that works both as a mirror and as a model to follow. Moreover,  the increasing impact of 
Hollywood movies on global culture implies the imposition of  cultural and social patterns that shape 
the perception of  the present in different ways. But cinema does not necessarily work as an instrument 
of  mass mind construction but rather as a visual event that spreads the perception of  the profound 
transformations determined by the wide diffusion of  digital and immaterial technologies. The crisis of  
contemporary cinema is consequently experienced as a radical rethinking of  the perceptual categories 
that have guided the relations audiences have had throughout the history of  cinematic spectatorship. 
Narrative does not represent simply an ornament, a superfluous issue in the process of  structuring a 
society;  rather,  it  is  a  fundamental  artefact  that  individuals  use  to facilitate  a  simplification of  the  
complexity of  the social experience (see Bruner, 1991). Transformations of  societies determine (and 
are determined by) the evolution of their narrative constructions, and the technological development 
that rewires present-day societies is mirrored in the narrative forms and structures of  contemporary 
life. It is more than evident that in the passage from the Eighties to the Nineties the impact of  digital  
technologies on our everyday lives radically mutated the narrative horizon of  cinema and literature. But 
the same can also be said about previous decades: the first societies completely immersed in televisual  
culture  experienced  the  dramatic  conflict  between  linear  and  alphabetic  information  and  the  
simultaneous and electrical  one proposed by television.  The expansion of  the consciousness is the 
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fundamental  guideline  that  leads  individuals  towards  an  enlargement  and  an  intensification  of 
perception. A new organization of  memory and knowledge seems to redefine the relationship between 
a multiplied self  and the outside world. 
Perception becomes the cultural  and psychological  plane where most of  the modifications happen, 
ceasing to work just as a membranal interface that allows living beings to recognize the external world,  
making  it  readable  and  understandable;  instead,  it  is  the  permeable  border  where  the  differences 
between external and internal reality collapse in a sort of  diffused psychosis that, rather than being an 
illness, is a permanent condition that signifies:
the effects of  the new disciplinary machines of  which they are the early warning systems,  
heralding the next step after internalizing (bourgeois) self-discipline and self-monitoring, 
where it would no longer be the mind – not even the Freudian mind, with its unconscious  
and superego competing for control – that is in charge, but instead, where the senses, the 
sensations, affects, and the body are the ones that are being direct ly addressed, stimulated, 
and appealed to, and thus “organized” and “controlled,” in order to fit the subject into the 
contemporary  world and the social  matrix of  “affective  labor”.  (Elsaesser,  2009,  p.  32, 
citing Hardt and Negri, 2001) 
In the contemporary age of  revolutionary technologies, the increasing interest in narratives connected 
with  perceptual  afflictions  could  be  read  as  the  discomfort  of  a  cinema dealing  with  the  radical  
transformation of  its productive and communicative model. The huge importance of  videogames or 
new forms of  reality  augmentation are affecting  the contemporary mediascape.  The previous,  pre-
television dominance of  cinema among visual media has been discussed within completely renewed 
relational  models converging in the meta-strategy of  interactivity.  New schemes and new forms of 
vision are pushing the  borders of  cinematic  narrative and representation strategies.  It  is  extremely 
important to avoid easy equations in which the intertwining of  cinema and its outside are described or 
interpreted following a deterministic  account.  A glimpse into the debate in film theory during the 
Seventies offers two interesting perspectives: from a methodological point of  view, the approach of  
Pierre Sorlin seems the most balanced and, perhaps, the most useful for this research. According to 
Sorlin,
a film, before showing us the interests and orientations of  a society, shows us the horizon 
of  thought along which it travels. Before telling us what a given society chooses to portray,  62
a film tells us what is considered portrayable. Thus, Sorlin posits the idea of  the visible, by 
which he designates what filmmakers consider  easily  presentable and what viewers can 
easily perceive. The result is to bring into focus both the kind of  ‘image’ a culture uses to 
portray  reality  and  the  idea  of  the  ‘image  of  reality’  a  culture  possesses.  (Casetti, 
1993/1999, p. 299)
It is widely acknowledged that Cronenberg’s Videodrome (1983) shifted the limits of  the visible, showing 
all the ongoing processes that were transforming cinema and image-viewing at the beginning of  the 
Eighties. Creating a movie in which the separation between the Self  and the outside, the subjective and 
the objective, reality and hallucination is totally erased, Cronenberg focuses on the body and transforms  
it into the  place in which mind and machine find an ideal interface in the process of  extending their  
respective influences and boundaries. In a movie strongly affected by McLuhan’s theories and marked 
by  the  presence  of  a  character  (the  tele-messiah  Brian  O’Blivion)  clearly  inspired  by  him,  it  not 
surprising that Cronenberg, with a raw corporeal power, shows how technological capabilities have 
become “the extension of  man” (McLuhan, 1964). Cronenberg adapts his poetics of  biological and 
venereal horror to a definition of  new standards for the depiction of  the transformed subject. Media  
and biology converge in the formation of  a renewed self  that extends beyond the physical borders and 
range of  action of  the nervous system: an enhancement of  the brain that, according to McLuhan,  
should  allow  human  beings  to  gain  stronger  control  over  the  surrounding  reality.  As  professor  
O’Blivion solemnly affirms at the beginning of  Videodrome,
The  battle  for  the  mind  in  North  America  will  be  fought  in  the  video  arena  –  the 
Videodrome. The television screen is the retina of  the mind’s eye. Therefore the television 
screen is part of  the psychical structure of  the brain. Therefore whatever appears on the  
television screen emerges as raw experience for those who watch it. Therefore television is  
reality and reality is less than television.
It  is  extremely  easy  to  recognize  McLuhan’s  theories  behind  the  prophetic  appearance  of  this 
mysterious theorist who refuses to appear  live  and who communicates only through videotapes. But 
what interests us is the entire representational process that Cronenberg engages in with Videodrome. His 
visual strategy, indeed, is completely internal to the cinematic language and works with the meaning and 
legibility  of  images,  never explaining what is to be considered “real” and what,  on the contrary,  is  
narratively explainable as a hallucination experienced by Max Renn or the other characters. The effect is 63
decisive, as the distortion of  perception slowly infects the whole narrative. As Bukatman (1993) writes:  
“These confusions, between reality, image, and hallucination, pervade the film. There is no difference in  
the cinematic techniques employed, no ‘rational’ textual system, which might serve to distinguish reality  
from hallucination for the film viewer” (p. 91). This ambiguous collocation of  the hallucinatory frame 
pushes the audience toward a complex perceptual realm in which the unbelievable becomes the rule  
and every image seems to be contaminated with this inner uncertainty. The audience is pushed into a 
condition of  wholly subverted spectatorship in which their perceptual system is led to the same spot 
inhabited by the overwhelmed character of  the movie. 
Starting with the first contagion experienced with the Videodrome signal, the presence of  Max Renn  
coincides with a spreading hallucinatory  state that,  substantially,  prevents the audience from clearly 
distinguishing the reality levels of  the narrative. 
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2   I Don’t Remember, I Don’t Recall 
- From Locke and the continuity of  memory to the expanded state of  amnesia
Lockean theories of  selfhood locate it exclusively in the continuity of  memory: for Locke, if  someone 
does not remember anything about his/her past, s/he has, literally, no identity. Identity seems to be the  
extension of  consciousness backward in time; whatever can be remembered of  a lived past belongs to  
identity and gives it a shape that guarantees a persistence in time. Unremembered past experiences are  
not part of  identity. According to Locke, forgotten past experiences are excluded from identity because, 
in his view, a person is always conscious of  what s/he thinks and remembers. The person maintains  
her/his identity and individuality if  the subject “consider[s] itself  as itself, the same thinking thing, in 
different times and places” and when “consciousness extends backwards to unite thought and action” 
(Locke,  1690/2004, p. 267).  It  is  consciousness that works together with thought to determine the 
perimeters  –  in  space  and  time  –  of  the  person,  of  the  persistence  of  subjectivity.  Thus,  if  
consciousness does not recover something from a recent or distant past, this missing part is not part of 
the person anymore. So the conclusion is that identity cannot be intended as a fixed or unchanging 
entity but rather a dynamic aggregation of  different, continuously updated memories that incessantly  
transforms itself. 
The substantial identification between memory and self  separates Locke from the Western tradition he 
comes after because, instead of  placing the self  in the consciousness of  the thinking process, he adopts 
the vision of  a consciousness that can go backwards in time. If  unremembered experiences, thoughts 
or actions should not be assumed to be automatically part of  identity, the consequence is that identity  
and selfhood are not related to the continuity of  the body or mind. This is why a case of  amnesia,  
according to Locke, is a signal of  the loss of  identity. 
The aporias contained within it (the knowledge of  the self  as a construction made a posteriori) did not 65
prevent Locke’s  theory  about the perfect  identification of  memory with the self  from being quite 
influential  during  the  following  centuries.  Hume,  for  instance,  in  his Treatise  of  Human  Nature  
(1740/1978),  reinforces  this  assumption,  assigning  to  memory  the  faculty  of  making  the  causal 
relations that lead to a determinate circumstance clear to the subject. Hume identifies knowledge with  
memory or with present perception of  facts, giving new shape and actuality to Locke’s ideas. In both  
philosophers, a particular concept recurs: if  identity can be extended to a memory that can include 
events that – whether or not they actually happened – are remembered by the subject, this activity  
relates to a form of  self-narrative. Of  course, according to Hume, memory works as a place  in which 
previous (actual  or fake,  real  or  invented) occurrences are pieced  together,  whereas,  in  the system 
erected by Locke, memory is the guarantee of  the existence of  the self, the mirror from which the 
subject reproduces its experiences. While there may be different movements and different directions in 
their conceptualizations, there is a common trust in the self-defining power of  memory and in the  
narrative value of  the ability to remember.
Given that Locke is the most relevant point of  departure for every theory about memory until the  
nineteenth century, it is absolutely clear that, since its birth, cinema has been profoundly indebted to 
Lockean theories of  memory. Classical cinema continued and reinforced this relationship, building an 
entire system for the visual representation of  memory which was premised on the solidity of  selfhood 
and the manifestation of  memory as a confirmation of  the continuity of  the remembering self.
It is obvious that the way we feel about and perceive ourselves is strongly linked to our memory; if  
something challenges, alters, erases or disturbs our memories, our sense of  identity is deeply menaced.  
This  happens  when  we  perceive  our  memory  as  a  reconstructed  phenomenon,  the  result  of  a 
combination of  different elements (emotions, images, sounds, interpretations, ours or other people’s re-
loadings of  facts).  Our sense of  self  is challenged when we understand that we never possess our 
memories,  that,  on the contrary,  we are part  of  them, because memory is  never inside but always 
outside ourselves. Locke, (as well as Hume and Hobbes) wrote about memory as a sort of  private  
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property,  as  something  that  belongs  to  us  and  which  nobody  can  transform  or  steal.  When  we 
remember something that happened to us in our past, we discover ourselves in the unique position of  
subject and object of  the same remembering process. We are, in a way, telling a story in which we are 
narrators and characters, about an experience we lived, facts that happened to us; thus, it is difficult to  
consider memory as a cold, distant tool useful only for recalling something. 
Memory has often been defined as an act that creates unity from chaos, a unity in which there is a  
subjective and objective identity that Western culture has named “Self ” and “World”. These are not a  
reality in themselves but rather constructions by a memory that discovers actions, thoughts, feelings  
that belong to a self  and that puts experiences and events that would otherwise be lost in a perceptual  
chaos into a coherent and continuous order (the World).
Moreover, intended this way, memory undergoes a process of  objectification: it  becomes an object  
closed in the drawer of  the skull. This objectification implies two relevant aspects: firstly, the fact that  
memory, rather than having the structured and closed shape of  an object, is actually an open process, a  
continuous becoming that is never concluded, is forgotten; secondly, the dynamics of  interchange that 
memory has not only with the brain but with the entire body, with the whole system of  senses, become 
irrelevant. The localization of  memory solely in the mind implies an objectification and, in a certain  
way, a mummification of  the remembered event (or sensory experience) that becomes a sort of  dead 
body ready to be autopsied and exhumed every time the subject feels the urge or the necessity of  doing  
so. The dislocation of  memory is a complex phenomenon that both multiplies the bodily connections 
between  the  remembering  subject  and  her/his  private  archive  of  memories  and  reconfigures  the 
unbalanced relationships with the social and cultural context. The traditional definition of  identity – 
and its one-way connection with memory-related issues – does not consider the possibility of  a broader 
and less individual process of  memory formation. 
The possibility of  reshaping the physical boundaries of  memory activities implies a redefinition of  the 
scale and the practices of  their representations. Of  course, memory has more than one connection with  
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the main theme of  identity. Autobiographical memory, for instance, perfectly exemplifies the paradox 
of  this relation: it seems to be something that exclusively belongs to the owner of  the memory itself,  
but it is the result of  a continuous process of  formation that more closely resembles a patchwork, a 
composite  structure  in  which  many  different  memories,  public  and  private,  social  and  personal,  
converge in order to determine an unstable point of  equilibrium between collective and individual. As 
new medical technologies intensify the possibility of  “entering” the hidden parts of  our body, human  
beings  experience  a  bizarre  condition  of  losing  the  boundaries  of  what  is  absolutely  private  and 
inaccessible.  Public  and  private  dimensions  are  continuously  challenged  as  solid  and  immutable 
categories and, more importantly, lose their spatial scope, their physical limits. Private and public are  
everywhere, in a spatial continuum that determines a process of  dislocation and relocation of  what had 
once been absolute and inviolable limits.  This,  obviously,  leads to a redefinition of  the connection 
between private or individual memory and the definition of  an identity. 
What is the connection between mind and memory? The history of  twentieth century thought tells us 
that it is neither useful nor correct to identify the two elements, but perhaps it is possible to analyse the 
possibility that memories exist absolutely independently from the mind. Tomas Maldonado provides a 
few examples: genetic memory, inscribed in our DNA, and immunological memory that belongs to 
antibodies are biological manifestations of  this extended definition of  memory. But there is also the 
epistemologically decisive issue of  memory in relation to computers, tools which store an enormous 
amount of  data, transforming them into something which is always disposable (Maldonado, 2005, pp.  
117-118).
Memory  has  always  been  considered  a  vast  mental  environment  in  which  all  of  our  experiences 
(connected to and determined by both the outside and inner world) converge, allowing us to decode the 
raw material delivered to us by our sensory schemata. Every time we have a cognitive experience, our  
memory is activated in order to make what is happening recognizable and identifiable, continuously 
relating it to previous experiences and accumulated knowledge. This tells us that memory is central to 
the process of  knowing and the formation of  consciousness.  However,  moving away from strictly 
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scientific aspects, a question concerning the cultural use and meaning of  memory which we intend to  
explore in depth here is one regarding the physical location of  memory itself. The extremely mysterious 
and elusive position of  memory is one the most contested issues in neurobiology: the engram is the 
internal trace of  a remembered event, a sort of  plastic modification that involves synapses that respond 
to the synaptic communication between connected cells and that, somehow, become stable, building a 
recorded event  and giving  it  a  form of  durability  (Semon,  1904/1921;  Schacter,  1996).  The  great 
question that besieges brain science regards the “where” of  this phenomenon – the presumed locations 
of  this activity are the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the neocortex. But, despite the uninterrupted  
debate about this localization, there are no certainties about the question. Perhaps this doubt is bound 
to be resolvable because of  the fact that animals have different kinds of  memories and these memories  
are formed in different ways. If  human memory is categorized in – at least – four types (episodic, skill,  
working, and conditioning), there is a strong possibility that each sort of  memory involves separate  
nervous system tracts and different areas of  cells.
As the famous psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving (1995) writes:
There is no single activity, or class of  activities, of  the organism that could be identified  
with  the  concept  that  the  term  denotes.  There  is  no  known  molecular  change  that  
corresponds to memory, no known cellular activity that represents memory, no behavioral  
response of  a living organism that is memory. Yet the term memory encompasses all these 
changes and activities. (p. 751)
Most of  the films discussed in this chapter try to deal with this fascinating aspect related to memory.  
The narrative approach somehow gets ahead of  scientific accuracy and finds a visual way of  depicting 
the brain and imagining an actual, physical position that helps audiences for spectacular purposes. The  
visualization  of  the  engram  represents  a  violation  of  scientific  discoveries,  offering  a  direct  and 
stimulating  visualization  of  such  mysterious  activities  and,  maybe,  tells  us  something  about  how 
contemporary  culture deals  with memory and how contemporary visual  strategies  try  to overcome 
some of  the voids of  the visible. But it is only the latest chapter of  an on-going relation between  
narrative and memory.
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Narration is a fundamental aspect of  memory functions. Narration implies two relevant issues related  
to mnestic activities: in order to tell a story, at least two memories are activated, because we deal with  
both our memory of  narrators and the audience’s. Then (and all the studies devoted to narratology 
have profoundly described this phenomenon), every time we become narrators, we decide the arrow of  
time, the chronological structure of  our narrative product. By doing so, the narrator also decides the 
majority  of  the  memory  activities  happening  inside  the  reader-viewer-spectator’s  system  of 
remembering. All the experimentations conducted by such great writers as Huysmans or Joyce, and 
many others during the twentieth century, brought to public attention the power of  interference that 
the  chronological  and mnemonic  systems adopted in the  narrative  structures  embrace in  order  to  
profoundly affect the readers’ reception.  And a transformation of  the figuring processes inevitably  
leads to a reshaping of  memory formation.
It is easily understandable how the explosion of  cinema as a mass language has intensely overwhelmed  
the mnemonic activities of  its audience, adopting images and sounds in a completely new way. The  
construction  of  memories  shaped  in  a  specifically  cinematic  way  alters  common  procedures  of 
memory-formation and recall. As extensively demonstrated by several studies and experiments, there is 
an inner relation between cinema and human mnemonic structures, a relation that lies in the activation  
of  the mnestic processes involved in every stage of  cinematic spectatorship. When we sit in front of  a 
cinema screen, mnestic activity is suddenly activated, forcing us to move inside the plot and interact  
with the images according to our modality of  spectatorship which has habits, rules, mechanisms that 
obey the norms of  our previous experiences as part of  an audience. 
Film theory dealt with memory and its implication in the important studies of  memorization conducted  
by Fraisse and De Montmollin. Casetti (1993/1999) underlines an experiment conducted by the two 
authors which
analyzes  both  what  remains  at  the  end of  projection  (‘immediate  memory’)  and  what  
remains after a long time (‘deferred memory’). In the first case, ‘what remains is a function 
of  the  relationship  between  the  images  and  the  story  told;  a  logical  or  affective  
restructuring takes place in overall impression’. […] In the second case we have, instead, a 
large amount of  data loss and a readjustment of  the global picture. With the passing of  
time ‘forgetfulness flattens the acoustic and visual images; it totally eliminates both their 
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accessory and characteristic details, or those defining the meaning, the originality, and the 
coordinates of  the story told by the film. The memory we retain of  the action is in the last  
analysis a passe-partout, a stereotyped tale’ . (p. 100, citing Fraisse and De Montmollin,  
1952, pp. 55, 68) 
Another key-point widely analysed is one that links remembering to nostalgia. Nostalgia and cinema  
were first connected in the writings of  French theorist Jean-Louis Baudry who often wrote about the  
importance of  nostalgia among the psychological features that drive a spectator to go to the cinema.  
Baudry  is  profoundly  indebted  to  the  Freudian  perspective  on  cinema  as  a  sort  of  hallucinatory 
apparatus.  Throughout  the  twentieth  century,  this  Freudian  inheritance  developed  a  solid  set  of 
metaphors for the condition of  the cinema viewer associated with that of  the dreamer, with a sort of 
regression that brings the psychological state to a condition of  near fulfillment, where dreams and 
illusions seem to become true and perceptions of  one’s own desires appear to be satisfied in a quasi-
hallucinatory condition. In his essay “Le dispositif ” (1975), Baudry affirms that the desire to be cinema 
spectators is strongly linked to a joyful condition, a “nostalgia for a state in which a desire has been 
satisfied through the transfer of  a perception to a formation resembling hallucination, which is at play 
and activated by the cinematic apparatus” (p. 70).
As many other post-Freudian intuitions, this reading of  the activity related to nostalgia needs to be  
updated and reconsidered. Firstly, it seems important to note that the reading of  the hallucinatory state 
connected to the cinematic experience has been dismissed for its inherent weakness. It is really hard to  
demonstrate the idea that the spectator is simply transported and overwhelmed by images and sounds,  
that his/her awareness does not help in the correct perception of  lived conditions. According to Laura  
Rascaroli’s (2008) writings about the work of  Terry Gilliam and Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days (1995), 
nostalgia should not be considered only as a solitary recreation, as a basic desire for distraction, but also 
as a productive activity in which the subject experiences cinema as a revolutionary apparatus that allows 
time travel and permits a free perceptual movement through different time levels and chronological  
planes. Floating through a distorted or unanchored chronology implies a complex mnemonic activity in 
which  the  reciprocal  positions  of  past,  present  and  future  are  constantly  negotiated  in  a  relation 
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between  the  perceptual  systems  that  must  confront  a  purely  narrative  freedom.  Focusing  on  the 
characters of  Lenny Nero in  Strange Days  and Joe Cole in Gilliam’s  Twelve Monkeys (1995), Rascaroli 
acutely points out how 
the spectator  never  completely  forgets  that  he  or  she is  at  the  cinema,  and fluctuates 
between  credence  and  mistrust,  without  necessarily  having  perfect  control  of  this 
mechanism – the border between belief  and disbelief, as well as between perception and 
illusion, is precarious and often crossed. This back and forth movement also concerns our 
metaphorical spectators. Cole and Lenny like their trips and clips so much that they prefer 
them to real  life;  and because of  this inclination they often cross the above described 
border between perception and illusion.
Another important theory about the specific connections existing between memory and the cinematic  
apparatus  is  Sigfried  Kracauer’s  regarding  the  Proustian  nature  of  filmic  experience.  As  David  
Rodowick (2007) points out:
[…] Kracauer suggests  that  the sensuous examination of  the surface of  things in  film 
produces simultaneously an interior examination of  the self  in memory. The perceptual 
density and indeterminacy of  things in their native duration, when framed and reproduced 
in the alienated form of  the photographic image, provoke a nonchronological investigation 
of  memory in the form of  mémoire involontaire. [...] Film is philosophical because its peculiar 
form of  empiricism – attention to things themselves in their duration – can produce dense 
philosophical investigations, not only of  things but of  ourselves in our phenomenological 
activity. (p. 76)
One  of  the  most  challenging  and  interesting  paths  followed  by  contemporary  studies  of  the 
connections among cinematic language,  the functioning of  its  apparatus and human consciousness 
doubtlessly is the one that stems from Husserl’s intuitions and the recent hypothesis developed by the  
French philosopher, Bernard Stiegler. Moving from Husserl’s phenomenological account of  memory in 
Logical Investigations, Stiegler discusses Husserl’s theories regarding two forms of  memory, primary and 
secondary  retention.  But Stiegler  somehow attacks  Husserl,  asserting  that  in  his  phenomenological  
account he misses the point by exploring the eidos of  the phenomenon of  temporal experience rather 
than considering the technical as a constitutive part of  perceptual and psychological occurrence. 
Husserl proposes a fundamental opposition between primary and secondary retention in the processes 
of  human consciousness.  Husserl  (1991)  is  helped in his  analysis  by the identification of  what he 
defines as “a temporal object”, one of  the many possible objects whose main characteristic is duration 72
over time, objects whose constitution is primarily temporal. A temporal object is perfectly suited for 
marking the differences between the first listening  (Husserl uses a melody as an example) and the 
ulterior recollection: 
a)  In  memorial  consciousness  grounded on  a  phantasy-appearance,  the  'image'  hovers 
before me as the object  does in perception. Or: in perception, the object itself  stands  
before  me;  in  phantasy,  I  see  it  'as  it  were',  and then I  apprehend it  as  the  image of 
something that has been. For example, I have the emerging tone-image and I apprehend it  
as the tone or as the melody that my little daughter played 'just now' or 'shortly before' on 
the  piano.
b) In the next moment, this 'image' is past; the tone has lasted for its appointed time (the  
phantasy-tone, and not only that, but the phantasm of  the tone as well); the melody has 
run its course in phantasy, and accordingly the phantasy-melody-appearance is also past. 
But then I have the consciousness of  the just-had having of  this appearance. And precisely 
in this way: I hear the melody itself  playing. I hear the tone itself  that has just sounded.  
And then it is past, but I am still directed towards it; it is not yet out of  my act of  meaning:  
I still have it firmly in the consciousness that belongs to 'immediate memory'. But this is 
not a phantasm, and one should not state that it is. I meet with phantasy-representations 
and phantasms only through 'reproduction' understood as recollection, as new appearance,  
not as the continuation of  perception (sensation) lasting as long as the 'fresh memory' lasts.  
(p. 169)
Thus, primary retention is the keeping of  what has just passed, a movement that allows consciousness  
to retain a chain of  notes (or images?) that goes backwards in time. This is what allows consciousness 
to establish the temporal nature of  the perceived object. But what happens when we have to recollect  
the heard melody, sometime after our first listening? Husserl names “secondary retention” the process 
happening in our consciousness when memory selectively recalls and reconstitutes the remembered 
object, having access to a “place” unhooked from the continuity of  the temporal flow of  perceptual  
processes.  Thus,  Husserl  erects  a  system in  which  temporal  continuity  is  structured  through  two 
different  paths,  separated  by  a  caesura  that  creates  a  temporal  gap:  if  the  immediate  perception 
elongates the present into a continuous duration, the same existence of  the second moment (the one  
characterized by recollection) as a stable perception is guaranteed only by its opposition to the first. 
This is the opposition that Stiegler takes up again, offering a direct critique. Following the theoretical  
road that undergirds the whole philosophical system of  the series of  essays Technics and Time, Stiegler 
insists on the fundamental assumption that humans have always needed technical prosthesis in order to  
survive and to develop individual and collective tasks, to give significance and direction to a condition  
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that seems to begin from an existence that is essentially without essence. So, the technical prosthesis has 
always been the constant element that has enhanced the human being and has shaped the perception of  
lived time. The revision that Stiegler works on Husserl’s phenomenology is profoundly determined by  
the attention he gives to the technical varieties of  memory that exist in a more dynamic and relational  
formation of  retentions:
Stiegler argues that if  Husserl had thought about the consciousness sitting down in his/her  
living  room to listen to a  gramophone  record,  he might have revised his  argument  in 
Logical Investigations. Each re-listening of  the exact same recording amounts to a different 
experience of  it. If  the record remains the same, then it is the listener who has changed – 
the listener conceived phenomenologically not as pre-given individual but as determined 
perpetually in an ongoing individuation of  the pre-individual,  factical milieu in which it  
finds itself. And this change in the listener has changed the primary retention of  the object 
in consciousness. It is precisely through a re-listening to the record that the “immediate  
experience” of  it changes. But this takes place only on the basis of  the memories of  it that  
condition the selective attention it receives in the moments of  re-audition. And this repeats  
and differs the first audition, itself  conditioned by the protentions “toward” the music that 
come from both individual memories of  musical experience, and the passive synthesis of 
“musicality” given to consciousness from the cultural archive. (Crogan, 2007) 
Time, in Stiegler’s account, is strictly related to our perception of  it, and this perception seems to be  
inevitably determined by the technical constitution of  a sort of  external memory that allows humans to  
anticipate the future and live through memory rather than lived pasts. In this process, two different and  
(apparently) opposite strategies are at work: on one side there is exteriorization, that is, the shaping of  a 
cultural and technical  context of  human socialization,  and on the other there is interiorization,  the  
construction of  a consciousness that relates to the position of  the self  in time and to the memory 
itself. Following the intuitions and terminology of  Gilbert Simondon, Stiegler argues that these two 
human procedures exist in a transductive relation in which reciprocity is the necessary condition for 
their  mutual  existence.  “The  ‘who’  (genetic  and  ‘epigenetic’,  experiential  memory)  and  the  ‘what’ 
(‘epiphylogenetic’, externally accumulated memory) invent each other in a ‘recapitulating, dynamic and 
morphogenetic  accumulation  of  individual  experience’  at  the  basis  of  human history  and cultural  
becoming and differentiation” (Crogan, 2006, p. 40). 
Stiegler  opens his book on cinema and technics by asserting that cinema is a technical  device that 
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on the part of  the cinema viewer; by doing so, cinema creates believability, the perception of  a quasi-
reality  that  becomes  the  strategy  through  which  cinema  succeeds  in  capturing  the  spectator’s  
consciousness.  This  happens  because,  according  to  Stiegler,  consciousness  constitutes  objects 
imaginatively.
Stiegler examines the relation between cinema and human consciousness in depth, with the intention of 
demonstrating that consciousness is intimately cinematographic because they appear to work in the  
same way. The montage of  temporal objects is a process that unites cinema and consciousness around 
a similar principle: to set up all the constitutive elements in a temporal flux (Stiegler, 2001/2011, p. 14).  
While Husserl claims that memory is a direct consciousness, Stiegler affirms that it is always a mediated 
one, continuing a long and rich academic tradition that insists upon the mediated nature of  memory  
(see, among psychologists, Annette Kuhn, 2000, and Steven Rose, 1992).
The importance of  the technical  aspect of  cinema lies in its  identification with what Stiegler  calls  
“mnemotechnologies”, instruments absolutely intrinsic to the mnemonic process. Husserl considered 
the gramophone as a mere support for objects (audio recordings) that were able to initiate and contain  
the perceptions related to memory, while the secondary retention remained separated (chronologically,  
mentally) from it. Stiegler affirms that this opposition, this separation between the two moments, is not 
assertable  because  of  the way mnemotechnologies  reproduce the  same temporal  objects  as  always 
identical to themselves. But while the object seems to remain the same, the listener/viewer is changed, 
so every single listening to a melody, every single viewing of  a film, is never a repetition of  the same  
experience because each time the audience sees and hears differently, especially because of  the effects  
of  the  previous listenings  or viewings.  Stiegler  argues  that  there  is  a  transductive  relation between 
primary and secondary retention because every past experience necessarily  influences the following 
ones: 
Perception of  a temporal object, then, and by extension, of  any object of  consciousness 
perceived in time, is never ‘pure’, never free of  the selective dynamics of  the imagination,  
of  selections based on the archive of  all past memories. All perception is marked by the  
protentions emerging not only from within the present moment of  perceiving – it is this 
that  can no longer maintain itself  in  pure opposition to the past  or the future in  this  
analysis – but from the memories of  past perceptions. This marking is a marking out of  
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what to perceive from the totality of  sense perceptions. In other words, all perception is  
always  already  a  selective  reduction  of  the  total  possible  retention  of  the  object  of 
consciousness. (Crogan, 2006, p. 44)
The fundamental intuition of  Stiegler, what makes him one of  the most technologically-aware media 
theorists, is the ability to transform the position of  the subject in relation to memory and its activities.  
The  subject  is  not  simply  a  receptacle,  a  holder  of  re-lived events;  while  posing  always  outside 
her/himself, it succeeds in considering memory from both inside and outside. Cinema is a decisive  
element in this transitional process: cinematic images, cinematic narrative and expressive structures 
contribute to the determination of  forms of  consciousness, and the widespread experience of  many 
different mnemotechnologies determines a profound alteration in the perception of  what surrounds 
us: it seems like there is a real-time montage of  every single present we experience. This is why Stiegler  
writes about the cinematographic structure of  consciousness, overlapping the two temporalities with a  
double coincidence:
- on one hand, the phono-phonographic coincidence of  past and reality (“there is a double 
conjoint  position:  of  reality  and  of  the  past,”  which  induces  this  “reality  effect”  – 
believability – in which the spectator is located, in advance, by the technique itself);
- on the other, the coincidence between the film’s flow and that of  the film spectator’s  
consciousness, linked by phonographic flux, initiates the mechanics of  a complete adoption 
of  the film’s time with that of  the spectator’s consciousness – which, since it is itself  a flux,  
is captured and “channeled” by the flow of  images. This movement, infused with every 
spectator’s desire for stories, liberates the movements of  consciousness typical of  cinematic 
emotion. (Stiegler, 2001/2011, p. 12)
The theoretical shift subtended by these accounts is related to the possible uses that the subject can 
make of  her/his  memories.  Memory can,  of  course,  be just  an automatic  response to perceptual  
stimulus,  or  an  image  that  comes  from the  past;  but  the  use  of  memory  as  an  instrument  that 
necessarily leads to an action means that perception and memory cannot exist in their absolute and 
untouched nature – they have to merge in a unique phenomenon. Classic American cinema has always 
worked in this way, composing and recomposing the hybridity of  these two aspects, somehow insisting 
on the legacy of  Locke and his theories about the person and identity. If  Locke (1690/2004) writes  
that a person “can consider itself  as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places”, he is  
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not  describing  what  identity  means;  so  he  pays  meticulous  attention  to  consciousness  and  its 
relationship to thinking, affirming that identity relates to consciousness:
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to 
be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself  from all other thinking things, in  
this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of  a rational being: and as far as this  
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the 
identity of  that person; it is the same self  now it was then; and it is by the same self  with 
this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. (p. 267) 
There have been many criticisms of  Locke’s assumptions, especially regarding the static nature of  the  
set of  memories that, according to him, give continuity to an identity. The nature itself  of  what Locke 
identifies with “memory” gives shape to an anachronistic reading of  a subject as the only transforming  
being,  while memories that guarantee the continuity of  personal identity remain untouched in the 
display cabinet of  the self. 
Identity is not static or integrated at all, and the same memories are susceptible to change. This is due  
to the fact that memory is not an object, but a process that continually exchanges information with the 
whole body that biologically contains that same process and which projects the combination of  both  
mental  and  bodily  memories  onto  the  context.  Cinema  has  always  adopted  the  flashback  as  the 
privileged  tool  for  memory  representation.  But  new  forms  of  memories  require  new  visual  
representations, and the flashback (as we have known it) needs to be updated accordingly.
- The collapse of  the flashback and the repetition of  images 
The rhetorical function of  the flashback is currently experiencing a profound transformation. Since the 
linear relation between memory, recollection and the representative status of  images linked to these 
mental processes has changed, the flashback has lost its hegemonic power and is caught in a moment 
of  impossibility, of  representative uncertainty, incapable of  representing the more complex situation of 
the image itself.  The classical use of  the flashback technique is necessarily related to a precise and 
unquestionable  subjectivity  of  the  remembering  character  who  becomes  the  spectator’s  reliable 
referent. The flashback is a narrative figure that needs and implies a solid and complete character.  
Moreover,  the  flashback  is  a  grammar  element  that  contains,  in  nuce,  one  of  the  most-cited 77
characteristics of  cinema as a medium: its capacity to oppose death, to resist the onslaught of  time (see  
Bazin, 1958/1967, p. 9). This results in the memorial nature of  the cinematic apparatus, an apparatus 
that erects a soft and fluid wall against the passage of  time and the erasure of  memories, in which  
flashback  could  be  identified  as  one  of  the  key-rhetorical  figures  for  its  ability  to  visually  show, 
metonymically, the whole cinematic language. 
Flashback  is  also  a  formal  solution that  questions  the  nature  of  the  exhumed memory  itself:  the  
flashback could have an owner, it could be linked to the memorial activity of  a character. But it could  
also be initiated by an off-screen narrator, as if  the movie itself  might have an autonomous memory  
and private remembering. In both cases, the adherence of  the flashback to the actual,  remembered 
events needs to be questioned, not least because every memory works as a reconstruction. Memory as a 
pure  recollection  of  facts  does  not  exist;  rather,  memory  exists  as  a  partial,  private,  subjective  
restoration of  what happened. If  we think about classical masterpieces entirely constituted in a long 
flashback, we notice that our subjectivity is mirrored in the remembering main character’s memory;  
s/he  becomes  the  inescapable  witness  to  whom  our  perceptual  subjectivity  is  anchored.  In  Billy  
Wilder’s Double Indemnity (1944), for instance, the whole narration rotates around a confession that the 
protagonist, Walter Neff, is recording: he recalls the events that lead him to commit a murder, and the  
flashback gives visual shape to this remembering, reinforced by the use of  voice-over. The combination 
of  flashback and voice-over builds an extremely strong system of  identification because the personal 
interpretation of  the events passes through the memory and the consciousness of  Neff. We, literally,  
inhabit  his memory,  and the movie becomes the visualization of  these memory-filtered events.  We 
believe him, or at least we do not have any reason not to trust his recollection. So, in a certain way,  
every flashback is a bet we place within the spectatorial  agreement we sign every time we watch a 
movie; the fractional part of  an individual memory becomes remembering tout court, the visual essence 
of  the visible memory. Flashbacks are always overlapped with a extra-narrative presence (the narrator? 
The cinema itself?) that can freely move inside the time dimension, rendering it a reversible space (as 
demonstrated in fractal narratives such as those of  Alejandro González Iñárritu). 
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We learn  the  brutality  of  this  rule  every  time  we  encounter  a  fallacious  flashback,  an  extremely 
uncommon  event  we  are  forced  to  deal  with  that  unmasks  the  subtle  and  fragile  nature  of  the  
audience’s  position.  It  happens,  for  example,  in  David  Fincher’s  Fight  Club (1999)  or  in  Alfred 
Hitchcock’s  Stagefright (1950).  We become hostages  of  the  narration,  but  we  discover  this  affected 
nature only when the trick is unmasked and the unreliability of  the narrator has been discovered.
An even more devastating experience of  time is the one offered in some movies which, while still using  
the flashback without a misleading purpose, decide to adopt the grammar of  remembering by linking it 
to characters  whose memory or perception is  not absolutely trustworthy.  If  Alain Resnais  is  quite 
evidently the director who has stretched the conceptual issues related to the flashback and its core  
meaning, perhaps Abel Ferrara is the most radical experimenter among contemporary directors dealing  
with the problematic nature of  the flashback. In his filmography, there are two movies that acutely deal  
with  these  issues:  in  New  Rose  Hotel  (1999),  an  adaptation  of  a  William  Gibson  novella,  Ferrara 
transforms the second half  of  the movie into an obsessive repetition of  a few sequences already shown 
on the screen. The main character, X, understands he has been swindled by the people he believed were 
allied with him, and he is forced to hide in a hotel room. In the closed space of  the room, X begins to 
reprocess all the memories he has formed during the previous events and becomes involved in a never 
ending chain of  flashbacks that obsessively return, never allowing the remembering subject to create 
any order in the confused realm of  his devastated memories. Closed in the hotel room, X can only 
investigate  his  memory  by  re-processing  all  the  floating  images  he  recalls  as  flashbacks;  his  
reconstruction  of  the  events  tells  him  something  about  the  failure  of  his  enterprise,  but  most 
importantly, tells us something about the contemporary nature of  the flashback. 
If  memory is the only active part in the definition of  subjectivity, memories are like body parts that  
claim their existence floating in the liquid nature of  an imprisoned mind. As Gianni Canova (2000)  
notes, discussing the disintegrated nature of  the flashback in movies like New Rose Hotel, “the past (the 
already seen) does not emerge from the memory in a linear form. Ferrara mashes, cracks, destroys it.  
Time implodes and disintegrates into many small fragments which crop up on the screen (and in the  
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memory  of  the  character),  without  any  logic  or  chronology”  (p.  86).  In  this  movie,  there  is  an 
unprecedented display  of  stratified  flashback,  but  the  grammar of  the  remembering fails  its  main 
historical  target:  here flashback does not work as a narrative tool  that  helps the character and the  
audience  in  the  cognitive  processing  of  the  factual  events,  nor  does  it  function  as  an  emotional  
reprocessing of  the key lived moments. Images are lost in the mnemonic maze erected by X; they are  
parts of  a dismembered body that cannot be put together anymore. 
The destruction of  the flashback’s  value is a solution Ferrara had already exploited in  The Blackout 
(1997), a narration vaguely inspired by Hitchcock’s  Vertigo  in which an actor, Mati, who is a slave to 
alcohol and cocaine, kills an unknown girl (almost instigated by the director, played by Dennis Hopper)  
after having discovered that his partner has had an abortion. His reaction to this dramatic event is a sort  
of  mnemonic removal, an erasure of  memories connected to this killing. But the violence has taken  
place in front of  a camera, and memories come back to haunt him, assuming the disturbing form of 
obsessive flashbacks. As Thierry Jousse (1991) writes, The Blackout 
is an excessive puzzle that summons every kind of  image in an eccentric and paradoxical  
product.  Mental  images,  obsessive elements arriving from Mati’s  troubled brain,  images 
from the movie shot by Dennis Hopper, images of  the same shooting, images of  a video 
documenting  a  therapy session,  images regarding the  life  of  the  couple  and the same 
blurred memory-images produced by the blackout of  the main character […]. (p. 59) 
The Blackout, moreover, deals  with the visual recording of  memories, in line with the inner nature of 
cinema itself. Some of  the dramatic events in which Mati is involved happen on the set of  a highly 
erotic remake of  Christian-Jacque’s Nana (1954), so there is a video recording of  the things he has done 
but which he does not remember at all. In the coexistence of  different images, Ferrara also tells us  
something about the nature of  video images in the cinematic body. As Jeffrey Pence (2003)  writes, 
“Many current films can be seen as figuring their difference from other media precisely through a  
textualisation of  film technology’s relationship to the past, to human and collective memory, in contrast 
and competition  with  the  same relationships  as  mediated by different  technologies”  (p.  239).  The 
presence of  video images as traces of  the past, of  a recorded past possessing the authenticity of  a 
testimonial form, has been broadly used by many directors as a way of  declaring the authenticity of  the  
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depicted  events.  Directors  such as Atom Egoyan have built  an entire  poetics  around this  variable 
textualisation that shows visual models of  remembering. Ferrara, on the contrary, does not adopt the  
differentiation of  visual texts as a rhetoric of  distinction: neither cinema nor video have a legitimacy per  
se,  because  of  their  photographic  or  electronic  structure.  The  Blackout  is  a  movie  that  shows  a 
counterfeit  reality  where  the  recording  of  it  cannot  have  any validation  of  authenticity.  Here,  the  
recording of  reality (and the intrinsic possibility of  its falsification) is less important than the ability of  
the  human  body  to  generate  images  that  substitute  for  reality  itself.  Mati  experiences  a  sort  of 
incapacity to stop the generative process of  images that his mind produces almost against his will. The 
uncontrollable desire to substitute reality with its replication can lead, Ferrara clearly shows, to a sort of  
autonomy of  images, definitively separated from our possession of  them and almost self-generated.
Ferrara clearly makes us experience  sur place journeys, involving the alteration of  consciousness and 
mnemonic  illumination;  this  perceptual  shifting  is  part  of  a  broader  reflection  about  the  actual 
movement  of  remembering  processes,  a  movement  that  can be fragmented into small  and partial  
images that become an indistinct flow, background noise, erasure of  an active consciousness. But, and 
this is a decisive aspect of  these two movies, Ferrara exploits the obsessive nature of  images that always 
return the same as a visual representation of  a memory that enters a phase of  stalemate and, forced to 
work  anyway,  does  not  find  anything  better  than  a  compulsive  insistence  on  a  (predetermined) 
perceptual space.
The process adopted in these two Ferrara films pushes us in a direction that leads back to Resnais and 
his ability to propose links between independent images. If  Deleuze is right in affirming that classical 
cinema  is  characterized  by  rational  cuts  (and  that  in  this  issue  we  can  find  a  distinction  from 
contemporary films), Resnais’s entire body of  work can be seen as a relentless effort leading to a new 
definition  of  the  logic  contained  in  every  cut  and of  the  rule  of  ‘returning’  images.  As  Deleuze 
(1985/1989) notes, 
As in  Je t’aime, je t’aime, there is return to the same image, but caught up in a new series. 
Ultimately, there are no longer any rational cuts, but only irrational ones. There is thus no  
longer association through metaphor or metonymy, but relinkage on the literal image: there 
is  no  longer  linkage of  associated images,  but  only  relinkages of  independent  images. 
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Instead of  one image after the other, there is one image  plus  another, and each shot is 
deframed in relation to the framing of  the following shot. […] It is a whole new system of  
rhythm, and a serial or atonal cinema, a new conception of  montage. The cut may now be  
extended and appear  in  its  own right,  as  the  black screen,  the  white screen and their  
derivatives and combinations […]. In the first place, the cinematographic image becomes a 
direct presentation of  time, according to non-commensurable relations and irrational cuts. 
In the second place, this time-image puts thought into contact with an unthought, the 
unsummonable, the inexplicable, the indecidable, the incommensurable. The outside or the 
obverse of  the images has replaced the whole, at the same time as the interstice or the cut 
has replaced association. (p. 214)
The  “deframing” style  adopted  by  Ferrara  consists  precisely  in  this  process  of  connecting 
independent images; the memory flow that besieges X in the closed room of  the New Rose 
Hotel is not a voluntary movement decided by the remembering subject, an active development 
that the protagonist determines with his complete awareness of  the happened events. Instead,  
memory becomes a sort of  autonomous mechanism that uses the perceptual criteria of  X as a 
passageway  for  reaching its  visibility.  The self-regulating  activity  of  memory transforms the 
cinematic rules of  actualization in two different ways: it determines profound transformations in 
the definition of  the subject and in his/her ability to resolve the puzzling reality with the help of 
memories  and  their  visualization;  consequently,  it  alters  the  functioning  of  the  flashback,  
associating a mere haunting presence of  time with the images coming from the past. Time and  
images,  and their  algebraic  sum,  do not  bring  a  new meaning to  the  present  nor  a  deeper  
significance to the past. The flashback loses its historical signifying individuality and becomes a  
dispersed, floating image unable to help us in the decrypting process of  our rememberings.
- Amnesia and memory diseases: WHO AM I? 
The real, medical conditions that lead to amnesia and other memory disorders are often associated with  
organic brain infections or the consequences of  brain surgery, or can be caused by trauma such as a  
stroke; there are also psychiatric bases for such memory troubles, and the trauma can be a psychological 
one. But in most cases identity and personality are elements that remain untouched or unaffected, even 
if  the capacity to concentrate or the level of  attention can be limited by these syndromes. 
But in movies things, are slightly different. One of  the main effects of  the amnesic syndromes seems to 82
be  an  experience  of  profound  and  radical  transformations  of  personality  or  of  the  extreme 
reconfiguration  or  erasure  of  identity.  There  are  countless  movies  in  which  amnesia  is  used  as  a  
convenient narrative expedient,  and there are also many different variations of  the causes and the  
effects of  these syndromes. The motivation is always linked to storytelling techniques, and the final  
result  is  one  of  creating  a  narrative  in  which  a  void  is  firstly  created  (the  diagnosis  of  the 
malfunctioning memory, questions about identity, the gap between the evidence of  the present and the  
lack of  a remembered past) and then filled with the rest of  the story. 
Curiously enough, in recent years there has been an increasingly high quantity of  movies dedicated to 
amnesia,  and the theme has  been introduced on a large  scale  among mainstream Hollywood’s  big 
themes. In the span of  just a few years, an impressive series of  titles brought amnesia and memory  
disorders to the center of  audience attention. After  Memento (2000), an independent movie that had 
enormous success, allowing its director, Christopher Nolan, to become a major studio darling, many 
screenwriters  remembered  the  value  of  amnesia  as  a  narrative  element.  The  arrival  of  memory 
disorders as a key feature in major movies was certified by its presence in two important films in the 
next few years. In  The Bourne Identity  (2002, directed by Doug Liman), the first episode of  the Jason 
Bourne saga (the only updated version of  the James Bond-style secret agent at the beginning of  this  
millennium), we encounter the hero as a victim of  a severe amnesia that is the main narrative motor,  
forcing the protagonist to find all the hints needed for a reconstruction of  his past. In an similar way,  
again  firmly  within  mainstream cinema,  the  animated  Pixar  aquatic  adventure  Finding  Nemo (2003, 
directed by Andrew Stanton) contains a key character, the Blue Tang called Dory, who suffers from an 
uncertain short-term  memory disturbance that creates many problems for learning and maintaining 
new information such as remembering names or recalling where she is going or why she i s doing 
something.  Obviously  enough,  her  complex  state  is  used  to  repeatedly  create  amusing  or  funny 
situations, but it remains an important element in the narrative development. The number of  movies 
using such themes is in the dozens, but particular note should be taken of  50 First Dates (2004, by Peter 
Segal), a romantic comedy starring Adam Sandler and Drew Barrymore. Here, the male protagonist is 
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forced to invent a new “first” encounter with the girl he falls in love with every day; her condition, in 
fact, implies that she can easily create new memories during the day, but every time she falls asleep, all  
the memories are erased and she wakes up having forgotten what happened to her. So he needs to  
arrange a new stratagem for meeting her and trying to make her fall in love with him each day; the girl’s  
head injury becomes a romantic metaphor of  an ever-renewing love. 
Two  important  elements  can  be  identified  in  this  partial  but  suggestive  inventory  (that  will  be 
implemented in the following paragraphs). Firstly, it is relevant to note the persistent and constantly 
increasing  attention  accorded  by  mainstream  and  commercial  cinema  to  amnesic  characters  and 
narrative descriptions of  different forms of  amnesia – an increasing consideration that should be read 
as a cultural trend and thus as an indication of  a broader and more profound concern of  contemporary  
subjects.  It  is  obviously  not  a  coincidence  that  contemporary  cinema  is  using  so  many  amnesiac  
characters, and in such a specific way, indicating that memory disease has become a cultural metaphor  
or symbolic manifestation of  the wider crisis of  the subject so avidly analysed by film historians and  
theorists. Secondly, the analysis of  this particular phenomenon should not be conducted according to 
the scientific correctness of  the diseases and conditions portrayed in these movies. Conducting a study 
of  the adherence of  these movies to the actual forms of  amnesia and their medical implications is 
rather unenlightening: what counts is the decisive aspect of  the cultural value of  such a transformation 
of  the narrative focus. Scientific incorrectness is merely an accident that should be left to psychiatrists  
or psychoanalysts interested in the comparative study of  cinema and science; the cinematic reality that  
emerges  from the  movies  discussed  here  is  a  sort  of  self-sufficient  world,  not  because  it  is  not  
permeable  to  external  stimuli  and  social  modifications,  but  because  the  visual  and  perceptual  
transformations contained in such amnesiac narratives as Memento or Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind 
are extremely relevant to our understanding of  the cognitive and physical transformation our whole  
society  is  experiencing.  These  transformations  are  also  determined by  the  fact  that  contemporary 
narrative structures are altering the relations among issues connected with memory and amnesia, not to  
mention that,  independently  from cinema and narrative,  our  memory  has  gone through extremely 
84
profound transformations following recent technological  innovations that have biologically  changed 
our nature. 
This  new attention focused on memory and its  alterations  is  manifested  even in movies  in  which 
memory is not a central element of  the plot itself, movies which instead operate within the mechanisms 
of  the  viewers’  memory,  confronting  them with  disrupted  narratives  that  question  the  elementary  
functions of  audience attention and retention. Movies that adopt the narrative strategy of  the forking  
path -- Groundhog Day (Harold Ramis, 1993), Sliding Doors (Peter Howitt, 1998), Lola Rennt (Tom Tykwer, 
1998)--  force  the  audience  to  follow  multiple  threads,  keeping  the  memory  alert  for  a  complete  
understanding of  the complex storytelling. Or we can refer to the first movies of  the Mexican director 
Alejandro González Iñárritu, in which the temporal organization of  disrupted and achronic sequences 
forces is the main effort requested of  the viewer. The narrative tactic utilized by González Iñárritu is 
quite  simple:  the  creation  of  multiple  narrative  gaps  that  will  be  filled  in  a  very  disordered  and 
chronologically  confused way with the subsequent scenes that need to be positioned in the correct 
position in order to fill the narrative void previously created. These are movies that overtly request a  
specific way of  retaining the narrative data in order to piece them together in a coherent way that is  
deliberately denied by the director. Memory is not a substantial element of  the plot, but it becomes a  
central part of  the cinematic experience, forcing the viewer to recreate a fragmented puzzle that is  
shown following an anarchic timeline. 
The  narration  of  amnesia  and  memory  diseases  is,  again,  a  question  that  leads  to  an  ultimate 
uncertainty. Our trauma culture never ceases to repeatedly pose the same question: Who am I? There  
are, of  course, many ways of  asking this question without ever mentioning these three words,  and the 
crisis of  the subject can even be narrated in oblique and indirect ways. Memory has been turned into 
one of  the most stimulating fields of  study because it has become a decisive element in the redefinition 
of  the subject’s boundaries. And, similarly to amnesia, its opposite, too much memory, emerges as a  
contemporary  and symbolic  affliction:  an excess of  memory paralyzes thought  and its  capacity  to  
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connect an event to its own context because memory becomes an insistent process focused on the  
same part of  the event or, more riskily, on the various possible ways an event may have happened. 
The remembering of  an event is of  course relevant, but the capacity we have to connect i t with the 
context, allowing us the chance of  a punctual and sharper reading of  something, is becoming equally  
important.  Each  memory  disease,  amnesia  or  excess  of  remembering,  determines  a  substantial  
impossibility of  contextualizing events and, similarly to what happens in Ferrara’s New Rose Hotel (not 
unintentionally  cited  for its  disrupted  use  of  flashback),  every  image appears as  an individual  and 
singular fragment disconnected from the others. 
Amnesiac characters and amnesiac spectators cease to perceive the wholeness of  the visual material and 
transform the identified optical  elements into a mosaic of  scenes,  as  severed sequences,  a  sort  of  
perpetual present or eternal past that is chained to a never-ending loop that undermines our perception 
of  the  distance existing  between present  and past.  Once  again,  Bergson comes to  help us  when, 
questioning the effective being of  the present dimension, he says that the past is, the present becomes. 
- A progression in representing memory and the acts of  remembering: the rise of  new cinematic technologies 
As  previously  noted,  there  is  a  strong  connection  between  technologies  of  memory  and 
transformations related to this human activity. Among the technologies of  memory we should include 
every visual technology that deals with images; as Georges Didi-Huberman (2003/2008) has noted, in 
order to remember something, it is necessary to imagine (pp. 49, 59-60). 
Images have a life of  their own, and the amount of  time condensed within each of  them directly refers 
to their capacity of  coalescence. Considering images as living entities means that the authentic essence  
of  the visual media has to be found in the dimension of  time. Memory is a biological activity that is  
profoundly linked to the perception of  time, with an emotive affection that colours each experience  
lived in a duration of  time. And images are the coalescence of  this connection with time. This is one of  
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the main themes raised by twentieth century reflections about images: images have a life, a duration that  
does not  coincide with the  permanence of  their  sameness,  but,  rather  more complicatedly,  with  a 
persistence into time that has been analysed by Walter Benjamin and Aby Warburg. The concept of  
Nachleben, as proposed by Aby Warburg, refers to the posthumous life of  images, their survival,  their 
particular  form of  persistence within a horizon that can be biological,  emotional  or cultural.  As a 
matter of  fact, Warburg not only refers to the physiological persistence of  images that remain on the  
eye’s retina, but describes a sort of  historical persistence of  images that, transmitted together with their  
mnestic power, guarantees their posthumous existence and produces new significations arising from 
their renewed value and context. 
This persistence of  images determines a profound change in the way human consciousness stabilizes its  
relationships with the visual. This theory, indirectly or not, leads us inside the perimeter of  the (partial, 
perhaps questionable)  re-reading of  Bergson proposed by Deleuze.  The recollected image is  not a 
fragment of  the past taken from the closed box of  memory: rather, as Deleuze (1985/1989) writes,  
“the recollection-image is not virtual, it actualizes a virtuality (which Bergson calls ‘pure recollection’)  
on  its  own account.  This  is  why the  recollection-image  does  not  deliver  the  past  to  us,  but  only  
represents the former present that the past ‘was’” (p. 54). 
This decisive transformation in the way remembered images are represented and intended leads us  
directly to the substantial insufficiency of  the flashback in proposing the surfacing of  the past, opening 
the way to an entirely new series of  visual forms and narrative strategies that attempt to build a bridge 
to the past dimension in a way that adheres to human consciousness and psychological activities. 
Certainly, there are different ways to depict memory and to use memory issues. What we are discussing 
here  is  the  crisis  of  the  relation  between  cinema  and  memory,  a  wider  symptom  of  a  possible  
syndrome: not only the matter of  the death of  the Bazinian ontology and the disappearance of  the 
direct connection between an image and the actual reference of  it. The transformed representation of 
memory and mnemonic processes also passes through a redefinition of  the frame inside which cinema 
shows a remembering activity directly connected to its own memory. Images have a history, and often 87
improved and enhanced technologies of  image treatment must deal with film history or with a visual 
documentation of  the past that becomes a central element in new feature films. One of  the collateral  
effects of  the morphing and digital manipulation of  images is the renewed system of  connections that  
comes from the digitally-treated images and the represented past; it looks as if  cinema is reinventing its  
modes of  representing  history and,  subsequently,  memory.  If  history itself  seems to be a sort  of  
collective mirror in which several different pasts are reflected, the visual treatment it undergoes pushes  
it away from the territory of  the document because of  the increased re-reading of  historical images (or 
of  images that are somehow marked with a historical frame, immediately recognizable as documents 
arriving directly from the reality of  their times) as fictional material. As Robert Burgoyne (2003) notes, 
with  its  increasing  use  of  morphing  techniques  and  computer  generated  visual 
environments,  the  cinema  would  seem  to  be  a  medium  that  refuses  history  in  the 
traditional  sense  of  origin,  authenticity  and  documentation.  And  yet,  contrary  to 
expectations, film in the present day appears to have strengthened its cultural claims on the 
past. (p. 223)
Thus, the document loses its role as a vestige of  the past and becomes raw material that is available to 
be  transformed  in  order  to  recycle  an  imagery  and  to  establish  an  artistic  re-enactment.  
Robert Zemeckis’s  Forrest Gump (1994) is a clear example that shows how the relation of  authenticity 
with the original document does not rely on philological fidelity with the cited footage but is more 
related to the “emotional and affective truth” determined by its visualization. Thanks to the use of  such 
digital  techniques  as  morphing  and interpolation,  the  character  of  Forrest  Gump,  played by  Tom 
Hanks, is continuously contextualized with an archeology of  moving images that somehow transforms 
Zemeckis’s film into a visual palimpsest of  the entire twentieth century: an image of  Gump is inserted  
into a sequence of  David Wark Griffith’s Birth of  a Nation (1915), 16 mm footage of  President John F. 
Kennedy, newsreel footage of  George Wallace and the historical events at the University of  Alabama,  
television footage of  John Lennon,  and many others.  The oblique ubiquity  of  Forrest  Gump,  his 
narrative function as the improbable epitome of  the entirety of  twentieth century American history,  
demonstrates an urge to transform each sequence into an iconic testimony about the hidden history of  
images in the digital era. The symbolic value of  Forrest Gump is rooted in its continuous transformation 
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of  the visual inheritance of  film history. Zemeckis’s film attests to the malleable and stratified nature of 
the digital, cinematographic image and succeeds in presenting the conceptual paradox of  a historical  
film that rewrites America history from the active perspective of  a developmentally disabled boy who 
just happens to  be  a decisive witness inside the frame of  many of  the turning points of  U.S. socio-
political  life.  Given  that  digital  technology  makes  every  image  virtually  distinct  from  its  original,  
Zemeckis forces the limits of  this truth and counterfeits the entire history of  a country, building a 
complex  narrative  in  which  history  ceases  to  be  an  inaccessible  and  fixed  element  but  rather  a 
transformable organism in which the positions of  the subjects continually shift and where even a not-
so-smart man can become the driving force of  decisive historical moments. 
The betrayal of  the original is admitted, as most of  the choices adopted by Zemeckis demonstrates, and 
the  modification  of  the  visual  material  made  possible  by  the  most  recent  technologies  of  image-
transformation becomes just a conceptual adjustment that transforms this relation into a paradoxical 
remembering. If, on one hand, the loss of  realist legitimacy seems to transform cinema using a visual  
language that somehow erases its genuine relation with the past (in the more orthodox, Bazinian way), 
this is not to be intended as a complete and absolute refusal of  history. Burgoyne (2003) adds: 
[…]  contrary  to  expectation,  film in  the  present  day  appears  to  have  strengthened  its  
cultural claims on the past. The cinematic rewriting of  history has, in the present cultural  
moment, accrued an extraordinary degree of  social power and influence. Film appears to 
have acquired, more than ever, the mantle of  meaningfulness and authenticity with relation 
to the past – not necessarily of  accuracy or fidelity to the record, but of  meaningfulness,  
understood in terms of  emotional and affective truth. Cinema, in effect, seems to evoke the 
emotional certitude we associate with memory for, like memory, film is now, to a greater 
extent than before, associated with the body; it engages the viewer at the somatic level,  
immersing the spectator in experiences and impressions that, like memories, seem to be 
burned in. (p. 223)
Again, we are confronted with a redefinition of  memory in the contemporary  visual scape; from a 
cerebral and exclusively mind-centred kind of  experience, film and memory emerge as sharing their 
new position as sensory and bodily kinds of  experiences. If  the relations established in contemporary  
cinema  between  mnemonic  processes  and  their  visual  representations  have  been  profoundly 
transformed, the object of  these procedures, the content of  these activities, ceases to be intended as an 
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untouchable event, crystallized in the absoluteness of  a distant and petrified past. The proliferation of 
visual  documents  that  everywhere  surround  our  present  is  a  constant  certification  of  our  – 
continuously measured – distance from the past. Visual documents from the past transform memory:  
from an individual dimension in which the relation with the past is constructed according to personal  
parameters,  memory  has  become  a  shared  experience  in  which  visual  documentation  plays  a 
fundamental role. Sharing a visual experience implies that the formation of  memory is becoming a 
collective event, and this shift transforms remembering into a collective process that leads to a shared  
relation with the remembered fact.
Cinema is a language that continuously tries to consider the consciousness of  the audience as part of  a  
developing  process  aimed at  the  redefinition  of  how the world is  perceived:  this  means  that  the 
external reality itself, through the recollection and visual repetition of  recurring aspects and events, is  
continuously shaped by the perceiving activities of  the cinema audience.
The twentieth century has often been identified with cinematic technology, but in the latter portion of  
it other visual systems have extended into many of  the cinematic functions: television, electronic and, 
then, digital images, visual special effects, virtual realities and so on have profoundly modified many of  
the peculiarly cinematic issues, shifting the perceptual application of  cinematic language itself. There is,  
of  course, a cinema that pretends to continue the everlasting state of  grace, the hegemonic power of  
the single form of  visual communication; there is also a more aware cinema that prefers to deal and to  
confront itself  with other specific languages, transforming film in a sort of  media-collector in which  
different media converge, redefining the limits and the effects of  the cinematic experience. The illusion 
of  controlling the world given by the emergence and diffusion of  cinema, with its implications related 
to the possibility of  reshaping external reality, is strongly linked to a collective and rather social sense  
of  the film experience.  The sensation of  a shared communion of  film’s  visual  and emotional life 
determined  the  constitution  of  a  generalized  and interpersonal  memory,  directly  inspired  by  the 
sensation of  controlling reality in a collective manner. However, the subsequent atomization of  the 
cinematic  experience  itself,  inevitably  connected  to  the  spreading  of  new  technologies  of  reality  
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capture  and  reconstruction  (such  as  video,  digital  images,  CG  images,  and  so  on),  leads  to  the  
constitution of  an individual  and intensely personal memory.  This  is  due to the personalization of 
technologies that moved the illusion of  controlling reality from a collective to a singular and private  
dimension.  The activities  of  seeing,  capturing,  eventually  transforming,  and re-experiencing reality  
marks a profound caesura in the perception of  the possibilities offered by the media, and cinema needs  
to find visual and conceptual frames to better explain this transformation. 
As Jeffrey Pence (2003) points out, 
This  possibility  destabilises  our  notions  of  what  memory  might  be  by  privatising  its  
collective form and totalising its subjective form. The instruments, institutions, styles and 
practices that one would term postcinematic also, by definition, lead us into a state of 
postmemory.  
Not surprisingly, for filmmakers and critics alike memory plays a crucial role in efforts to  
distinguish between the nature and influence of  these different media. To a great extent, 
recent North American cinema forwards a profound contrast between narrative cinema 
and  the  textual  forms  associated  with  new  technologies  as  models  and  modellers  of 
memory. From one point of  view, this transformation may lead to panic, as in an entire 
genre of  techno-dystopian films emerging from Hollywood such as Strange Days. (pp. 237-
238)
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The notion of  postcinematic clearly indicates a posthumous condition of  cinema as we have known it  
for a long time. The linearity of  the relation is self  evident: if  cinema has always been a privileged path  
for defining and shaping the social memory of  each individual spectator, affirming the possibility of  a  
unifying language able to connect different individual memories in a collective recall, the postcinematic  
(with  its  practices  and instruments  that  determine narratives  and styles)  is  shaping a  condition  of  
postmemory, in which cinema has to rethink and reconsider its own position inside the visual scape of 
multimedia,  and memory becomes something different  from the complex system we were used to 
during the classic age of  film. One important effect determined by this transformation directly refers to 
an effect that cinema has widely exploited to better mark its difference from other visual languages, the  
“textualization  of  film technology’s  relationship  to  the  past,  to  human  and  collective  memory,  in  
contrast and competition with the same relationships as mediated by different technologies” (Pence,  
2003,  p.  239).  We  are  not  just  referring  to  the  obvious  opposition  shown through  several  works 
dedicated to television and its  dangerous effects:  from Sydney Lumet’s  Network  (1976) to Gus Van 
Sant’s  To  Die  For  (1995),  cinema  has  often  tried  to  locate  its  enemy  in  television,  offering  one-
dimensional  representations  in  which  evil  and  the  cathodic  tube  share  the  same  position.  The 
textualization of  the differences, that is, the visual shape of  different time positions, is noticeable in  
such works as Kathryn Bigelow’s  Strange Days (with the Squid technology we will discuss in a further 
chapter), in Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report  (2002) or, in a more traditional way, in almost the entire 
filmography of  Canadian director Atom Egoyan. Throughout his entire career, Egoyan has always tried  
to offer a visualization of  the work of  memory and of  its decisive persistence in the present dimension,  
erecting a linguistic system that has always connected past and present through a coexistence of  past  
and present inside the same conceptual perimeter but with a differentiated textual substance. In each 
film of his filmography, Egoyan has always adopted the use of  video (in the first part of  the career) and 
digital  (in  his  most  recent  film)  inserts  that  help orient  the  viewer  within the  time frames  of  the  
sequences and allow the director to build a personal poetics in which past and present, while clearly  
opposed, exist in a mutual relation of  influence and extension. A remarkable example is Speaking Parts  
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(1989), a film in which there are at least three different textual differentiations: electronic images are 
experienced in a sort of  video cemetery where relatives of  dead people just sit and watch recorded 
images of  their lost loved ones; video sequences express a spatial distance in the form of  a video  
conference (where the illusion of  spatial nearness is covered by the certainty of  the time proximity); the 
recorded  images  of  a  surveillance  system  offer  an  aseptic  and  uninvolved  perspective  on  the 
relationships among the different characters.
While in his latter films Egoyan uses digital images as a substitute for the electronic ones he widely used 
as a recurring theme in his first movies, Speaking Parts is still striking in its originality and in its personal 
use of  a technology that is clearly linked to a past that nowadays seems very distant. 
Adopting a very different approach, in  Minority Report,  Steven Spielberg, focusing on a future world 
where vision can assume the form of  a prophecy, builds an entire set of  technologies that literally  
besiege  human  life,  offering  infinite  possibilities  of  visual  experience  but  also  transforming  the 
Foucauldian  panopticon into  a  social  emergence  of  power.  The  devices  adopted for  transplanting  
memories into the present here assume the form of  a support resembling a little glass tablet in which 
visual recordings of  the past are stored: the painful memories of  the past haunt the main character,  
Anderton (played by Tom Cruise),  through an obsession with his dead son. The private system of  
vision that Anderton uses in his worst moments of  sorrow is a complex device that projects holograms  
of  recorded sequences; the visual logic of  the home movie is transported into a dimension in which 
screens  do  not  exist  anymore  and  vision  becomes  a  more  physical  immersion  that  enhances  the 
emotional implications of  the visual experience. Spielberg chooses not to let the audience’s perspective 
simply overlap with that of  the main character. Moving laterally, the camera offers a disturbing glance at  
the immaterial thickness of  the hologramatic image, offering multiple looks on the artificial nature of 
the reproduced memory. The reality effect of  these images is so strong that Anderton talks with his 
former wife  and his  dead son,  pretending that  they  are actually  in  the same room with him.  The  
purpose is the same as the visual proposal contained in Egoyan’s movie, but the electronic magnetic 
image has been replaced by an enhanced image contained in a transparent support. Between these two 
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visual and technological extremes, we can find an enormous range of  techniques for the visualization of 
the past,  since one of  the main goals of  cinematic language has always been the preservation and 
visualization of  memory. 
The videotapes  and futuristic  holograms carry  out  the  same mission:  making the  viewer  aware  of  
different chronologies, visually separated by different textualisations that immediately help the audience 
in the process of  identifying the past and the present as distinct narrative frames.
The  unbelievable  augmentation  of  storage  technologies  –  whose  applications  profoundly  affect 
contemporary cinema and its image-production – inevitably leads to a sort of  endless and all-embracing 
retention,  and this  structural  transformation determines a  changed set of  features that  identify the 
human faculty  of  memory.  Where  once  memory was  structured  around the  necessity  of  selective 
associations and contrasts, the prosthetic nature of  digital and electronic devices implies a nonselective 
storage  of  information,  a  generalized  keeping  that  dramatically  alters  the  essence  of  mnemonic 
functions and that, by contrast, affects its opposite: forgetting seems impossible, both because of  the 
infinite capacities of  the mnemotechnologies to which we entrust our recollections and because of  the 
subsequent  disappearance  of  the  reciprocal  spaces  of  present  and past.  The  spatial  and  temporal  
inflation of  memory weakens the  boundaries  between chronological  areas which were once clearly 
separated and erases the possibility of  oblivion. Or, conversely, it transforms oblivion into a sort of 
necessity in a perceptual realm in which continuous recollection becomes the generalized virtuality of  a 
culture that is affected by an indistinct flow of  time inside which one can no longer distinguish between 
past  and  present.  The  narratives  offered  by  visual  media  concur  in  this  memory  depletion,  often 
proposing narrative models in which no effort of  time decoding is required and where a flattening of 
chronological distinctions seems functional for the purposes of  the storytellers. Frederic Jameson, with 
his usual prophetic tone, warns us about the possibility of  new form of  spectator, an involved subject 
that becomes “a quasi-material registering apparatus for […] machine time […] and the video image or 
‘total flow’ “ (Jameson, 1987, p. 206). 
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The new forms of  cinematographic spectacle seem to work in the direction of  a profound redefinition 
of  the chronological categories of  present, future and past. As Pence (2003) continues, 
Where once modernity and the cinematic could be seen to break the grip of  history on the  
present – precisely through disciplining the past by monumentalising it – and redirecting 
action and sociality toward an unmade future, postmodernity and the postcinematic seem 
initially to wrest the present from the domination of  the future in a process by which the  
here and now becomes identical with the there and then. (p. 246)
Maybe we have to return to Benjamin and his decisive analysis of  the relationship between the “now” 
and the past. In a description that has a lot in common with some of  Bergson’s theories, assuming the  
existence of  only a single, generic past that is possible to recall in the present, Benjamin  (1983/1999) 
writes:
Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each “now” is 
the now of  a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with 
time. […] It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its 
light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash 
with  the  now (Jetzt)  to  form a  constellation.  In  other  words:  image is  dialectics  at  a 
standstill. For while the relation of  the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of  
what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural <bildlich>. Only 
dialectical images are genuinely historical – that is, not archaic – images. The image that is  
read – which is to say, the image in the now of  its recognizability – bears to the highest 
degree the imprint of  the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded. (p. 463) 
Images have a life, and their textual connotation inevitably influences the way the viewer interprets  
them. The necessity for the cinematic image to exist only in the present dimension raises questions 
about the insistence of  a different time “inside” the perimeter of  the present. The dictatorship of  the  
flashback is linked to the illusion that images inevitably  are in the present; by doing so, the analysis 
seems to forget that the present is always inhabited by the suspended dimensions of  past and future 
(Deleuze, 1985/1989, pp. 37-38). 
- Bergson, cinema and memory diseases: immersion inside memory and multiple coextensive pasts
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The effects  of  Bergson’s  intuitions  are  fundamental  to  understanding  the  recent  evolution  of  the 
relationship between cinema and the representation of  memory. Moreover, there is a director whose 
filmography stands as a crucial turning point that separates the classical and contemporary forms of  
mnemonic activity both inside and in front of  the filmic screen. The work of  Alain Resnais certainly 
represents  the communicative  and representative interval  that completely transforms the traditional  
relationship between the cinematic image and the mechanics of  a memory that somehow seems to 
admit that narrative is the only possibility for the same existence of  memory. In the diptych composed 
of  Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959) and L’année dernière à Marienbad (1961), the French director explores a 
wide range of  new possibilities offered by cinematographic grammar in the effort to represent memory 
and its implications in a way that is not only  memoirist but which tries to make cinema work in the 
closest way possible to the human activity of  recollection.  Hiroshima Mon Amour  tells the story of  a 
confrontation between memories:  a memory lived and experienced in first person and without any 
mediation, and another one structured around the representation of  what happened, around a narrative  
that tries to free the main character (played by Emmanuelle Riva) from an oppressing past. The passage 
moves away from memory as a haunting condition towards memory that becomes an act and can be 
left behind for a new beginning. On the contrary, L’année dernière à Marienbad proposes the hypothesis of 
a memory that, suspended in an uncertain state in which its truthfulness cannot be verified, is offered  
as a basis for a possible future. When the man played by Giorgio Albertazzi proposes to the woman a  
story  about  a  recent  past  that  he  claims  to remember but  which  she cannot,  everything becomes  
enshrouded within a pervasive uncertainty that reduces reality to mere appearance. As present and past 
start to reciprocally superimpose, every word becomes an image, and every image becomes a memory. 
The realities that exist inside and outside the human brain are identical. Thus, the audience never fully 
understands  if  the  shared  memory  offered  by  the  man  and initially  refused  by  the  woman is  an  
invention or an actual recollection: what remains is the visible representation of  how memory works,  
the  decisive  shaping  of  a  cinematic  reality  exclusively through a  journey  inside  the  brains  of  the 
characters.  While  Resnais  may  have  been  working  after  decades  of  cinema  in  which  dreams  and 
96
hallucinations had been represented, he was perhaps the first director after  Eisenstein to break up 
cinematographic language in order to search for direct access to the actual operations of  the human 
brain and to offer them a visual organization. By doing so, Resnais succeeded in substantiating the 
identity of  mind and world, an identity that Deleuze (1985/1989) acutely analyses with these words:
In Resnais this identity already appears less in a whole than at the level of  a polarized 
membrane  which  is  constantly  making  relative  outsides  and  insides  communicate  or 
exchange, putting them in contact with each other, extending them, and referring them to 
each other. This is not a whole, but rather like two zones which communicate all the more, 
or are all the more in contact, because they cease to be symmetrical and synchronous, like 
the halves of  the brain in Stavisky. In Providence, the bombshell is in the state of  body of  the 
old, alcoholic novelist, who rattles in every direction, but also in the state of  the cosmos in 
thunder  and  lightning,  and  in  the  social  state  in  machine-gun  and  rifle  bursts.  This 
membrane which makes the outside and the inside present to each other is called memory. 
If  memory is the explicit theme of  Resnais work, there is no reason to look for a latent 
content which would be more subtle; it is better to evaluate the transformation that the  
notion of  memory is made to undergo in Resnais (a transformation as important as that  
carried out by Proust or Bergson). For memory is clearly no longer the faculty of  having 
recollections:  it  is  the  membrane  which,  in  the  most  varied  ways  (continuity,  but  also 
discontinuity, envelopment, etc.), makes sheets of  past and layers of  reality correspond, the 
first emanating from an inside which is always already there, the second arriving from an 
outside always to come, the two gnawing at the present which is now only their encounter.  
(p. 207) 
The correspondence between layers of  reality, as Deleuze puts it, inevitably leads to a redefinition of 
the standardized time, to a new visual regime in which the very classicalness of  a cinema that made 
clear  what  had  been  and  what  is  now present  through  a  self  evident  differentiation  must  be 
reconsidered.  The  fundamental  position  of  Resnais  in  this  process  of  transformations  regarding 
memory and its narrative representation is undisputed; his declared interest was the visualization of 
thought processes, creating a cinema that could be called intellectual because it was focused precisely on 
the active functions of  a brain building its own world and expressing the emotional activities contained 
in and determined by it. Resnais lays the foundations for the cinema to come, confronting cinematic  
language with an evolution of  the same Eisensteinian concepts: if  the great Russian theorist affirmed  
that  montage  restores  the  rules  followed by thought  processes,  Resnais  opens  up a  totally  different 
perspective on the same issue,  reinforcing  the early  revolutionary ideas  proposed by Bergson.  The 
contemporary evolution of  scientific knowledge about the brain and its functioning may be seen as a 
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The passage from Hiroshima to Marienbad erects a complex system of  representation in which we seem 
to witness infinite variations of  all the possible combinations of  space-time relations in which the logic  
of  causality appears totally forgotten. The Where, the When and the Why stand as unknown quantities;  
the interpretation of  the events, having lost the visual hold of  spatial and chronological continuity, loses  
itself  in the words of  the Narrator, caught in the continuous bounce-back between now and then,  
without any solid chance of  clearly understanding what really happened. 
The fragmentation of  the narrative world represents the collateral effect of  the over-scaled inflation of 
memory above actual perception, of  the past above the present. Resnais discloses a narrative realm in  
which memory shows its immensity and absolute power: the possibility of  a false memory unhinges  
memory itself  from the dictatorship of  history or truth. All questions remain unanswered; the audience 
fails to identify as real or imaginary all  the visual illusions, all the plot twists:  the final result is the 
dispersion of  many of  the previous assumptions that cinematography does not have the capacity to 
reach a point in which mental processes or invisible thoughts or emotions are shown. The surface of  
the characters (their behavior, the words they pronounce, their movements) has always been intended as 
impenetrable, and the inner thoughts, the hidden emotions and feelings, have been conveyed through 
such particular and schematic solutions as the extreme close-up or specific camera movements. Resnais 
makes clear that the same cinematographic apparatus that has always been used with a curious shyness 
about these issues can enter the fissures of  the characters’ surfaces and be an integral part of  their brain 
activities. If  Eisenstein wrote and theorized about a restoration of  mental activities, that is, a specular 
representation of  them, Resnais throws the cinematic apparatus  inside those activities, comparing and 
equating film grammar and brain functions. The inner difficulty of  cinema that, according to its nature,  
has to depict reality and extract from it its own genetic material,  is bypassed by Resnais thanks to  
several inventions and innovations, including the representation of  mental evocations through glimpses  
of  images, through flashes of  thought that break the continuity of  the narrative and shift the viewer’s 
mental plane towards other spatial-temporal realities (see Callev, 1997).
The nonlinear chronologies of  the chosen images – or, better, the fragmented reality constructed by the  
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directorial  choices  –  and  the  non-associative  structure  of  images  and  sounds  that,  in  Marienbad, 
becomes the puzzling mosaic of  unintelligible events, the necessity of  the flow of  images in time: all of 
these elements converge in the revolution initiated by Resnais, a radical transformation that would go 
on to have its most significant effects in latter decades. And it is memory that undergoes the most 
profound transformation:  in  Resnais’s  cinema,  memory is  not  a  mere re-enactment  of  the past  or 
simply a present that has been: 
The memory filmed by Resnais is not a present that is now past. None of  the experiences 
of  memory [...] refer to an ancient present that Resnais would try to introduce in the actual  
present, or to reconstitute; but, in a very different way, the important thing is the heavy 
presence of  the past, of  the remembrance which always vanishes. The memory in Resnais’s 
work is always active, it determines the characters, makes them unable to achieve certain 
actions, or urges them to achieve others. It is a constantly present memory, continuing its 
effects. (Debaise, 2000)
Having a memory, for Resnais, does not mean re-living already-lived situations and conditions. Rather,  
it means interpreting the possibility of  forgetting, the actuality of  an impending oblivion, forcing the 
subject into a partial and selective fragmentation of  the lived events. Memories are transformed by the 
particular  perspective  from  which  the  memories  are  recalled.  In  this  way,  the  multiple  types  of 
interference coming from the complex web of  connections existing among past, present and future are  
multiplied by the germination of  mental images. The conceptual jump determined by this visualization  
of  the life of  the brain projects Resnais' cinema to the realm of  imagination and memory; the virtual 
nature  of  the  mental  projections  makes  possible  a  present  totally  conditioned  by  unverifiable 
possibilities, all marked by the same degree of  actuality.
The risk of  a purely psychological cinema – or, as Deleuze writes, of  an “abstract” cinema (1985/1989,  
p. 209) – is always around the corner, but Resnais makes memory and imagination live outside the  
perimeter of  his characters’ brains. There are encounters, dialogues, quarrels, pains and joys; in short, 
there  are  events,  and  these  events  are  profoundly  determined  by  the  unstoppable  flow  of  the 
intertwining consciousnesses which is actually happening inside, and never outside, the life of  the brain:
Therefore, Resnais’s cinema is at the same time an attempt to account for the processes of 
thought,  and  a  cinema  of  the  event,  of  the  difficulty  to  explain,  to  relate  what  has 
happened, even when these events are constitutive of  the characters. Events, like memory 
or  imagination,  are  not  added to  consciousness;  altogether,  they  form a  network  that 99
determines the character; he is just as much the event that has determined him as he is the  
way he feels or imagines a situation. (Debaise, 2000)
Resnais’s influence on contemporary cinema has been subtle, but undeniable. The explosion of  mental 
images is not intended to produce a better understanding or a wider political awareness, as it often was 
with Eisenstein’s visual manipulations. Instead, his cinema shows the determinant effects that mental  
pictures have on everyday life, on the choices the characters make, on the turns their lives take. A close 
examination  of  recent  movies  that  deal  with  memory  issues  and brain  activity  demonstrates  how 
Resnais was the initiator of  a different use of  cinema and its narrative and visual structures. 
- The visual representation of  memory: the hard-disk metaphor, the cartography of  memory 
One of  the most important and stimulating points of  reflection that so-called cyberculture has brought  
to cultural  debate is  the  parallelism made between the computer and the human brain.  Significant 
thinkers such as Minsky (1988) and Moravec (1990, 2000) have discussed the possibility of  implanting 
chips directly  into the brain or connecting a computer directly to the nervous system. Cinema has 
broadly followed these visionary suggestions,  substantially  adopting the surface of  these reflections 
without  any  deeper  analysis  of  the  reliability  of  the  scientific  assumptions.  The  goal  behind  this 
insistence on the ability of  machines to exactly replicate cognitive activities or to simulate mind actions 
is  probably  the  same  one  underlying  some theorists’  dreams of  ultimately  superimposing  artificial  
intelligence onto humans and making machines and biological  persons  equal.  A discussion of  the  
scientific accuracy of  this equation and of  these visions of  the future could be interesting, but might 
also be misleading:  what seems more appropriate for the purposes of  this research on the cultural  
relevance  of  such  visual  metaphors  is  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  social  representations  of  
subjectivity, subtended by these perceptual facilitations, come to be determined. In the end, the analysis  
should be focused within a cinematic framework, questioning these metaphors and trying to catch a 
glimpse of  how cinema represents itself  as a medium and what this explains about its cultural status.  
Analyzing films built around memory issues and closely observing the visual figurations subtended by 
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them, we discover intriguing aspects of  cinema itself  rather than generically comprehending the reality 
we live  in  or the  subjects  we are becoming.  As  cinematographic  narrative  has explored the  mind-
computer metaphor, it has spread the constitutive elements absorbed from scientific and literary culture  
to the  world of  everyday life  through popular  culture  and its  myriad manifestations.  By doing so, 
cinema has profoundly explored its own nature as a medium, constantly subjected to technological  
innovations and transformations, and endlessly attracted to analogies such as cinema-dream, cinema-
thought. This set of  rhetorical and visual metaphors seems to be the late actualization of  Benjamin’s 
intuition  regarding  media  technologies  which,  undergoing  radical  transformations,  determine 
proportioned alterations in the experiential and perceptual possibilities of  the subject.
If  metaphor has always been the privileged key in the process of  explaining something we do not know 
(in science this is the most common procedure, in order to make clear and known something that is 
obscure and unknown), then perhaps the complexity of  activities and systems such as biological and 
biochemical  ones  forces  the  cultural  process  to  make  them  simpler  by  analogizing  them  to 
contemporary technological innovations which are equally complex. From the clay potter to Cicero’s  
wax tablet, metaphors have always worked by comparing memory (just as any other scientific issue – 
for instance, consider how the nervous system was once described as a hydraulic or, after Galvani’s  
animal electricity,  electrical  system) to something else.  The computer seems to be a more complex 
metaphor,  because  the  scientific  and  technological  evolution  of  this  tool  has  been  marked  by 
continuous parallelisms between it and the human brain. It worked in this way from Wiener and Von 
Neumann’s theories, and the path marked by the pioneers dramatically influenced the following steps. 
From  Intelligent  systems  that  can  substitute  for  humans  in  specific  activities  to  the  Artificial  
Intelligence widely debated in scientific and literary scopes, the computer has always been intended 
more as a substitute element rather than a prosthetic implementation of  biological functions. As Steven  
Rose writes, 
the  metaphor  reverses  itself.  Instead  of  biologizing  the  computer,  we  find  ourselves 
challenged by the insistence that human memory is merely an inferior version of  computer  
memory, and that if  we want to understand how the human brain works we had better  
concentrate on studying and building computers. (Rose, 1992, p. 95)
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One important historical precedent in this direction was the Perceptron. The Perceptron was designed 
by Frank Rosenblatt with the intention of  replicating the functions of  human neurons, associating 
learning and remembering, but after a while it became evident just how different the representation  
offered by Rosenblatt was from the actual complexity of  neuron activity. Later came connectionism, 
with an entire set of  models designing for computers: rather than conceiving specific elements intended 
to ‘take care’ of  the mnemonic activities, the connectionist design was more complex and built around  
a vaster  set  of  networks.  The effort  was  clearly  directed  toward  replicating  the  complexity of  the 
different  layers  of  neurons  and  networks  working  in  a  human  brain.  Dialogues  among computer 
modelers, neurobiologists and philosophers formed the beginnings of  a new approach which became 
computational neuroscience (see Churchland & Churchland, 2002; Kosslyn, 1994).
One of  the most radical opponents of  connectivist theories is the mathematician Roger Penrose. The  
kind of  specific responses to specific inputs that characterizes the deterministic functioning of  brain-
based computer models simply does not exist in neural responses which instead, Penrose argues (1990),  
possess a strong indeterminacy both in terms of  reactions to a given circumstance and outputs that are  
not determinable: 
According to Penrose, then, a reductionist strategy must fail on two related grounds. In the 
first place, indeterminacy at the level of  the neuron and its synaptic interconnections means  
that one will never be able to understand the mind or the brain simply by an analysis of  its  
individual components, whose responses are inherently unpredictable. In the second place, 
however, this indeterminacy at the level of  the component gives way to predictability at the 
level of  the system. Consciousness, intelligence, memory thus emerge as properties of  the  
brain as a system rather than those of  individual components within that system. (Rose,  
1992, pp. 87-88)
There is also an important issue that needs to be discussed which ties together the artificial nature (the  
once-oxymoronic phrase that is no longer so...) of  memories, according to the use of  technological  
tools  that  supplement  our  biological  memory,  and  the  coexistence  of  individual  and  collective 
memories.  It  is  true that  modern technologies,  which can embalm memories,  inuring them to the 
ravages of  passing time, work as an enormous collector of  individual memories, but it is equally evident  
that the  opportunity to share individual pasts builds an entirely new collective memory. Then, as we 
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have previously  seen,  the  dichotomy between fact  and fiction,  especially  thanks  to cinema and its 
functioning, blurs and disappears: 
Modern technologies – photography, film, video and audiotape, and above all the computer  
–  restructure  consciousness  and memory  even more  profoundly,  imposing  new orders 
upon  our  understanding  of  and  actions  upon  the  world.  On  the  one  hand,  such 
technologies freeze memories with all the rigidity of  old Victorian sepia family portraits, 
providing  an  exoskeleton  which  prevents  them  from  maturing  and  transforming 
themselves as they would do if  untrammeled and without constant external cues within our 
own internal memory systems. On the other, they dissolve the barriers between fact and 
fiction in quite subversive ways. (Rose, 1992, p. 95)
But maybe the point that interests us in a very specific way is related to the way that the indeterminacy 
discussed by Penrose leads to the conclusion that the brain is not infallible or unerring and that the  
linearity of  computer systems is not observable in brain networks. The fallibility of  memory stands as 
an insurmountable obstacle for any connectivist equation, especially if  we consider that every single  
piece of  information managed by the brain carries within itself  the key-element of  meaning.  Meaning 
refuses a simplistic representation because of  its processual and developmental structure; meaning does 
not exist as such but rather is a continuous metamorphic phenomenon. Each time we remember, we  
make a substantial change inside our memories, recreating them according to the modified condition 
that surrounds – physically, historically, psychologically – the event, the act of  remembering. 
Here, once again, we are confronting the main issue of  the processual nature of  mnemonic elements 
and the continuous recreation of  memories. This is what happens with cinema, a sort of  mnemonic 
metaphor on its own, when confronted with these issues.
One the most interesting cinematic experiments in recent years is Michel Gondry’s Eternal Sunshine of  
the Spotless Mind (2003), written by Charlie Kaufman and winner of  an Academy Award for best original 
screenplay.  The movie begins on Valentine’s Day,  when Joel and Clementine meet on the beach in 
Montauk. There seems to be something between them, and they decide to spend the night together.  
Then the story goes back to a few days before Valentine’s day: when his girlfriend Clementine splits up 
with him, Joel is devastated to hear that she contacted an unusual firm, called Lacuna Inc., in order to 
have her memories of  him erased. Joel decides to get revenge and undergo the same procedure to wipe 
out all his memories related to her. But during the process of  cancellation, Joel discovers that he really 
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prefers to keep the remembrances of  their affair with him and desperately desires to foil the procedure.  
Lost inside the labyrinth of  his fading recollections, Joel listens to Clementine who suggests hiding her  
in some obscure sections of  his subconscious. Joel goes back to his childhood memories, trying to 
insert the mnemonic presence of  Clementine into a moment of  his life in which she was unknown to  
him. Joel fights a sort of  battle to take back the memories of  her from the tool that carries on the  
procedure. When Joel and Clementine go back to the memory of  their first encounter in a house on a  
beach, right before being “caught” and erased, they decide to meet again on the Montauk beach. Joel  
awakes from the procedure, and it’s Valentine’s Day. He goes to Montauk where he meets Clementine  
in a repetition of  the first sequences: they are actually having their first meeting for the second time.  
They do not remember anything of  the past, but the somehow feel something happening between  
them. Later they discover everything about Lacuna, their prior relationship and the erasure of  their 
reciprocal memories, and they decide to try a second time. 
Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind is perhaps the most typical of  the movies which represent the visual 
processes related to memory. It offers a fallacious and misleading visualization of  location of  memory, 
but at the same time it is characterized by a narrative description of  memory and its activities that few  
movies have offered before. Beginning from actual experiences, and showing a notable awareness of 
the  most  recent  discoveries  about  memory,  the  conceptual  frame encircling  Eternal  Sunshine  of  the  
Spotless  Mind is  entirely built  around the key concept of  memory as a constant recreation. Looking 
closely, almost all the scenes in which Clementine appears and interacts with Joel are determined by his  
memory.  The  entire  narration  of  Gondry’s  movie  is  the  measurement  of  the  distance  that  exists 
between the actual  Clementine and the girl  that is  fabricated by the main character. In one of  the 
pivotal  moments  of  the  movie,  Clementine  asks  Joel  to  hide  her  in  order  to  escape  the  erasing  
mechanism; this moment, as do many others in the film, happens in Joel’s memory, when he is just 
talking to himself. Maybe this is the best visualization of  the process happening inside the memory of 
actual events. Joel continuously recreates them because, each time we try to remember something, we 
reprocess  the  memories  we have  and repeatedly  recreate  the  memory.  But  before  getting  into the 
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analysis of  how memory seems to work, how memory processes and recreates remembered events, it is 
useful  to examine the cartography of  the brain as depicted in Gondry’s movie,  as well  as in other  
contemporary visual works. 
The fictional Lacuna Inc. is a medical service that offers its customers a procedure that detects and 
erases specific  painful  and unwanted memories.  The method appears to be physically  painless  and 
normally leaves just a headache the day after thanks to the ability of  the medical staff  involved in the  
process and their precision in localizing memories within the complex space of  the human mind. If  a 
patient chooses to erase a part of  her/heis mnemonic property, s/he needs to gather all the things that  
are somehow linked to the memories destined for erasure. This solution has a double effect: getting rid 
of  all these objects, the patient cannot be confronted with otherwise unexplainable things after the 
procedure and, more importantly, these items are used to locate the spots of  memory during the first  
step of  the process. The patient is connected to a brain scanning machine and asked to look at every  
single item; doing so, s/he allows the technician to locate exact coordinates in her/his brain, specific 
places that light up in response to the visual stimulation that fires mnemonic correspondences. All these 
single spots are noted and registered in order to create a sort of  memory map that is  used by the  
technical  staff  during the erasing process.  After the patient has been sedated,  the Lacuna staff  re-
activates each single point charted on the map and in this way each memory is re-experienced by the 
patient who, in the meantime, inhabits the recalled memory and watches it as it is dissolved by the  
eraser. 
This visualization of  the brain map directly derives from the visual implementations we have witnessed 
in recent decades of  scientific progress with technologies that allow a profound and detailed analysis of 
the interior of  the human body. On their screen, Lacuna technicians see a bidimensional map of  the 
brain, very similar to a real one determined by a functional MRI machine, with specific spots lit up and,  
after  the successful  erasure,  the selected marks  disappear.  This  is  a  simplistic  and popular idea  of 
erasing memories that some scientists claim could one day be possible: at the basis of  every neuronal 
learning,  there  is  the  synaptic  linkage  of  two neurons,  and behind the  synapse  there  is  a  protein  
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synthesis; blocking this synthesis during the completion of  a selected learned activity could lead to a  
loss of  that particular behaviour. The visualization offered with the help of  the adapted fMRI machine  
used by Lacuna is more elementary, but there are other scientifically correct issues that balance this 
approximation and its cinematic justification (for those who are interested in this kind of  scientific 
realism). 
The  removal  of  each  mnemonic  fragment  is  made  with  a  sort  of  fading  progression  and,  more 
importantly, the course of  the erasure proceeds following an inverse time-line. The procedure begins 
with the most recent recollections and ends with the most distant in time. This is a precise effect that 
links memories to the emotional nucleus that allows the event to plant more profound roots in the lived  
experience. The intervention of  Lacuna operates at the emotional level, on the sensitive substance of 
an event that is not only perceived but also linked to emotional reactions and precise implications. 
There are many different ways in which fading and dissolving memories are shown in Eternal Sunshine of  
the Spotless Mind. Once they are tracked and targeted, memories are destroyed both at the surface, visual  
level  and  the  purely  sensible  and  emotional  level.  Objects,  bodies,  signals, facial  features  and 
background details, everything is subject to a sort of  rubbing device that, slowly but implacably, finds 
even the most hidden aspect of  a remembrance and cuts it out of  the visual field. There are very few 
CG special effects involved in a narrative structure that is aware of  one of  the most bizarre a priori: a 
large part of  the movie shows, from inside Joel’s brain, the progress or the momentary collapse of  the  
device that is supposed to wipe the memories from his brain. Gondry makes a clear choice, adopting a 
strongly focused narrative: the main part of  the movie is framed in the erasure procedure taking place  
at Joel’s apartment during one night. Joel is present, sleeping but (as the audience well knows) extremely 
active in his effort to protect some memories that he does not want to be cleaned up anymore. These  
sequences alternate with ones taking place inside Joel’s brain, where memories, bodies, places and items 
are attacked and erased by the Lacuna device. 
As the director of  photography, Ellen Kuras, says, 
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Much of  the syntax of  the dramatic action leads you to believe that you’re in a memory, or 
a memory of  a memory, but the reality of  where you are in time and space is not exactly  
clear […]. One of  the ways Michel wanted to suggest this visually was by calling back to 
early cinema, where magicians were using live-action practical effects in order to change 
time and space. He didn’t want them to feel or look completely seamless. In one of  the  
scenes, he wanted me to shake the camera so we could see it was a handheld effect in 
camera, as opposed to a locked-off  superimposition effect or double exposure. That was 
the  enigma  of  the  film  to  me:  we  would  have  these  unconventional,  trompe  l’oeil 
transitions  that  were  not transparent film language,  but  the  lighting sources  had to be 
naturalistic at the same time. (Pavlus, 2004, pp. 36-37)
This undecided and confused situation seems to become a sort of  cinematic cancer that attacks the 
basic  logic  of  the  mise-en-scène:  the  proliferation  of  flashbacks  constantly  besieges  the  audience’s 
attention  and sense  of  cognitive  location.  The traditional  linguistic  choice  meant  to  represent  the  
movement backward in time with a certain visual clearness becomes undistinguishable from the rest of 
narrative. 
There is strong tendency in contemporary cinema toward representing the brain as a map in which it is  
possible to find the place of  memory. Each time memory is visually represented in its relation to the 
human brain, directors and screenwriters seem to be obliged to offer a cartography of  the brain with  
specific sections and spots that are supposed to be the places in which remembered things and events  
can be found. The cartography of  the brain is the most obvious solution for a visual representation 
that needs to refer to otherwise invisible activities, but in Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind this visual 
twisting is brilliantly balanced by the whole mindset which undergirds the complex vision of  memory  
built by Gondry and screenwriter Charlie Kaufman. Here the technicians of  Lacuna Inc. switch on a 
monitor that, in a very cold and aseptic black and white, shows a bidimensional section of  the brain, 
with a point of  view from above the invisible skull. The matter of  the brain is represented with the 
usual scientific iconography, with the two lobes and the different shades of  gray that distinguish the  
different parts of  it. Little green and orange spots are the precise locations in which memories lie. It is a  
sort of  videogame, with the technicians targeting the exact spots that have to be erased. 
Recent discoveries about brain activities as well as technological innovations dedicated to examining 
brain regions (CAT scans and other innovative tools adopted for medical use) have permitted doctors  
and scientists to produce representations of  the brain, leading fictionalized works related to this topic  10
to emphasize the concept of  visualizing the brain offered by these tools. The necessity of  finding and 
identifying singular places and regions of  the brain devoted to specific activities and connections has 
led to another massive cultural phenomenon: the metaphor of  the brain as a hard disk. The same 
linguistic  arsenal  that  uses terms such as  memory  and data  storage is  directly  connected with  the  
pervasive and ubiquitous presence of  personal computers in everyday life, and thus the brain has come 
to be frequently represented using this hard disk metaphor. 
Paycheck  (John Woo, 2003) is another movie in which neurons and synapses are visualized in a very 
obvious way, with a sort of  journey inside the brain; a software programmer is forced to erase all the  
memories related to the programming activity he has carried out for a big corporate firm. The purpose 
is to wipe each fragment of  cerebral activity in order to avoid any attempt at industrial espionage. As is  
typical in such films, the head is connected to a brain scanning device, and the movement of  the device  
is visualized by the technicians involved through a sort of  subjective shot that moves the perspective 
through a three-dimensional environment in which there are biomorphic elements that are supposed to 
be neurons and synapses. Once they reach the exact spot in which the memory is located, they fire a  
beam at these places that, just as in a videogame environment, destroys the targeted organism. A parallel 
screen  shows,  with  some  extremely  cinematographic  sequences,  the  visual  narratives  which  are 
connected to the selected spots that are to be erased. 
This seems to be the preferred way of  representing the located memory, transforming the brain cells 
and regions into a sort of  battlefield upon which some technologically advanced devices start a micro-
war against the spots where (dangerous, painful, unwanted, unnecessary) memories are situated. There 
are cultural reasons, of  course, for this spatial metaphor, a fictional representation that has little to do 
with actual brain functioning but which tells us a lot about the visual regimes that determine most of 
our  perception nowadays.  Memory,  as  I  will  try  to  show in  the  latter  portion  of  this  chapter,  is  
becoming one of  the most mediatized elements of  our visual culture. 
Lacuna Inc. offers a highly symbolic service to its customers: it actually creates memory gaps and voids 
and,  at  the  same time,  confirms  and reaffirms  the  social  construction  of  mnestic  processes.  The 
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mapping of  memories during the first part of  the procedure is built around a system that duplicates  
and mirrors the formation of  memories determined by media’s effect upon our brains. Filmic language 
and grammar are central to the visual representation of  memory offered by cinema in many works,  
such as Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind. Here, for instance, the kind of  relation established between 
the remembering subject and the narrative of  his recollections is clearly a double one. Joel is, at the  
same time, the spectator and main protagonist of  the remembered events, and the interactive nature of  
these memories is clearer once we analyse the fact that Joel continuously chooses the characters and  
actors of  some sequences, updates the narrative situations, and creates for himself  a paradoxical and 
ageless role as he reprocesses the actual events in order to find a way to escape the wiping process. In  
brief,  he just tells  himself  his story, reaffirming the power of  the narrator who chooses roles and  
narrative twists, and showing once again the transformable and always updatable nature of  memories,  
to which he adds a new editing logic, some voice over, and new possibilities of  narrative development.  
Revisiting his memories with the aid of  Lacuna Inc.’s devices and helping the technicians in the process  
of  creating a visualized map of  the located memories,  Joel is  asked to connect some items to the 
immediate recollection that is linked to them. He is forced to recreate a narrative for each single object,  
because the successful erasure of  memories occurs through a surfacing of  their emotional core that is 
inextricably linked to the related story, the associated narrative of  their formation. 
In her essay about Gondry’s movie, Carolyne Jess-Cooke (2007) brilliantly analyses the relation between 
memory  and  mass  media  intended  as  narrativising  instruments;  discussing  the  process  of  brain 
mapping starting from memory-charged objects, and the inescapable connection between memory and 
desire (a connection that is coagulated in the affective value of  each item to the patient/customer),  she 
notes  that every single object selected by Joel is associated more with a story than a memory. Each 
memory has found its place in Joel’s brain because, as he says when confronted with a snow globe 
during the first step of  the procedure, “there’s a good story behind this”. The past is clearly determined  
by the possibility of  narrativizing it, because the narrative structures that are hidden behind an object or  
an image are the emotional link that can re-activate the experience of  memory formation. It is not the  
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object that needs to be erased from the mind of  the patient; rather, it is the constructive procedure of  
its related narratives. This assumption leads to the conclusion that, if  the process of  memory formation  
is a narrative one, then the interpretative frame of  the event becomes more and more important in the 
relation the subject establishes with the memory. 
This would mean that memory creates a meaning for the past while the process of  narrativization runs  
parallel to that of  rewriting the memory:
Eternal Sunshine figures memory as filmic, with superimpositions, overlapping voices from 
the  past  and present,  and  an  editing  process  that  reflects  the  invasive  technologies  of  
mnemonic  erasure.  In  this  kind  of  memory,  the  subject  is  also  the  spectator,  both 
participating in memories and gazing upon himself  as a “double” entity. The film suggests  
in addition that the act of  re-remembering involves doubling the “original” memory. As a 
consequence, the “original” or “real” historical event is not doubled, but instead a double  
rupture is created between history and the act of  remembering. (Jess-Cooke, 2007)
Gondry and Kaufman use the character of  Joel and the invention of  the erasing device to point out an 
ultimate, possible truth about the fluid and inextricable nature of  memory: there is never an exact and  
absolutely truthful correspondence between memories of  events and the events themselves. Because  
memory is an act of  narrativization even at the moment of  its formation, the remembering subject  
finds him/herself  in the powerful position of  always creating a partial reconstruction of  what actually  
happened,  working  at  both  a  conscious  and  unconscious  level.  Memory  formation  implies  an 
instantaneous  falsification  of  reality  because  all  the  events  that  actually  happened  are  affected  by 
emotional, moral, sentimental and psychological variants and alternatives. When a memory is formed 
through a narrative procedure, it immediately enters the realm of  the “re-creation” of  the event, and 
the exact correspondences between the two poles of  the narrativization (fact and invention) become so 
blurred that the concept of  truth itself  fades and loses all of  its relevance.
The  impossibility  of  verifying  memories  is  another  key  aspect  of  cinematic narratives  related  to 
memory problems and different forms of  amnesia. This implies a theoretical shift that associates a 
physical and sensual relation with memory and mnemonic procedures. Memory does not have a place 
in  the  mind because  memory  is  determined  by  an  entirely  bodily  experience (an  experience  built  
through the senses), and its cognitive value becomes less relevant than narrative and emotional ones. In  
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Eternal Sunshine, emotion and memory are linked because of  the decisive role that the emotional value 
of  memories has on the way that they are stored differently according to the positivity or negativity of  
the feelings connected to them. The mental journey experienced by the unconscious Joel as he tries to 
hide certain memories in order to avoid a complete erasure leads him to both pleasant and mortifying 
memories,  and  the  remembering  subject  is  surprised  by  the  emotional  strength  of  the  re-lived 
experiences.  This  emotive  re-enactment  of  the  previous  experiences  determines  a  curious  level  of 
awareness, clarified when Joel, returned to his childhood, calls his mother and affirms, “It’s amazing 
how strong this feeling is”. 
Through Joel’s experience with the erasure process engineered by Lacuna Inc.,  Eternal Sunshine of  the  
Spotless Mind paradigmatically describes the remembering subject’s double condition as spectator and 
main protagonist of  his/her narrativized memories. Jess-Cooke (2007) describes the cinematic value of 
this directorial strategy:
This is reflected in the ways in which Joel re-experiences his past. Throughout the memory 
erasure  procedure,  Joel’s  process  of  narrativization,  or  re-remembering,  is  a  kind  of 
experiential spectatorship. This is the notion of  experiencing by perceiving. Joel not only 
“spectates” his memories, but re-experiences their various sensual processes and emotional 
contexts. Like Taussig’s suggestion of  the flexibility of  the self, floating easily between the  
environment and subjectivity, experiential spectatorship can be read as reconciling mutually 
affective embodiment and disembodiment  at  the  level  of  mnemonic mimicry.  Memory 
narratives are specifically point-of-view based, yet they may figure the subject as a third 
party,  as  present in their  own memory (like Joel),  as a mimetic double that  guides  the 
narrativizing process of  the memory.  The dialectic  of  absence-presence at the heart  of 
memory in this context is an important component of  narrative memory. The emotional  
core of  a memory retains the “presence” of  the subject, and it is essentially this bodily-
stored emotional response that ruptures temporalities by re-situating the subject back into  
the remembered past via his or her senses. 
The “flexible self ” epitomized by Joel is a sort of  multiple character who occupies the screen also on  
behalf  of  the audience. Their identification with him leads the audience to experience a suspended  
visual  condition  that  confounds  reality  and  imagination,  memory  and  present  time.  Gondry  and 
Kaufman build a labyrinth in which the recognition of  the temporal dimension is erased together with  
the  memories  contained  in  Joel’s  brain.  There  is  constant  rebounding  among  different  times  and 
different  narrative  situations,  and  the  only  common  element  is  Joel’s  presence,  both  as  a  sedated 
spectator  lying  in  his  bed  wearing  pajamas  and  a  brain  scanning  machine  and  as  the  hyperactive 
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protagonist of  a losing battle against the erasing device. The setting is always his mind, a mind that 
ceases to exist  only in  a metaphysical  condition and that,  finally,  shows its material  and embodied  
nature. Inside Joel’s mind, the struggle he makes is not only aimed at saving his complex system of 
memories, but is also concerned with protecting his identity from an erosion of  the self  embodied by 
the unstoppable doubling of  his  experiences.  If  the movie is quite entirely set inside Joel’s psyche, 
spectatorial  activity  is  confronted with a temptation toward disembodiment  that  is  opposed to the 
central idea regarding the physical and bodily location of  a memory. Memory is not located in a single  
spot in the brain, nor is it wholly located in the brain; it rather is dispersed throughout a self  that finds  
the body as a stratified place of  memory (see Rutherford, 2003). 
Another aspect worthy of  further attention is  Eternal Sunshine’s system of  visualization, especially in 
comparison  with  some  sequences  of  the  aforementioned  Paycheck.  In  the  latter,  a  Philip  K.  Dick 
adaptation, particular emphasis should be put on the visualization of  memories that is shown on the 
parallel screen during the erasure procedure. In these sequences, the audience sees on the screen an  
aseptic room in which the “usual” technicians are working on the brain of  the character played by Ben  
Affleck; the survey in the brain’s inner zones is conducted with a sort of  flight simulator that moves the 
point of  view of  the shot through a three-dimensional,  biomorphic maze of  thin green lines that  
intersect in nearly spherical forms. While the representation of  neural synapses holds little interest for 
our argument, it is more interesting to analyse what happens on the other screen that occupies our field 
of  vision during the erasure sequence. While Jenning’s brain is wired and connected to the scanning  
machine, the only criterion adopted for distinguishing the different contents of  these synapses is to 
visualize the images contained in them. For this reason, a cinematic sequence corresponds to each  
synapse, as if  cinema could be rooted in the located memory,  and as if  a single synapse could be  
visually translated into a cinematically structured sequence in which there are no narrative first persons, 
no subjective perceptions, no hierarchies of  emotional involvement. 
Thus, while the visualization of  the Lacuna Inc. device never offers the technicians a visualization of 
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the content of  the targeted memories, in  Paycheck the externalization of  these images transforms the 
images that are hidden in the subject’s brain into shared visual material. The difference is profound.  
Joel’s  recollections  remain  his  property  or,  at  least,  are  re-seen  and  re-experienced  only  by  their  
“owner”; the external  subjects  (everybody apart from himself  and the Clementine that inhabits  his  
memories) are cut off  from the experience, and their contact with the more personal issues of  the facts  
lived by the patient are limited to the visualization of  a schematic medical snapshot of  a brain section.  
The cinematic  declination  of  the  recollections  remains  anchored  to  its  bodily  frame,  to the  same 
organism that is directly connected to the memories. In Paycheck, the memories that are to be erased are 
experienced  for  the  first  time  by  external  viewers,  while  the  remembering  subject  lies  in  a  semi-
comatose condition; his brain is used as a storage unit, and the mnemonic properties cease to belong to  
him and become inert visual fragments, absolutely separated from their emotional root, their process of  
formation. The opposition set out in this comparison precisely duplicates the absolute antagonism that 
exists between two different ways of  considering memory and the processes of  memory formation. 
While Paycheck seems to be unaware of  the most recent discoveries about the human mnemonic system, 
Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind  adopts a relatively coherent perspective on the way contemporary 
neuroscience explains the process of  memory formation. This is because Gondry’s movie (even though 
it assumes the possibility of  memory erasure, which seems highly improbable) works upon one of  the 
main concepts in contemporary studies about memory: reconsolidation. Recollections are transferred  
from the procedural memory to the structural memory, and the assumption at the basis of  Eternal  
Sunshine is that in order to complete the erasure of  memories it is their emotional cores that have to be  
eradicated. In fact, the mechanisms of  memory storage in the human brain have been shown to be very  
selective and differently modulated. There is a vague locatedness (there are memory zones in our brain, 
there are no memory spots)  in  the process of  memory formation.  Recent  discoveries  have found  
important differences in how the brain saves memories that have an emotional implication. The brain  
somehow chooses to preserve a more detailed storage of  negative emotional recollections, and the  
traumatic memories seem to be secured in the amygdala (one of  the zones of  the brain dedicated to 
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emotional  responses)  and  the  hippocampus  (which  is  associated  with  most  of  the  mnemonic 
processes). While the majority of  movies that offer a visualization of  memories and memory problems 
describe recollections only as passive and objectified elements that  are immutably  stored once and 
forever, one of  the better solutions adopted in  Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind  is to show all the 
emotional  traces  that  reinforce  the  deepening  of  memories  and  create  a  challenging  cinematic 
visualization for the representation of  this phenomenon. This point becomes extremely clear with the 
character of  Clementine who, after her memory erasure, seems to have only the emotional linkage of  
the destroyed memories remaining inside her. 
Issues of  embodied memories, spectatorial doubling in front of  movies set in characters’ psyches, and,  
more relevantly,  the narrativization of  unverifiable memories can be found in many contemporary  
movies, but perhaps the most effective and striking is David Cronenberg’s adaptation of  the Patrick  
McGrath’s  novel  Spider.  Spider  (2002) is  the  story  of  a  man named Dennis  Cleg,  whose  nickname 
“Spider” comes from his childhood habit of  weaving webs made of  thin rope all around the house.  
Spider is released from a mental institution and, after having stopped taking his medication, is haunted  
by memories concerning what happened to him before being imprisoned in the psychiatric facility. All  
his recollections are focused around a tragic event that destroyed his family. Raised in a brutal working 
class milieu, little Spider developed a morbid relationship with his mother and a sort of  hatred for his  
father and his betrayals. The movie features a continuous movement that joins two separate temporal  
dimensions: Spider visits all the places in which his memories are set: his childhood house, the pub 
where his father spent most of  his nights, the sordid streets and fields of  his neighbourhood. Filtered  
by the flashbacks of  the adult Spider, we see the child discovering the adultery committed by his father 
with Yvonne, a vulgar and rude prostitute who resembles his mother. When Spider’s mother discovers  
her husband with his lover, the man kills the wife and buries the corpse. He then takes the prostitute  
home and imposes Yvonne on the son as a substitute mother figure. When little Spider becomes more 
aware of  the crime committed by his father, he seeks revenge by turning on the gas through a complex  
system of  his obsessive web. The incident is fatal to Yvonne but not to the father who, emerging with 
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the dead body of  his wife in his arms, accuses the boy of  having killed her. The boy Spider is taken to  
the mental hospital in exactly the same way that it happens to the adult Spider at the end of  the movie:  
after having finished his personal journey through his private memories, Spider tries to kill his landlady,  
believing that she is the same Yvonne he failed to kill when he was a child.
Spider is built entirely around a strong polarization between two temporal dimensions, the past and the  
present,  and  this  double  timeframe  is  represented  by  Cronenberg  through  an  extensive  use  of 
flashback. The movie constantly moves back and forth between showing Spider as a boy and as an  
adult, assuming that the geometrical pivot of  this narrative is the present time in which the adult Spider  
remembers  what  happened  to  him  during  his  troubled  childhood.  The  sharp  and  precise  use  of 
flashback is indicated by the mnemonic effect of  places and sounds, bodies and colours. Each time the  
adult Spider encounters something that is somehow linked to his childhood, the mechanism of  the 
flashback turns on and we are suddenly projected into the past where we meet the narrative situations  
that concurred to create the damaged psyche of  the remembering subject. But, Cronenberg being the  
challenging director he has always been, the rhetoric of  the flashback is profoundly affected by the 
disruptive forces that inhabit Spider’s fragile mind. As the director himself  declares in an interview, 
Spider is a movie about psychosis and about the reconstruction of  reality or, maybe, more 
precisely, about reconstruction of  reality as continuous process. Basically, a psychotic does 
everything any other human being does,  but he suffers  a  sort  of  discrepancy with the 
collective psychosis which is society, and so he is hardly compatible with it.  (Grünberg, 
2002, p. 19)
It  is  precisely  for  this  reason  that  the  mechanisms  of  flashback  undergo  a  procedure  of  visual  
transfiguration  that  transforms them into the  visual  representation  of  the  puzzled  memories  of  a  
psychotic. Cronenberg enters Spider’s mind, offering a visual realm that mirrors the affected brain of  
the adult man without insisting on abominable visions or delirious nightmares. 
Spider  follows a narrative procedure that avoids visual special effects and bizarre images. Cronenberg 
continues working at dismantling the linearity of  the logics implied in the rhetorical functions of  the  
flashback.  The solution adopted here is  a very uncommon one:  during the remembered moments,  
inside the frame of  the flashbacks as images coming from the past, Cronenberg makes both the child  
and the adult version of  Spider appear. In the same frame we can watch the remembering subject and 11
the remembered object: when Spider, confronting a place that fires up some memories in the labyrinth  
of  his mind, remembers an event, a dialogue, an action, he is physically transported inside the same 
space-time frame of  himself  as a child. He becomes the mute (but active) witness of  his memories: he  
opens the doors, he sits in front of  his father and mother, he watches the child version of  himself  
talking with his mother. This is a radical – but, at the same time, very simple – way of  showing the 
activity of  a damaged mind. The psychosis is shown at an elementary level, with the duplication (one of 
the most common signs of  psychosis) complicated by the presence of  a third element that transforms  
the linearity of  time; there is the double Spider in the same frame, but there are also Mrs Cleg and her 
eroticized double Yvonne (both played by the same actress). 
The simultaneity of  these incompossible presences marks the saturation between our perception and 
the productive activities of  Spider’s memory. The most evident example of  this generative nature of  
mnemonic procedures comes in the fracture that happens in the aforementioned process of  composite  
flashback generated by the visits Spider pays to his memory places. At a certain point, indeed, the adult  
Spider ceases to appear only in the flashbacks where he is present as a child and begins to be present  
also in places and times where he was not many years before. These are the moments in which the 
imaginative nature of  memory is manifested in its pure essence: the difference between imagined or 
actual facts loses its relevance.  Spider  erases the eccentric and asymmetrical use of  the flashback and 
inaugurates a second phase of  its narrative structure, an enhanced procedure of  splitting the past into  
different  reconstructed  fragments  totally  separated  from the lived  experiences  of  the  child  Spider.  
Cronenberg slowly shifts the audience’s attention from the perceptual realm of  a psychotic character  
towards the labyrinthine nature of  memory. Spider happens to remember events he never witnessed, 
but  while  the  adult  protagonist  recalls  these  sequences  and  appears  at  the  centre  of  the  falsely  
remembered  events,  the  spectator  finds  her/his  position  inside  the  generating  mechanism Spider’s  
memory is becoming. Watching the movie as it goes on, we perceive a distinct sensation of  a suffocated 
environment in  which any possible image appears in its  double nature of  both representation and 
creation. 
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By doing this, Cronenberg pushes us to inhabit this affected memory, to trust a disrupted psyche and to 
abandon ourselves  to  the  procedure  of  meaning  construction  that  does  not  belong  to  images  or 
sequences but that is their direct emanation. While pretending to adopt a visual structure profoundly 
connected  to  the  tradition  of  classical  narration,  Cronenberg  subverts  the  rules  of  spectatorial  
agreement and transforms the movie into an unstoppable descent inside the absorbing and morbid  
nature of  a language-dispossessed character. Flashback becomes as liquid and malleable as any other 
rhetorical figure adopted to represent a mental illness and the subsequent distortions of  perception. As 
Patricia MacCormack (2003) writes:
Time is no guarantee of  development of  reason, and thus it is reversed or diffused. This is  
the essential definition of  memory. Like cinema memory is the immanence of  different 
places, events and periods compressed into accessible and immediate recollection. In order 
to remember the actual we must first distort time and space, clearly a paradoxical and thus 
hazardous project. Thus the rudimentary observation of  less critical viewers that the film is 
about the unreliability of  memory fails to see that memory as a concept has no relationship 
to authenticity or reliability. It is a tactic rather than a fact. 
It is through the patient building of  a different logic that we enter in phase with the mental associations  
determined by Spider’s malfunctioning memory. The obsessive use of  the little diary in which Spider 
annotates  every  single  thought  in  a  confused  and  illegible  way,  the  compulsive  and  productive 
excrescence of  the web that determines his nickname and plays an important role in the murder of  his 
mother, the neurotic use of  the voice (a sort of  undistinguishable mantra that duplicates almost every 
word or sentence coming from the “narrative past”: all these concurrent elements help Cronenberg 
construct an undeniable identification between the spectator and the psychotic character. In a movie 
that is built entirely around the distance that exists between the different versions of  memory and the 
actuality of  real events, Cronenberg pushes the audience towards a place in which the pathologies of  
the protagonist become a “common space” where the experience of  memory seems to maintain its  
cognitive value while, on the contrary, it also becomes a creative and productive activity that can also  
relate to a destructive and counterfeiting event. The difficult combination of  Spider’s eccentric and 
unorthodox memories and the reality intended as a memory shared by a majority form the mirror in  
which Cronenberg shows us how all memories are imaginative and constructive, counterfeiting and 11
protective.
It remains a fact that the mind, as the title of  Gondry’s movie reminds us, is “spotless”. There is no  
possible way to, nor any conceivable visualization that can, show the exact location of  memories in our 
brains. The metaphor of  the hard disk, with its precisely situated mnemonic elements, is not sufficient  
for a correct understanding of  brain activities and is not scientifically accurate. But it remains, per se, an 
important metaphor for the necessary mediatization  contemporary culture seems to impose on our 
visual system of  orientation in the realm of  images. And it is precisely the constant narrativization and  
visualization  of  memories  that  offers  a  sharper  and  more  profound  visualization  of  memory’s  
functioning: the malleable nature of  an interactive and “open” narrative implies a temporary condition 
that is the substance of  mnemonic activity. 
As Bukatman (1993) notes, analyzing some of  Baudrillard’s most fertile intuitions and reflecting upon  
the transformations of  bodily representation in science fiction and horror movies, 
The  subject  is  the  body,  mutable  and  mutated.  The  subject  is  the  mind,  thinking  and 
cognizing.  The subject  is  its  memory,  recalling history  and experience.  [...]  In the era of 
terminal  identity,  the  body  has  become a machine,  a  machine that  no longer  exists  in 
dichotomous opposition to the “natural” and unmediated existence of  the subject.  [...] 
Baudrillard’s prose mutates the body into a device fully assimilated to the modalities of  the 
telematic interface. The body is no longer metaphor or symbol; nothing lurks below the 
flesh.  The body is  now an infinite set  of  surfaces – a  fractal  subject  – an object among 
objects. (pp. 244-246)
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Obviously there are historical, social and economic reasons for a simplified metaphor that fulfills our 
compulsive desire for mediatized representation. In  Eternal Sunshine,  when Joel visits Lacuna for the 
first time and asks for information from the doctor, he wonders if  the procedure could cause brain  
damage. The doctor patiently explains that the entire process of  partial memory erasure  is a form of 
brain damage, a bland form of  damage (he compares it with the effect of  a heavy drinking night). 
Curiously  enough,  when Bergson first  studied  mnemonic  activities  and their  connections  with  the 
physiology  of  the  human  brain,  he  wrote  about  the  impossible  localization  of  memory  and  the 
connection  between  memory  problems  and  neurological  damage.  In  Matter  and  Memory, Bergson 
(1939/1991) writes:
All the arguments from fact which may be invoked in favour of  a probable accumulation 
of  memories in the cortical substance, are drawn from local disorders of  memory. But if 
recollections were really deposited in the brain, to definite gaps in memory characteristic 
lesions of  the brain would correspond. Now in those forms of  amnesia in which a 
whole period of  our past existence, for example, is abruptly and entirely obliterated from 
memory, we do not observe any precise cerebral lesion; and on the contrary, in those 
disorders of  memory where cerebral localization is distinct and certain, that is to say, in 
the different types of  aphasia, and in the diseases of  visual or auditory recognition, we 
do not find that certain definite recollections are, as it were, torn from their seat, but that  
it is the whole faculty of  remembering that is more or less diminished in vitality, as if  the  
subject had more or less difficulty in bringing his recollections into contact with the 
present situation. (p. 315)
Bergson is extremely clear: there is absolutely no relation between the loss of  mnemonic data and a  
precise or localized brain damage. In Bergson’s view, the spatial connection between brain regions and 
memory locations is unverifiable. More precisely, Bergson adds, “There is not in the brain a region in 
which memories congeal and accumulate. The alleged destruction of  memories by an injury to the 
brain is  but a break in the continuous progress by which they actualize  themselves” (p.  160).  The 
actualization of  memory appears to be the main problem, given that what seems to be lacking in people  
affected by memory diseases is not the rude data of  actual events but the process that leads to the 
recollection itself. 
The metaphor that visually associates the brain and the hard disk is based on the parallel made between 
memories  and data.  The necessity  of  finding a  visual  representation  for  a  located  memory  seems  
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paradoxical if  we think about the huge cultural shift that has progressively pushed the same concept of 
identity away from the continuity of  memory or from the physical permanence of  the same subject.  
The  cultural  disappearance  of  the  stability  guaranteed  by  all  the  forms  of  bodily  and  subjective 
continuity creates a theoretical void that, in several narratives, seems to be fulfilled by the permanence 
given by the uniqueness of  mnemonic elements. Memory substitutes for thought as the constitutive  
element of  the self, and this substantial transformation happened ironically while memory itself  was 
losing all connection with the concept of  physical location and univocal correspondence with a single 
“owner” of  the recollections. As Bukatman (1993) writes, 
To have memory is to have history; it is also to develop empathy. [...] Memory is thus  
constitutive of  the self  in these fictions. In an era of  bodily transformation, change and 
dissolution, the mere (and ahistorical) fact of  physical existence is no longer a guarantor 
of  truth or selfhood. (pp. 248-249) 
- A spurious memory for a spurious reality
As we have stated before,  the  work of  Alain  Resnais  forms a sort  of  monument  to the  virtually 
unlimited connections between cinema and memory; nearly every frame of  every film he has directed 
seems to be haunted by the intuitions we can find in the masterpieces he realized between 1959 and 
1961.  Hiroshima mon  amour  and  L’année  dernière  à  Marienbad are  two movies  entirely  devoted to the 
exploration  of  visual  and  mental  phenomena  connected  to  memory  and  its  problems.  Memory 
continues to be a radical construction in which the presence of  data and information merits the same  
attention usually devoted to absence, blank spaces and voids. Memory is always incomplete, its own 
substance related to lacunas and blind spots. Cinema certainly is a medial prosthesis (see further in this 
chapter) that enriches the limits of  the remembered and of  what can be remembered, and it is also a 
strong and active support that backs up the biological functionality of  human memory. However, more  
than anything, cinema remains a decisive example of  how “media and memory mutually constitute our 
everyday experiences […], inscribe and transform each other” (van Dijck, 2008a, p. 76). 
Hiroshima mon amour  certainly represents the turning-point for a certain way of  representing memory 
and its diegetic implications. Michel Foucault theorized the possibility of  escaping the uniqueness of  
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history by contemplating the possibility of  many different histories, each with its own specific speed 
and duration, that sometimes find a point of  intersection that we can define as an “event”. Event, in  
Foucault’s account, ceases to be a single portion or specific fragment of  time and becomes a plan upon  
which different and separate historical paths meet and overlap. The dialogues between the two lovers in 
Hirosima mon amour are constantly haunted by the impossibility of  verifying their reciprocal accounts of 
the  past:  when  the  French  woman  describes  what  she  saw  in  Hiroshima,  her  Japanese  lover 
continuously answers: “You saw nothing in Hiroshima”. But while her words refer to the collective  
heritage  of  the  historical  moment  of  the  bombing of  Hiroshima,  he  is  speaking about  a  private,  
singular witnessing of  the enormity of  what happened. The event, according to Foucault (1972, 1977), 
is precisely the point in which two different and apparently incompatible truths meet. The becoming-
image  of  memory  entails  the  definitive  breaking  of  linearity,  of  any  possible  truthfulness  of  the 
recollections. Cinema, after Resnais, becomes the narrative place in which different realities, historical 
paths and mnestic perspectives meet and merge.
Moving on from the intuitions about memory and its processes present in many of  Resnais’s movies,  
we are substantially approaching a decisive issue: memory could also be intended as an invention. As 
Bergson  (1939/1991)  made  clear,  there  is  a  radical  distinction  between  “memory”  and  “memory 
images”, the latter being the actualization of  the first. He explains: 
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of  our history, we  
become conscious of  an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the present in 
order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then, in a certain region of  the past a  
work of  adjustment, something like the focusing of  a camera. But our recollection still  
remains  virtual;  we  simply  prepare  ourselves  to  receive  it  by  adopting  the  appropriate 
attitude. (p. 171)
The virtual nature of  the recollection, its positioning on a sheet of  the past characterized by specific  
issues,  means  that  we  cannot  find  the  desired  point,  we  cannot  discover  it  because  of  its 
unapproachableness or, as Deleuze (1985/1989) points out, 
a third case can arise: we constitute a continuum with fragments of  different ages; we make 
use  of  transformations  which  take  place  between  two  sheets  to  constitute  a  sheet  of 12
transformations. For instance, in a dream, there is no longer a recollection-image which 
embodies one particular point of  a given sheet; there are a number of  images which are 
embodied within each other, each referring to a different point of  the sheet. (p. 123)
In this way we create a series of  relations among images that are disjointed, belonging to different time-
frames, extending their trajectories and mutual links in a chain of  non-chronological mechanisms. This 
is  the case in  which memory determines the  outcome of  its  fallibility,  the chance of  its  collapse:  
“sometimes we only produce an incoherent dust made out of  juxtaposed borrowings; sometimes we 
only form generalities which retain mere resemblances. All this is the territory of  false recollections 
with which we trick ourselves or try to trick others” (p. 123).
The  proliferation  of  mediated  forms  of  memory  enormously  enhances  the  possibility  of  our  
recollection succeeding in its quest, in its effort toward actualization that finds an immaterial substance 
in the memory-images. But, at the same time, it somehow increases the eventualities of  its failure, the  
trap of  incessantly disjointed references among several  sheets  of  the past,  among virtually  infinite  
planes of  recollections. The exposition of  our perceptual apparatus to a plethora of  stimuli allows us to  
extend the use of  external media devices that empower the active capacity of  our memory, but also 
contains the risk of  a fallible recollection that alters and misrepresents the actual remembered events,  
rendering the distinction between true and false memories impossible. As Philip K. Dick (1978/1985)  
writes in his controversial essay How to Build a Universe That Does not Fall Apart Two Days Later,
our  memories  are  spurious,  like  our  memories  of  dreams;  the  blank  are  filled  in  
retrospectively.  And  falsified.  We  have  participated  unknowingly  in  the  creation  of  a 
spurious reality, and then we have obligingly fed it to ourselves. We have colluded in our  
own doom. (p. 8)
In 2000 a very interesting movie arrived from a quite unknown English director, Christopher Nolan.  
After the scarcely noticed Following, Nolan re-elaborated a short novel written by his brother Jonathan 
and the two came up with a bizarre screenplay. Memento encountered a discreet success after its release, 
but  an  unstoppable  drumbeat  spread  the  word  about  this  unique  spectatorial  experience.  Success 
arrived,  slowly,  but  becoming  massive;  Memento  soon  became  a  cult  movie  that  brought  a  lot  of 
attention upon its director who went on to become a huge blockbuster-maker, with such successes as 
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Batman Begins (2006) and The Dark Knight (2008). 
The plot of  Memento is, at the same time, both very easy and very difficult to summarize. It is the story 
of  an investigation, conducted by Leonard Shelby, into the rape and murder of  his wife. He looks for 
the perpetrator of  this awful crime, a mysterious John G., having only a little information and a strong 
will. The investigation, unfortunately, is thwarted because, due to a head injury which happened during  
the assault that led to his wife’s death, Leonard is incapable of  making new memories. This means that,  
within a period of  a few minutes, all new data and information are somehow erased from his memory, 
leaving only the remembering of  what happened before the tragic incident. This means that Leonard 
remembers  everything  up  until  the  moment  of  the  fatal  assault  he  suffered  with  his  wife.  He  
remembers his name, his past, how to use a telephone or a camera, how to drive. He also remembers 
his identity, or, at least, this is what he believes. This condition of  anterograde amnesia forces Leonard  
to erect a complex structure of  mnemonic mechanisms which he calls “a system”. He gets several  
tattoos that recapitulate the essential details of  his investigation; he takes a lot of  snapshots upon which  
he writes the information he collects; he writes many notes to himself; he creates meticulous routines in 
order to maintain control over his everyday life. 
It is impossible for Leonard Shelby to rely on his previous knowledge to direct his behaviour. His  
condition forces him to live in a permanent present that,  literally, fades from his horizon every ten 
minutes. He is continuously obliged to re-start his relations, to re-boot his investigation, to re-encounter  
for the first time people he has already met. To explain the difficulty of  his condition, Leonard explains 
that for him it is “Like waking. Like you always just woke up.” Given the intricate configuration of  his 
search and the suffering situation of  his mnemonic system, Leonard is constantly manipulated by the  
undecipherable figures around him. He is aware of  this menace, so he must endlessly doubt all the  
information he comes across. He is uncertain of  every circumstance because he always has to verify the 
source and find the exact position of  the newly acquired knowledge in the landscape of  his external  
(written,  photographed,  tattooed)  memory.  When someone  tells  him a  story,  gives  him a  clue  or  
suggests  something to him, Leonard is caught in an inextricable situation: he is instinctively led to 
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believe what he hears or discovers, but, simultaneously, he has to doubt every single word because he 
cannot afford the luxury of  trust. Trust is almost always built on previous experiences or knowledge, 
and if  Leonard Shelby lives every minute without his, he cannot rely on anybody. And this also happens 
to be the spectator’s condition while watching Memento.
In the opening sequence, we watch the development a polaroid shot of  a murder; this sequence is run 
completely in reverse, and the picture fades back from the developed image to the black of  the film.  
This reverse development of  the polaroid contains,  in  nuce, the functioning of  the whole narrative 
machine built  by Nolan and his brother/co-writer.  Nolan is  telling us, in the only scene shot in a  
reversed timeline, what will happen during the rest of  the movie, and his statement is made clearer by 
the impressive killing sequence that shows a murder played in rewind, with the blood of  the victim that  
flows back from the wall into his wounded head and the bullet returning into the gun. All the other 
sequences are shot normally; each of  them follows the correct chronology of  time. But while watching 
Memento, we know what is going on in the plot, but we never know what has happened. In fact, Memento  
is edited in a reversed chronological order, so that the first scene we watch is actually the end of  the  
narration, and we proceed from one scene before the other. The arrow of  time is inverted, so we know 
what happened before the events that are taking place in front of  our spectatorial eyes only in the  
subsequent sequence. This means that we experience a condition that exactly corresponds to Leonard’s. 
Moreover, the film continuously jumps between the color sequences depicting Leonard’s quest and his  
everyday life and black-and-white scenes that show Leonard within the closed space of  a motel room 
while his voice-over describes the medical details and the practicalities of  his condition, or he talks on  
the phone to an unknown person. Only the color scenes proceed backward in time, and the black-and-
white segments follow a chronological development. The last segment of  the film is the one in which 
the  two  differently  colored  timelines  converge,  and finally  the  audience  seems  to  have  an  almost 
complete understanding of  the events and the narrated facts. 
The narrative stratagem adopted by Nolan leads to a repositioning of  the audience: we are put inside 
Leonard’s head, and we completely experience the consistent puzzlement he inhabits. The reliability of 
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the narrator is influenced by Leonard’s condition,  and consequently is  profoundly informed by the 
reversed chronological structure of  the narration. As the director says in an interview featured on the 
DVD, “the confusion comes from putting the audience in tune with the protagonist’s mindset. […] The 
protagonist  becomes  the  surrogate  of  the  audience.  Nobody  knows  how  he  happened  to  be 
somewhere. Including himself ”. All the uncertain data Leonard collects need to be verified by the facts,  
but  the  facts  cannot  exist  until  the  following  piece  of  movie  that  actually  contains  the  preceding 
narrative block. Our ignorance about the facts proceeds together with the stratified awareness reached 
by Leonard. While following his actions on the screen, we find ourselves surprised by the uncommon 
and uncanny situation in which we partially or completely lack knowledge about what led the character  
to the specific circumstance he is in: why he is there, who are the characters depicted, what happened 
that determined the narrative event. We have to await the passing of  time in order to achieve awareness  
of  what occurred before. This endless movement forward and backward in time necessarily puts the  
audience in a weak position, since the lack of  information collides with the apparent linearity of  the  
film’s structure. 
There are several movies in which the narrator turns out to be an unreliable one (David Fincher’s Fight  
Club,  for  instance,  is  one  of  the  most  recent  and  influential  examples),  but  the  canonical  trope  
regarding this peculiar narrative figure is related to the fact that he is dreaming, lying, or in a coma. 
Most of  the movies that use an unreliable narrator turn out to be counterfeited narratives only at the  
end, showing the actual relation that the protagonist  has with the surrounding reality and with the  
narrative context.  Most of  these choices obey the dictatorship of  the final  twist,  the solution that 
necessarily has to surprise the audience, forcing them to re-read the movie with a new understanding.  
Memento avoid this obvious trick, altering the relation with the images at its roots: the structure imposed 
by the authors onto the narrative force the audience to doubt every single event because the cognitive  
filter that works throughout the movie is Leonard’s perception of  events. So it is the whole relation of  
identification, empathy and sharing of  knowledge that undergoes a profound alteration in a movie such  
as Memento. The procedure is standard: putting the audience into the mind of  the main character looks  
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like a common expedient that usually determines a primary process of  identification.  But Leonard 
suffers  from his peculiar  condition,  so everything he does, sees or “remembers” is  unreliable.  In a 
mystery movie in which the solution is shown in the first sequence of  the film, the end of  the story  
(actually its beginning) inevitably leads to another anomaly. If  the trust we have in Leonard and his  
actions is, paradoxically, doubtful throughout the entire film, at a certain point we discover ourselves in 
a  more uncomfortable  position.  We totally  mistrust  him and start  to doubt the main issue of  his  
investigation. As Elasaesser (2009) writes about what he calls the “mind-game film”, 
In each pathology of  subjectivity […] the mental  condition is such that it  exceeds the 
clinical case-story. Indeed, the point of  giving such subjectivities-in-action the format of  a  
mind-game film would be to draw the audience into the protagonists’ world in ways that 
would be impossible if  the narrative distanced itself  or contextualized the hero via his or 
her  (medical)  condition.  In  other  words,  the  hypothesis  would  be  that  mind-game 
(reconcile with other) films imply and implicate spectators in a manner not covered by the 
classical  theories  of  identification,  or  even of  alignment  and engagement,  because  the 
“default values” of  normal human interaction are no longer “in place,” meaning that the 
film is able to question and suspend both the inner and outer framing of  the story. (p. 30) 
Teddy is a sort of  companion who constantly helps Leonard in his investigation and who seems to have 
found the killer who attacked Leonard and his wife.  At the same time, Leonard is convinced by a  
woman that it is, in fact, Teddy that he is looking for. So Teddy, understanding the forthcoming danger,  
decides to tell Leonard the truth: he tells him that the real rapist and killer was found years before and 
killed by Leonard himself. Of  course, Leonard cannot remember this event, the same way he does not 
remember that his wife survived the assault. So he is forced to deal with the possibility that his entire  
memory is false,  that his pursuit of  the killer is just a way to “entertain” himself  in his otherwise  
insignificant life. In order to change the meaning of  his existence, he needs to change his memory. But 
he does not have a memory, so he falsifies the notes that represent the surrogate of  his remembrance. 
He writes a few notes that he knows will later convince him that Teddy is the killer he is chasing. 
This is the point of  the movie in which the audience finds itself  more than caught in the mechanism of 
unreliability  erected by the process of  identification with Leonard.  Having followed all  the mental 
acrobatics, the audience reflects upon the possibility of  a fallacious process of  identification. During 
the whole movie, the Teddy’s face has been associated with the description “Don’t believe his lies”,  12
written at the bottom of  his Polaroid image. So, since the identification is extremely strong, the viewer  
is forced to make a choice: who is more trustworthy? A protagonist whose system of  recollection has  
been proven to be fallacious and extremely problematic? Or the unpredictable and apparently deceitful 
Teddy who seems to be the only one in possession of  all the facts? Curiously enough, the perceptual  
sympathy determined by the shared memory problems moves the audience closer to Leonard. 
The link between memory and reliability is made clear during one of  the most important dialogues: 
TEDDY: Lenny, you can’t trust a man’s life to your little notes and pictures.
LEONARD: Why?
TEDDY:  Because  you’re  relying  on  them  alone.  You  don’t  remember  what  you’ve 
discovered or how. Your notes might be unreliable.
LEONARD: Memory’s unreliable. No, really. Memory’s not perfect. It’s not even that 
good. Ask the police, eyewitness testimony is unreliable. The cops don’t catch a killer by 
sitting  around  remembering  stuff.  They  collect  facts,  make  notes,  draw conclusions. 
Facts, not memories: that’s how you investigate. I know, it’s what I used to do. Memory 
can change the shape of  a room or the color of  a car. It’s an interpretation, not a record. 
Memories can be changed or distorted and they’re irrelevant if  you have the facts.
Like many other movies related to amnesia,  Memento  makes a big narratological assumption: that the 
lack  of  memory  implies  a  sort  of  narrative  blank  that  the  plot  will  fill  according  to  determined 
strategies. In Memento, this void is never transformed into a closed and meaningful unity of  sense. The 
disclosure of  understanding is continuously postponed, even if  the concept of  “post” needs to be re-
imagined in a movie built with a reversed timeline. 
The reasons for  Memento’s success are not difficult  to understand.  Memento  is  a rare kind of  visual 
experience and, moreover, is a movie that directly questions the audience about the visual functioning 
of  the human body. The perceptual experiment conducted by the Nolan brothers is directly addressed 
to the questioning of  identity  issues.  The disturbance of  memory necessarily  implies  doubt about 
identity. As Basil Smith (2007) suggests:
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In point of  fact, what is unique about Memento is the way in which it poses this problem. It 
is not just that Leonard may have been fused from two consciousnesses, but also that there  
is no way to discern, either from the inside or from the outside, which elements of  the two  
former persons now exist  in the resultant person, and, thus, that nobody knows which 
beliefs from which series are true or false. Leonard may be constituted by two series of 
conscious memories in an uneasy mix. But what is really troubling is how his plight may 
mirror ours. (p. 38)
The  increasing  attention  towards  amnesiac  characters  is just  another  massive  brick  in  the  wall 
contemporary cinema is erecting in order to discuss and problematise the issue of redefining identity. 
This  crisis  has  reached  previously  unexplored  levels  nowadays,  and  Memento  perhaps  represents  a 
turning point. There are exact and disputable questions raised by the Nolan brothers, and their choice is  
to adopt a double path to reach the problematic. First comes the puzzling storytelling that directly 
challenges us in questioning our spectatorial habits and reflecting upon the levels of  attention involved 
in the visual experience of  a film audience. Then, the complex narrative structure is successfully linked 
to the specific nature both of  the character and of  the mnemonic mechanisms involved cinematic  
experience. Among the few answers given by Memento, the most important is about the persistence of 
identity over time. If  Leonard is the living (and exasperated) example of  the necessity of  a continuous 
mirroring that allows us to achieve a constant and renewed awareness of  our identity, “it asks us to  
abandon the notion that personal identity is transitive, that our memories must be true, but also that  
such identity is not static or unified” (Smith, 2007, p. 38).
The constant sensation of  abandonment is conveyed to the audience through the substantial dyscrasia  
existing  between  the  absolute  trust  professed  by  Leonard  about  his  remembered  past  before  the 
traumatic event of  his wife’s violent death and the information surfacing at each narrative twist. As a  
matter of  fact, parallel with the reversed storytelling of  Leonard’s investigation – and at the core of  the 
black-and-white  timeline  –  Nolan  inserts  the  story  of  Sammy  Jankis,  a  character  that  Leonard 
encountered in his “previous” life as an insurance investigator and which the amnesiac Leonard uses as 
an anchor for his existence. According to the insistent memories that Leonard constantly shares in 
telephone conversations that take place in a motel room, Sammy Jankis was a man affected by the same 
short-term amnesia  that  Leonard  suffers  from and  whose  authenticity  Leonard  strongly  doubted. 12
Sammy was perfectly able to take care of  the insulin administration for his diabetic wife, so Leonard 
decided to refuse the insurance claim for his disability. Subsequently, in order to test the legitimacy of 
her  husband’s  condition,  Sammy’s  wife  made  him  repeatedly  inject  her  with  insulin  shots.  This  
desperate attempt ended tragically, because she died and the husband remained lost in his unwitting 
oblivion. What counts in this narrative procedure is always the unreliability of  Leonard’s memories, and 
this long flashback seems to have no credibility because of  the self-evident unreliability of  Leonard, 
and the audience has to be extremely doubtful about what Nolan shows. And Teddy, the undercover 
cop who seems to help Leonard, confirms viewers’ doubts when he yells at Leonard that he has entirely  
altered his memory of  the Sammy Jankis story to avoid the acknowledgement of  the fact that it was 
actually his wife who, having survived the attack that Leonard says was fatal, died after he administered 
an overdose of  insulin to her. Jankis really was a cheat, and Leonard has reconstructed his character as 
a poor victim in order to reshape the form of  his counterfeited memory.
Another decisive point raised by such films as Memento is the redefinition of  the positions occupied by 
memory  in  the  technological  environment  of  contemporary  life.  Memory  has  always  been  a 
fundamental  theme  of  film narratives,  and  its  cinematic  treatment  has  always  been  an  intriguing 
challenge. The extremely significant modification in the collective perception of  mnemonic processes 
has lead to an increasing literary and cinematic production of  works that deal with memory and its  
alterations. The social construction of  memory seems to be an emergent issue, and mediatized memory 
significantly constructs a sort of  shared past. The privileged form of  memory sharing in Memento is the 
one of  the database (see Manovich, 2001) of  images, in a constant metaphorical turn that Nolan uses  
for testing the actual limits of  the cinematographic medium’s possibilities in the hyper-medial present. 
Memento  paradoxically reminds the audience about the awareness of  a past that mediatized memory 
(even in its more private and intimate form) rebuilds, re-enacts and reshapes, a past that has been  
transformed by the amnesiac event. 
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- Prosthetic memories: We do not possess our memories, we are part of  them 
If  the representation offered by memory’s philosophers leads to a visual definition of  memory as a sort 
of  object contained in the skull, and the visual representations that many movies offered tend to follow 
this conceptual path, there are two issues that need to be discussed: first of  all, the spatial position of  
memory is far from being clearly identified as coincident with the brain and its physical mass, and there  
is also the fact that memory cannot be described as an object. As previously noted, memory should be 
rather intended as a process, “a process of  mental representation engaged in a continuous interchange 
with the wholeness of  the body” (Maldonado, 2005, p. 23). The question that arises, thus, is connected  
to the link between this idea of  bodily memory and the reciprocal belonging between the body and the 
self. Is the body that produces the process of  memory a single and individuated body, connected with a  
determined  and  solid  cultural  identity,  or,  rather,  does  the  mediatization  of  memory  imply  a 
dissemination of  private and individual memory, an interchangeability of  recollections that radically  
question the existence of  the concept of  the “individual”? 
Locke, Hume and Hobbes described memory as an integral part of  the self  and its continuity. Theirs is  
a way of  considering memory as a kind of  private property, a sort of  immaterial capital or inalienable  
resource that is substantiated by the owner’s experiences of  this disordered and elusive accumulation. 
In the media-scape of  contemporary technologies, of  course, it is, to say the very least, complicated to 
affirm the univocity of  this reciprocal sense of  belonging, given the atomized and shared dimensions 
of  mediated memory that are  owned by many subjects at the same time. Perhaps it was Nietzsche 
(1882/2001), in his analysis of  consciousness and communication, who first wrote about the human 
consciousness as a network of  connection between different human beings:
My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as an individual 
but rather to the community and herd-aspects of  his nature; that accordingly, it is finely  
developed only in relation to its usefulness to community or herd; and that consequently 
each of  us, even with the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as  
possible, “to know ourselves”, will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves 
which is “nonindividual”, that which is “average”; that due to the nature of  consciousness 
– to the “genius of  the species” governing it – our thoughts themselves are continually as it  
were outvoted and translated back into the herd perspective. At bottom, all our actions are  13
incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, there is no doubt;  
but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they no longer seem to be. (p. 213)
The  increasing  use  of  external  technologies  that  store  and  process  memory  data  is  somehow 
transforming both the material foundation of  the memories that are constantly mediated and also the  
cultural nature of  memories and acts of  remembering. The focus should be placed on the transformed 
social  use  of  recollections,  because  the  evolving  technological  enhancement  has  not  modified  the 
objects  of  memory,  but  rather,  as  José  Van  Dijck  (2008b)  suggests,  the  “performative  nature  of 
memory – that is, the way we create and deploy memories as a way of  giving meaning to our lives” (p. 
119). What is changing is not the content of  a hypothetical box of  memories, but the use we make of  
this constantly transforming box itself. Digitization is one of  the main elements of  this transition. The 
profound transformations determined by the evolution of  the material supports in which we everyday 
inscribe our memories is reshaping our entire culture, and digital technologies are the most important 
element that is effectively multiplying the mediation of  each remembering act. The meaning given to 
mnemonic  processes  and  the  different  perceptions  of  every  remembered  event  leads  to  decisive 
questions about the political and social implications of  what we call “cultural memory” (Sturken, 1997,  
p.  1)  and  represents  a  collective  plan  in  which  a  negotiation  between  individual  stories  and 
representations takes place. The inner structure of  the field of  negotiations clearly depends on the 
changing and evolving systems that technologically permit the constitution of  a memory that becomes 
increasingly less individual and more collective.
One  rich  and  stimulating  analysis  of  this  cultural  and  theoretical  stalemate  is  offered  by  Alison 
Landsberg in her work on prosthetic memory. Her essay “Prosthetic Memory: The Ethics and Politics 
of  Memory in  an Age  of  Mass  Culture”  (2003)  summarizes  most  of  the  issues  discussed in  this 
chapter,  treating  cinema  (and  some  movies  in  particular)  as  a  field  of  both  investigation  and 
exemplification.  The  definition  of  prosthetic  memories  is  linked  to  the  possibility  of  considering 
memories  as  not  being  constituted  by  the  lived  experience  of  the  remembering  subject.  Having 
prosthetic memories implies the hypothesis of  interchangeable experiences that generate multiple and 
shared recollections. Landsberg clearly underlines how, in the whole of  human history, memory has 13
always been prosthetic and shared, and that every historical reality has been the result of  a mediation 
(beginning with language and cultural narratives), but she adds that the radical emergence of  “the mass 
media – technologies which structure and circumscribe experience – bring the texture and contours of 
prosthetic memory into dramatic relief ” (p. 191). Referring to mass media, Landsberg emphasizes the 
importance  of  cinema  and  its  substantial  capacity  to  produce  experiences  which  are  immediately 
possessed by the audience. 
What is questioned, according to the main tendencies twentieth century thought and, especially, within 
the post-modern horizon, is the difficulty of  making the real be a part of  collective and all-embracing  
narrative structures; the atomization of  perception and the singularity of  proliferating realities leads to 
a  disruption  of  linear  time  and  to  the  idea  of  reality  as  the  result  of  a  controversial  sum  of 
individualities that share some memories and cohabit individual realities. Prosthetic memories radically  
question the assumption of  the total possession of  private memories as private properties: they are, 
according to Landsberg, “memories that no individual can own, that individuals can only  share  with 
others, and whose meanings can never be completely stabilised” (p. 151). Cinema, of  course, is one of 
the most relevant media to have generated substitute experiences that have been implanted into the 
memories of  viewers without ever being lived by them. The production of  mediated recollections 
generates processes of  identity construction that pass through “memories which become experiences 
that film consumers both possess and feel possessed by” (Landsberg, 1995, p. 191).
Landsberg (2004) identifies the main characteristics of  prosthetic memories in four points:
First, they are not “authentic” or natural, but rather are derived from engagement with 
mediated representations (seeing a film, visiting a museum, watching a television show, 
using a CD-ROM). Second, like an artificial limb, these memories are actually worn on the 
body;  these  are  sensuous  memories  produced  by  an  experience  of  mass  mediated 
representations. [...].  Third, calling them “prosthetic” signals their interchangeability and 
exchangeability and underscores their commodified form. In this sense, I agree with those 
who have rejected the “culture industry” model in which mass culture is seen solely as a 
site of  domination and deception. I argue that commodification, which is at the heart of 
mass  cultural  representations,  is  precisely  what  makes  images  and  narratives  widely 
available, available to people who live in different places, come from different backgrounds,  
from  different  races  and  from  different  classes.  […]  Finally,  I  call  these  memories 
prosthetic to underscore their usefulness; because they feel real they help to condition how 
an individual thinks about the world, and might be instrumental in generating empathy and 
articulating an ethical relation to the other. (pp. 20-21)
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What Landsberg is trying to underline is the decisive aspect of  media-generated memories that goes  
beyond  the  irrelevant  distinction  between  true  and  false  recollections,  arriving  directly  at  the 
fundamental issue regarding the foundation of  a subjectivity that ceases to be a merely individual one 
and becomes one of  the foundational  elements of  a  social,  multiple  identification that  can create  
possible paths for counter-hegemonic activity. 
Landsberg (2003) admits that the risk of  commodification for such memories is relevant, especially  
given the fact that they are produced and employed within the boundaries of  a commodity culture. But 
it is their intrinsic structure and genesis that transform them into paradoxical commodities that can 
never be completely owned, that cannot coincide with any form of  private property and, therefore, into 
a  complex  cultural  object  that  occupies  “a  unique  position  within  and  yet  implicitly  opposed  to  
capitalism” (p. 151). She cites Etienne Balibar’s (1994) concept of  “universal property”: an idea about 
property which affirms that there are objects “that can be appropriated but not totally possessed” (p.  
220).  Prosthetic  memories,  Landsberg  argues,  are  the  exact  counterbalance  to  the  dictatorship  of  
private property. As a movie such as Paul Verhoeven’s Total Recall (1990) demonstrates, memories can 
become public, collective, shareable: memories, often, do not belong to an owner, do not arrive from a 
single  body  or  brain  but  are  sold and implanted.  And,  again,  there  is  no distinction  between real  
memories  and prosthetic  ones  when memories  are  produced and spread by media  and create  the  
memory of  an experience. 
The social implications of  new technologies of  reproduction have always been related to the capacity  
for identity-formation that collective media have always had. But Landsberg (2004) brings the reflection 
one step further, claiming that 
Prosthetic memories originate outside a person’s lived experience and yet are taken on and 
worn by that person through mass cultural technologies of  memory. The idea of  prosthetic 
memory, then, rejects the notion that all memories – and, by extension, the identities that  
those memories sustain –are necessarily and substantively shaped by lived social context. 
Prosthetic memories are not “socially constructed” in that they do not emerge as the result 
of  living and being raised in particular social  frameworks. At the same time, prosthetic 13
memories are  transportable and hence not susceptible to biological  or ethnic claims of 
ownership. (p. 19)
The  liquid  and  wearable  “nature”  of  these  memories  transforms  them  into  disseminated  entities 
absolutely detached from individuality or singularity, from a person’s actual and real past, and yet they 
remain  fundamental  elements  in  the  definition  of  what  we  still  call  “subjectivity”.  It  is  a  partial  
subversion of  the Lockean assumption discussed in the beginning of  this chapter as decisive in the 
process of  memory representation in pre-classical and classical Western cinema. But, at the same time, 
the identification of  cinema as a  place in  which prosthetic  memories  have been working since  the 
beginning of  film history  leads to an analysis  that  connects the new protocols  of  experience that 
cinema continuously reinvents in order to build a bodily and sensuous activity. 
Prosthetic memories, as intended by Landsberg, are not metaphors and, most relevantly, break with the 
old distinction between authentic and inauthentic experiences, between real and unreal,  which have 
been paradoxically reinforced by postmodern thinkers such as Baudrillard and Jameson. Affirming that 
the “real” is no longer capable of  being experienced, they somehow claim the existence of  a “real”. 
The prosthetization  of  memories,  rather,  implies  the  disappearance of  any possible  discrimination 
among the various levels of  authenticity that separate the authentic from the unauthentic, insisting on 
an experience of  reality that does not rely upon the authentic adherence between the lived and the  
(prosthetically) remembered experience. 
The two movies at the centre of  Landsberg’s analysis (2003) are Ridley Scott’s  Blade Runner (1982) and 
Total Recall; both are science fiction movies set in the future, and both are inspired by the literary work 
of  Philip K. Dick. In both movies, there are characters that wear implanted recollections as elements of  
a prosthetic memory that does not biologically or organically belong to them.  Blade Runner  and Total  
Recall are works in which the possibility of  memories being technologically created and implanted inside  
the bodies of  the subject is assumed to be ordinary. Artificial memories (they are not “real” or “false”) 
become a determinant part of  the characters’ pasts, as the cyborgs of  Blade Runner are able to recall a 
childhood they never lived or the working man of  Total Recall  can be sure of  having been to Mars 
thanks  to  specific  memories  technologically  created  and  implanted.  These  movies  have  somehow 13
reinforced the power of  the metaphor of  the mind as a hard-disk on which information is written and  
stored. The same idea is found in Robert Longo’s Johnny Mnemonic  (1995), an adaptation of  a William 
Gibson novel that considers the same possibility, with the main character as a courier who carries data 
stored inside his brain, which is also precisely what happens with Neo Anderson in Larry and Andy 
Wachowski’s The Matrix  (1999) in which his “virginal” brain is enhanced with uploaded information 
such as martial arts ability. 
The decisive difference between Scott and Verhoeven’s movies is that, in Blade Runner, the authenticity 
of  memories is considered relevant as soon as it enables humans to discover and identify replicants  
because  of  the  false  nature  of  the  memories  they  have.  In  Total  Recall,  memories  are  treated  as 
commodities because there is a special agency, named Rekall, Incorporated, that provides its clients 
with specific memories of  whatever they want, allowing them to go on holiday even if  they do not have 
the money to afford a vacation: as the firm’s advertising says, the first time it catches the attention of 
Douglas Quaid (played by Arnold Schwarzenegger), “you can buy the memory of  your ideal vacation,  
cheaper, safer and better than the real thing”. When he asks for information about the fake memory of 
a trip to Mars, Quaid poses the decisive question to an employee of  Rekall: “How real does it seem?” 
The man answers, “as real as any memory you have. Your brain will not know the difference”.
The lack of  difference between real memories and implanted ones disappears because of  the incapacity 
of  the brain to detect any difference. As a matter of  fact,  the brain makes impossible the implant 
because of  a capsule of  memory already present in it.  The doctors at Rekall  fail  in the operation 
because, as they discover during the treatment, Quaid has already gone under a memory erasure and the 
process they have just begun to do has activated the artificial recollections found inside his brain. Thus  
a society in which memories are sold and worn as commodities uses recollections as it does other visual  
devices that determine and define the construction of  the subjectivity. It is what cinema has always  
done. As Burgoyne (2003) confirms, there is a strong continuity between films and prosthetic memories  
as proposed by Landsberg, because a movie “engages the viewer at the somatic level, immersing the 
spectator in experiences and impressions that, like memories, seem to be burned in” (p. 223). Movies 
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are, in Landsberg’s (2003) words, “part of  one’s personal archive of  experience” (p. 235), even if  the 
bits of  life experienced by a spectator in a movie theater (or anywhere s/he can experience a movie  
nowadays) are simply fragments that are not lived in the first person by the remembering subject. 
Further, Stiegler (2001/2011), analyzing what he calls “mnemotechnologies”, writes that all forms of 
memory that we can call “objective” (such as cinema, of  course) work both as a complex system that 
offers a testimony of  a past not necessarily experienced by the subject and as something that moulds  
and manages  the  sense  of  time experienced by someone.  Thus we arrive back at  Stiegler  and his  
theories about the externalization of  memory as a solid element of  the entire history of  mankind. The  
passage from mnemotechniques (methods of  memory storage,  from ideogrammatic  writing  to the 
calendar) to mnemotechnologies which store and give order to memories (computers, cell phones, GPS 
systems, memory cards, data storage disks) means the ever-increasing objectification of  our knowledge.  
These technological extensions of  the human mind constantly redefine the boundaries of  what we 
consider thought and memory and enact their most relevant transformations, both reshaping the limits  
of  many human cognitive processes and the way we understand the relationship between past  and  
present and their mediated representation. 
Somehow  we  are  confronted  with  the  superimposition  of  the  past  and  present,  in  a  sort  of  
technological concretization of  what Deleuze (1985/1989) wrote about the past intended not only as 
images coming from an undefined distant period, but rather as a 
virtual  element  into which we penetrate to look for the “pure recollection” which will 
become actual in a “recollection-image”. The latter would have no trace of  the past if  we 
had not been to look for its seed in the past. It is the same as with perception: just as we 
perceive things where they are present, in space, we remember where they have passed, in 
time, and we go out of  ourselves just as much in each case. Memory is not in us; it is we  
who move in a Being-memory, a world-memory. In short, the past appears as the most 
general  form  of  an  already-there,  a  pre-existence  in  general,  which  our  recollections 
presuppose, even our first recollection if  there was one, and which our perceptions, even 
the first, make us of. From this point of  view the present itself  exists only as an infinitely  
contracted past which is constituted at the extreme point of  the already-there. The present  
would not pass on without this condition. It would not pass on if  it was not the most 
contracted degree of  the past. (p. 98)
The bodily experience of  memory that Deleuze draws from Bergson is  a form of  memory which 
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differs from the concept of  it  as mere images recollected and consisting of  “corporeally inscribed  
habits”  (Jay,  1993,  p.  193);  this  insistence  upon  the  body  and  its  prostheses,  the  basis  for  the  
aforementioned theories  of  Landsberg,  is  connected  to  embodiment  theories  rather  than to  post-
humanism and its theory about the whole body as a prosthesis. 
The exteriorization analysed by Stiegler and Landsberg does not coincide with a simple transplantation 
of  data that finds different places for their  storage, independently from the biological or technical 
environment they happen to be in. The extension of  humans into inorganic prostheses radically alters  
the  constitution  of  personal  and cultural  experiences,  profoundly  interferes  with  the  processes  of 
identity  definition and subverts the relationship between individual  consciousnesses.  It  is  the direct 
continuation of  Simondon’s (1958/1980) theories about the parallel paths of  human evolution and the 
development of  technological objects and Canguilhem’s (1952/2008) ideas about the continuity existing  
between human organisms and technologies. 
The radical increase of  external devices to which we refer many of  our mechanisms of  conscious 
functioning (as consciousness tends to adopt external  memories as integral  parts  in the flux of  its 
development)  necessarily  leads  to  a  quantitative  impoverishment  of  biological  memory  activities;  
however, this does not result in collective amnesia thanks to the many technological devices that help us  
in  the  task  of  improving  the  capacity  of  a  hybrid  memory  and reshape  the  paths  of  mnemonic  
consolidation. 
The unverifiability of  memories in a completely mediatized mindscape is also becoming a pivotal issue 
in mainstream television, especially in a few narrative and visual experiments carried out in a current  
series.  Fringe,  broadcast  by  Fox  in  the  US,  comes  from  the  same  producers  and  creators  as  the 
worldwide success Lost and has more than one thing in common with the adventures of  the survivors 
of  the plane crash on a mysterious island. Created by J.J. Abrams, Roberto Orci and Alex Kurtzman,  
Fringe follows the “Fringe Division”, an autonomous unit of  the FBI that investigates a mysterious and 
inscrutable series of  paranormal events which seem to be connected in a comprehensive and cryptic  
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“Pattern”. The team is formed by an FBI agent, an eccentric scientist (who has lived for many years in  
a mental hospital) and the son of  the latter. The scientist’s presence determines an investigative strategy 
that  draws  intuitions  from  “fringe  science”,  a  sort  of  in-between  discipline  that  opens  scientific 
discourse to the possibilities disclosed by the most radical and innovative discoveries of  contemporary  
physics. 
Like many other narrative (cinematic, literary) objects,  Fringe exploits the narrative strategy of  a past 
that, episode after episode, slowly comes to the surface thanks to the traditional device of  the flashback  
or of  the character who reveals bits of  past time, helping the audience and other characters figure out 
the most important parts of  the plot. But memory, in a series so connected to scientific experiments 
and  visionary  technology,  can  offer  more  on  a  narrative  basis:  memory,  its  formation  and  its  
multifaceted recalling processes are at the core of  several episodes, seeking to redefine the boundaries  
of  contemporary reflection upon memory and technology.
The first bizarre occurrence of  an “explanted” memory happens in the opening episode of  the series  
and has a very strong importance in the economy of  the whole narrative. In order to have information 
about a secret conspiracy, Olivia  Dunham, the FBI agent who is the main character of  the series,  
participates in an experiment that allows her to enter a state of  mental resonance with a man in a coma.  
This is the only way she can get inside his brain and discover hidden aspects of  the secret plan she is  
investigating  with  her  team.  This  journey  inside  someone  else’s  brain  causes  some  of  her  dying 
colleague’s memories to be imported into her mind; so, during the plot development of  the first season, 
we often find her dealing with memories that she doesn’t know she has, with detailed knowledge of  
places and situations she has never visited or experienced. Moreover, during these travels inside what 
becomes an inner part of  herself, she often sees her own memories from the point of  view of  the  
colleague (the two were having an affair when he was mortally wounded). So, for example, when she re-
lives the experience of  a dialogue she had with the man whose memories she is trying to “steal”, she  
happens to see herself  in the double position of  external viewer and internal character. By doing so, 
even at a very elementary level,  this narrative solution adopted by the creators of  Fringe shows the 
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paradoxical condition of  the remembering activity, with the subject that discovers her/his ambiguous 
position. 
Thus,  it  is  the  confrontation between a fragile  and unstable  self  and a reality  that  is  continuously  
perceived as an effect of  an ongoing process that determines the aberrant perceptions and frequent  
reconfigurations of  consciousness.  Fringe  tries to push some of  the most challenging assumptions of 
visionary science even further, and in an episode of  the second season, entitled “Grey Matters”, there is  
another kind of  memory “transplant” when three patients housed in mental facilities undergo brain  
surgery to have pieces of  their brains extracted. The plot revolves around an experiment performed 
many years before during which a part of  the brain of  the mad scientist, Walter Bishop(the scientist of 
the Fringe division),  was removed and put into other people’s heads in  order to preserve a secret  
contained in his memory. A mysterious character in the present is collecting the pieces of  Dr. Bishop’s  
brain, trying to read them together and unveil the best-hidden secret of  the scientist’s memory. So, in  
order to achieve a complete reading of  the severed parts  of  the brain and their  content,  this man  
collects brain fragments from different subjects whose mental conditions dramatically change after the 
surgery that allows them to return to sanity. This detail shows how the implantation of  a fragment of 
brain/memory coming from a foreign body was the cause of  the temporary insanity of  the patients.
Imagining stories without a strict or obsessive attention towards the scientific truth, Fringe operates in a 
gray zone in which science and its unorthodox secondary paths follow the anarchic and experimental  
inspiration of  a scientist, the aforementioned doctor Bishop, who in past decades had tried to lead 
human consciousness to unexplored places. The two examples just cited show again how much popular 
forms of  entertainment are dealing nowadays with such topics as the redefinition of  consciousness,  
mind expansion and the limits of  human memory.
Moreover, let us return to a crucial point in this chapter, that is, the authenticity or inauthenticity of  
memory and recollections. As Paul Grainge (2003) writes in the introduction of  a volume he edited  
about memory and popular cinema,
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The concept  of  “authentic  memory” is,  of  course,  highly  problematic.  The desire  for 
memory as  stable,  reassuring,  and constant has always been plagued by the fear  of  its 
instability and unreliability, and its disposition towards fantasy and forgetting. The impact 
of  digital mediation further compounds and complicates the question of  authenticity [...].  
In  certain kinds  of  critique,  however,  a  notion of  memorial  authenticity  has  endured, 
linked negatively to presumptions about the deracinating effects on memory produced by 
and within particular forms of  technological media. (p. 5)
- Déjà vu: mnemonic or visual phenomenon?
Déjà vu  (2006),  directed by Tony Scott,  is  a film which, despite its title,  never deals with the most 
stimulating possible concepts regarding the eponymous perceptual phenomenon. It is just an ordinary 
action movie in which a few agents work with a revolutionary instrument that allows a sort of  visual 
analysis of  previous events. The technology utilized by these agents is related to a wormhole that offers  
them the possibility of  examining the past in order to re-live traumatic or violent situations (here, an 
explosion on a boat) and modify their developments. Employing complex devices, they witness only  
once, and with a four day and six hour delay, a number of  events. But this is merely a superimposition 
of  different time levels, not anything strictly related to déjà vu.
Déjà  vu is  a  phenomenon that  rarely  enters  into contemporary narratives,  and when it  does,  it  is  
infrequently  narrated in its  complexity.  This  circumstance is  quite striking  given that contemporary 
literary and cinematic fiction largely employ every possible affliction or disturbance of  memory and the 
human perceptual system. There is a very subtle reference to déjà vu in The Matrix, in a short sequence 
featuring a black cat that Neo, the protagonist of  the trilogy, sees doing the exact same movement twice 
in less than ten seconds. “A déjà vu is usually a glitch in the Matrix. It happens when they change 
something”, Morpheus and Trinity explain to Neo to make him recognize a forthcoming danger. 
In Brian De Palma’s Femme fatale (2002), déjà vu is the visual key of  the entire representation (starting 
with the trailer of  the movie, in which De Palma shows the whole movie in thirty seconds, compressing 
it with a high-speed fast-forward). The duplicity of  the mysterious main character is the double life she  
lives, the double identity she steals, the double reality she visits before we understand we have been 
watching her dreaming before she lives her actual life in the second part of  the movie. Throughout the  
entire movie, De Palma sends out a lot of  signals that literally duplicate every detail, showing that we 14
are witnessing a doubling of  the perceived material; we literally travel with the character’s consciousness  
suspended inside a dream. And after her awakening, we start – together with her and the whole movie – 
to reprocess the visual material we have been watching through her eyes in the first part of  the movie. 
Two different advertising posters appear at two turning-points of  Femme Fatale: in both of  them we read 
“Dèjà vue”,  and De Palma suggests  that,  while  there  is  nothing new to watch,  there  are a  lot  of 
perceptions yet to be experienced just by inhabiting already seen images. This is the iconization of  a  
condition that condemns us to a visual scape which always seems to work with the same material. 
A more frequent use of  the mysteriousness of  déjà vu is that of  a continuous reliving of  a situation 
that appears always to be the same, a curious situation that we find in the comedy  Groundhog Day, 
directed by Harold Ramis, and in an episode of  the sixth season of  the TV series  X-Files,  entitled 
“Monday” (written by Vince Gilligan and John Shiban, original airdate February 28, 1999).  Here, an 
ordinary  day  rotates  around a  bank robbery  involving the  agents  Mulder  and Scully;  although the 
robbery apparently always happens the same way (we repeatedly watch one of  the two agents die), the  
narrative lets  the characters  acquire  an increasing consciousness of  what happens,  forcing them to 
continuously modify its development. However, only the robber’s girlfriend – the only character having 
a clear awareness of  the temporal cage she inhabits – lives this as a true déjà vu.
Déjà vu is usually read as a continuous movement around the same time frame, a sort of  chronological  
obsession  that  transforms  the  experience  into  a  repeating  loop,  rather  than  being a  glitch  in  our 
ordinary relation with the context we live in. This is also the assumption around which the complex  
narrative structures of  Chris Marker’s La Jetée (1962) and its almost-remake 12 Monkeys (1995), directed 
by Terry Gilliam, are built. Here, a child becomes the spectator of  his own death and remains haunted 
by this traumatic image for the rest of  his life, until he dies once again (and again, and again) in front of  
a child version of  himself. In the middle, there is the illusion of  time travelling, contrasted with the 
final acknowledgement of  the inevitable truth: “there was no way out of  Time”. The déjà vu sensation 
that literally revisits the man during his entire life is the image of  a man dying and the odd impression 
of  not fully understanding what happens in front of  his eyes. His déjà vu only appears to be a déjà vu, 
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since we imagine that, after witnessing his own death, this child will re-live his life again in search of  
this lingering final image, thus becoming a slave to the mise en scène of  the inescapability of  Time. 
Here,  we are confronted with the main issue of  déjà vu: the uncanny sensation determined by the  
consciousness of  an interrupted perception, by the postponed unveiling of  an occurrence that seems to 
be re-lived while actually being lived for the first time. In 1908, Bergson dedicated the essay entitled  
“Memory of  the  present  and false  recognition” to déjà  vu.  Going  against  the  main psychological  
explanations of  the phenomenon, Bergson chose to clarify his assumptions about déjà vu, following 
the intuitions he had already presented in his previous Matter and Memory. Starting from the idea that 
déjà vu should not be considered a pathological and extraordinary occurrence, Bergson (1920) insists 
on  his  well-known description  of  the  formation  of  memory  as  simultaneous  to  perception:  “The 
formation of  memory is never posterior to the formation of  perception; it is contemporaneous with it . Step by step, as 
perception is created, the memory of  it is projected beside it, as the shadow falls beside the body” (p. 
128). He then focuses on the relation between actual and virtual, stating:
memory seems to be to the perception what the image reflected in the mirror is to the 
object in front of  it. The object can be touched as well as seen […] it is actual. The image  
is virtual, and though it resembles the object, it is incapable of  doing what the object does.  
Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself  all along with a 
virtual  existence,  a  mirror-image.  Every  moment  of  our life  presents  two aspects,  it  is 
actual and virtual, perception on the one side and memory on the other. Each moment of 
life is split up as and when it is posited. Or rather, it consists in this very splitting, for the  
present moment, always going forward, fleeting limit between the immediate past which is  
now no more and the immediate future which is not yet, would be a mere abstraction were  
it not the moving mirror which continually reflects perception as a memory. (pp. 134-135) 
Bergson continues his analysis, insisting on the necessity of  distinguishing among different “heights of 
tension or tone in psychical life” (p. 120), a tension that allows us to activate some psychological devices  
that prevent the separation of  the perception and recollection of  events inside consciousness, thus  
foreclosing a clear perception of  déjà vu at every moment. Bergson also individuates the strangest part  
of  the phenomenon in the eccentric occurrence of  a subject  who watches him/herself  living and 
observes a particular form of  his/herself  from the outside, like a viewer in front of  a screen. It is in 
this twofold experience, which deranges the usual functionality of  the conscious processes, that the 
subject  experiencing déjà  vu falls  into a paradoxical  condition of  someone watching a recollection 14
which is actually happening in the present time, and in which he is both the main character and the only 
viewer.  About the impossible localization of  memory and the wholeness of  the past, Bergson states:  
“In false recognition, the illusory memory is never localized in a particular point of  the past; it dwells in  
an indeterminate past – the past in general.” (p. 111); Deleuze (1983/1991) adds: “Not only does the 
past coexist with the present that has been, but, as it preserves itself  in itself  (while the present passes),  
it is the whole, integral past; it is all our past, which coexists with each present” (p. 59). 
The Italian philosopher Paolo Virno (1999), in his essay about this Bergson text, acutely links Bergson’s  
theories to what Nietzsche wrote about the use of  history, making the two thinkers converge on the 
equation  between  the  hypertrophy  of  memory  and  the  impossibility  of  action.  As  Nieztsche  
(1873/2004) wrote:
Imagine the most extreme example, a person who did not possess the power of  forgetting  
at all, who would be condemned to see everywhere a coming into being. Such a person no 
longer believes in himself, sees everything in moving points flowing out of  each other, and 
loses himself  in this stream of  becoming. […]. Forgetting belongs to all action, just as both 
light and darkness belong in the life of  all organic things. (p. 4)
The momentary paralysis of  history is linked to the hypertrophy of  memory. Déjà vu becomes the 
phenomenon which mirrors our era, which has often been characterized as the “end of  History”.
The importance of  déjà vu is related to the excessive visibility of  the duplicity of  every moment in a  
perceived now and a remembered now. This excess appears to be strongly related to the experience of 
the virtual  to which our age gives so much importance.  The disclosure of  “the experience of  the  
possible” in every phase of  our life (Virno, 1999, p. 41), transforms the phenomenon of  déjà vu into  
one of  the metaphors of  our era.  What Bergson writes  about the individual  phenomenon of  the 
“lowering of  the tension in psychical life” needs to be updated, because déjà vu has moved from the 
pathological and private intimacy of  the malfunctioning memory and has become a public, or rather  
collective, symptom.
The paralysis of  the vital psychological functions leading to the hegemony of  a solipsistic hypertrophy 
of  memory is clearly represented by Abel Ferrara in the previously analysed  New Rose Hotel,  which 
offers a quite surprising exemplification of  Bergson’s (1920)  ideas  about how déjà vu has nothing to 14
teach us, being just a duplication of  perception. He writes: 
We feel that we are confronted with a recollection: a recollection it must be, for it bears the  
characteristic mark of  states we usually call by this name and which only appear when their  
object has disappeared. And yet it does not present to us something which has been, but  
simply something which is; it advances pari passu with the perception it reproduces. It is a 
recollection of  the present moment in that actual moment itself. It is of  the past in its  
form and of  the present in its matter. It is a memory of  the present. (p. 136)
This paralysis of  life, this syndrome of  inaction, is at the core of  the recent production of  Gus Van  
Sant,  the  American  filmmaker  who recently  changed his  way of  narrating,  reflecting  on the  crisis 
contemporary  filmmaking is  going through.  Elephant (2003)  is  a  movie  Van Sant  dedicated to the 
Columbine High School massacre committed by two students. But Elephant is not a sociological enquiry 
into contemporary violence, nor is it a portrait of  American society and its intrinsic nihilism. It is a 
movie that shows the difficulty for cinema of  catching the intimate nature of  images, the impossibility  
that cinema is experiencing in its effort to duplicate the emotional and conscious perception of  the 
outside world. Van Sant clearly admits the strong influence of  the Hungarian director Béla Tarr and 
especially  his  Sátántangó  (1994), an influence evident in the way  Elephant is  conceived,  in the mode 
chosen to depict the situation of  stasis, of  emotional and relational paralysis that the young characters 
experience. 
The objective complexity of  an extraordinary event such as the slaughter in the Colorado high school is  
depicted by Van Sant by means of  a deep subtraction of  cinematic suspense or dramatic construction.  
The time-frame of  the event looks like an air bubble in which all the characters are trapped, without 
any possibility of  an off-screen or any reasonable explicatory flash-back. Time is frozen, and we are  
forced to follow the students in their long and purposeless walks along the corridors, to hear their  
barren  dialogues,  always  re-starting  the  chronological  unrolling  of  the  events  from a  hypothetical  
beginning. Van Sant, against all the common rules of  film grammar, avoids the parallel montage in 
order to give the sensation of  the immobility of  time: rather, he chooses to replicate a few scenes,  
shooting them differently each time. This is a process that clearly involves the activity of  memory that  
is internal to the process of  spectatorship; as J.P. Garry III (2004) writes:
There are cinematic precedents for viewing an action from different points of  view. Citizen  14
Kane (1941),  Rashomon (1950) and  JFK (1991) are among the most famous. […] In these 
films  characters  relate  their  experience  of  a  person  or  event  and  come  to  different 
conclusions, demonstrating the subjectivity of  truth. But  Elephant  doesn’t work that way. 
The action within each version of  this unremarkable scene is scrupulously identical, while 
the visual differences derive from where the camera is, not the subjective interpretation of 
each character. Van Sant is addressing more purely cinematic questions. From whose point 
of  view should dramatic action be viewed? Aren’t characters  in the background just as 
important as characters in the foreground? 
Elephant keeps the viewer distant by offering a plurality of  visions that never contribute to a better  
understanding of  the depicted reality.  The sense of  déjà vu loses the uncanny mystery of  its own 
innermost essence and becomes a purely optical intermission in the flow of  a non-linear narrative. The 
same choice is also followed in Last Days (2005, about the final hours of  the rock star Kurt Cobain’s 
life) and especially in Paranoid Park (2007). Whereas in Last Days we watch a few fragments repeating 
twice (again, from different points of  view, but never giving the impression of  a step further towards 
the  truth  about  the  mystery  of  Kurt  Cobain’s  suicide),  in  Paranoid  Park  Van  Sant  radicalizes  his 
approach and chooses to build the entire movie like a traditionally structured pop song with its verses 
and its repeating chorus (here, images of  young boys going around the park on their skateboards), a  
visual refrain that offers itself  to the eyes of  the viewer, provoking a sudden sensation of  déjà vu. It  
means we immediately understand we have already been there, we have watched the same images, but  
we experience them as if  they were in front of  us for the first time because we filter them with the 
psychological impasse experienced by the mind we are visiting. 
Paranoid Park could easily be read as a mental projection of  the main character who, overwhelmed by 
the responsibility for the murder he committed, continues to watch and re-watch the same images,  
trying to obtain a clearer vision of  what has just happened to him. But, as with New Rose Hotel, nothing 
becomes clearer. It is just a stream of  images, a continuous déjà vu in which the character doubles  
himself, becoming both the viewer and the main player of  the sequences. The character seems to be  
living while optically perceiving, but he is really paralyzed in a situation in which the only active move  
he can make is  to rewatch the  blurred images of  a  skateboard moving up and down the hills  of 
Paranoid Park. Once again, the footage that is repeatedly shown is an apparently empty moment of  the 
character’s life: the meaningless repetition of  pointless sequences does not tell us anything about the  14
violent event around which the movie spins. But these futile plans are the images that surface in his and 
our perception, not the fundamental moments describing the murder he involuntarily committed. It is 
the same choice adopted in Elephant: an ordinary occurrence, totally separated from the dramatic event 
that is supposed to be the turning point of  the plot, identically repeated different times during the  
movie. The uncanny effect of  déjà vu is obtained through the familiarity with already-seen images, and 
with the dramatic subtraction that these images contain. We are forced to inhabit this box of  distilled  
time, always recognizing that we are building a form of  recollection in the same moment that we are 
perceiving. Our voyage in Van Sant’s cartography of  consciousness follows the fleeting movements of 
the skateboard while we float between the two conditions that Benjamin foresaw in the future of  the 
cinematic  audience:  shock  and distraction.  This  is  where  the  contemporary  (again  with  Benjamin) 
“atrophy of  experience” meets Bergson’s intuition about the duplicity of  the perceptual act and the  
collapse of  action in the presence of  a hypertrophic memory. 
The complex relation between past and present returns in Deleuze’s (1985/1989) words, acccording to  
a specific perspective  that,  following Bergson,  insists on a coexistence of  the two dimensions that  
transforms  the  paramnesia (that  is,  the  illusion  of  déjà  vu)  in  a  sort  of  nonpathological  and 
unexceptional condition of  human perception:
What is actual is always a present. But then, precisely, the present changes or passes. We 
can always say that it becomes past when it no longer is, when a new present replaces it.  
But this is meaningless. It is clearly necessary for it to pass on for the new present to arrive, 
and it is clearly necessary for it to pass at the same time as it is present, at the moment that  
it is the present. Thus the image has to be present and past, still present and already past, at 
once and at the same time. If  it  was not already past at the same time as present,  the  
present would never pass on. The past does not follow the present that it is no longer, it  
coexists with the present it was. (pp. 78-79)
Reconsidering some of  Bergson’s ideas, particularly those from his later production, John Mullarkey 
(2004) proposes an interesting subversion of  Deleuze’s perspective, arguing that:
It is not that there is one type of  actual perception with the virtual existing beyond and 
around it  (as  a  reservoir  of  differences),  but  rather  that  there  are  different  forms of 
actualities that virtualize their mutual differences such that a lowest common denominator 
is  abstracted  or  spatialized  […]  whilst  those  differences  are  consigned  to  a  halo 
surrounding that  single  actuality  and called  'the  virtual'  or  the  'memory  of  the  past'.
To provide a less exotic analogy in terms of  visibility and invisibility, Virtualism thinks of 
the  invisible  as  the  ontological  ground  of  the  visible,  while  Actualism thinks  of  the 14
invisible as a psychological artefact of  vision. For Actualism, things are always visible in 
and to themselves […] and only invisible to certain points of  view (pp. 474-475).
This radical shift is not simple a rethinking of  nominal categories but insists on the specificity of  our 
situated persepective that makes things visible or not, according to the active role of  our psychological  
movement that (as Bergson clearly lays out in The Creative Mind) depends on a choice “determined by 
our power of  acting” (p. 68). 
14
3 Seeing Is Believing? 
- Sight diseases and the changing of  cinematic point of  view
Scientific experiments have shown that if  we take a person 
and hook their brains up to certain PET scans or computer 
technology and ask them to look at a certain object, and 
they watch, certain areas of  the brain light up. And then 
they have asked them to close their eyes and imagine the 
same object, and when they imagine the same object it the 
same areas of  the brain to light up as if  they were actually 
visually looking at it. So it caused scientists to back up and 
ask this question. So who sees then? Does the brain see? 
Or do the eyes see? And what is reality? Is  reality what 
we’re seeing with our brain or is reality what we’re seeing 
with our eyes? And the truth is  that the brain does not 
know  the  difference  between  what  it  sees  in  its 
environment  and  what  it  remembers  because  the  same 
specific  neural  nets  are  then  firing.  So  then  it  asks  the 
question: What is reality?
(from the movie  What  the  Bleep  Do We Know?,  2004, 
produced and directed by William Arntz, Betsy Chasse, 
Mark Vicente)
The cinematic experience has always been marked by a particular  visual  approach towards images.  
Compared to other visual experiences, watching a movie is a totally different way of  relating to images,  
and the key issue of  the movement of  the images is not just an additional element that  algebraically 
enriches the result of  the visual process. Sight has always been considered the  place in which images 
happen, and the metaphor of  the mechanical eye adopted in the description of  the movie camera has  
always insisted on a similarity that maybe does not tell the whole truth. 
The entire cinematographic experience, for instance, is  rooted in an illusion: the spectator is never  
aware  of  the little  gaps of  darkness that  separate one frame from another.  The perception of  an 
uninterrupted luminosity 
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can be explained thanks to the “critical frequency of  fusion” or the “frequency of  the 
stimulus, where the physical intermittence is no longer phenomenally present, even as the 
variation of  the intensity of  the source  of  light” (Romano 1965:  10).  The cadence of 
twenty-four frames per second guarantees the end of  the “flickering” (still present with the 
first projectors, with only eighteen frames per second) and completely eliminates the gap 
between light and darkness. (Casetti, 1993/1999, p. 95)
This appears to be one of  the first and more fundamental strategies of  deception that cinema carries 
out through its mechanical apparatus, an apparatus that at the same time guarantees the wholeness of  a  
perfectly told lie and offers to human sight a series of  mirrors in which reality is reshaped and re-
experienced. Human sight is always kept under consideration, from the very beginning of  the cinematic 
spectacle: a particular form of  blindness is the one that allows the viewer not to perceive all the blanks  
existing between each frame of  the film. The velocity of  the film’s movement inside the projecting 
machine is calculated in order to obliterate this failing vision, this invisible darkness that we do not  
perceive. It emerges as an important element that forces theory to reflect upon the mechanisms that  
regulate the activity of  sight and the construction of  vision. There is a paradoxical difference between 
the mechanics of  the human eye and the meaning formation that is activated at a more abstract level  
during the perceptual process. The paradox, according to Benjamin, insists upon the inexplicable nature  
of  the  cinematic  medium itself.  In  his  most  famous  essay,  “The Work of  Art  in  the  Age of  Its  
Technological  Reproducibility”  (1936/2008),  he  reflects  on sight  and  visual  perception and writes: 
“Clearly, it is another nature which speaks to the camera as compared to the eye. ‘Other’ above all in the 
sense  that  a  space  informed  by  human  consciousness  gives  way  to  a  space  informed  by  the  
unconscious” (p. 37). What Benjamin affirms is that a direct and unmediated perception of  reality is  
simply impossible, given the enormous mental and unconscious activity that surrounds, precedes and 
follows the mere physical reception of  visual data.
What cinema is  teaching us nowadays is  a  radical  rethinking of  the  profound organization of  the  
medium itself  that,  following decisive innovations  in  the  field  of  digital  images  and visual  special 
effects, is undergoing a radical re-conceptualization involving both its communicative level and its inner  
structure.  The  revolution  experienced  by  cinema  in  recent  years  is  the  logical  continuation  of  a  
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discourse that was born together with the origins of  photography and cinema, a discourse that leads 
directly  towards  an  isomorphism  between  visual  operations  and  mental  representations  as  an 
unavoidable touchstone in contemporary reflections about visual communication.
If  direct and unmediated vision is an impossible task in an increasingly technological and digital world,  
systems of  visual communication are somehow invested with the curious task of  both representing the 
altered world that human sight cannot contain and showing, through images,  the exteriorization of 
certain human cognitive processes in digital machines, computers and, through those tools, cinematic  
systems of  communication. 
Furthermore, recent discoveries in the medical field have led scientists to analyse, in great visual detail,  
the inner workings of  the body and the reactions of  the brain during visual processes, dramatically 
altering theories of  human mental faculties connected to the eye and the perceptual apparatus as a  
whole. A long series of  studies centered on the activity of  the eye led medicine and science to the  
conceptually subversive conclusion, reached long after philosophy, that the eyes do not actually see; just  
as vision is a complex process that involves several areas of  the brain, so too are there many parts of 
the brain active in the registration and elaboration of  the raw data obtained by the visual apparatus.  
Contemporary  tendencies  in  neurobiology  differ  from the  traditional  understanding  of  the  brain’s 
functioning. In the past, it was believed that only one area was responsible for vision while another area 
was  linked  to  the  intellectual  capacity  of  comprehension.  Of  course,  these  older  theories  were  
formulated without the essential aid of  the technological supports that nowadays make sharper and 
more accurate imaging inside the brain areas possible. 
Indeed, vision is one of  the processes that has undergone the most reconsideration in contemporary  
theories. As Samir Zeki (2000) points out in his study of  the relations between the arts and the brain,  
what has changed is the way we now understand vision as a complex and modular process
in which the brain, in its quest for knowledge about the visual world, discards, selects 
and, by comparing the selected information to its stored record, generates the visual 
image in the brain, a process remarkably similar to what an artist does. This view 
emerged from one major  finding,  namely  that  there  are  many other  visual  areas 
surrounding  the  primary  visual  cortex  (area  V1)  and  that  their  participation  is  
essential for a normal vision. […] This proliferation of  newly discovered visual areas,  
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many of  which are specialised to process different aspects of  the visual scene such as 
form, colour and motion, raised important questions about why the brain needs to 
proceed different attributes in different compartments. And it is this discovery, and 
the  train  of  thought  precipitated  by  it,  that  was  instrumental,  if  not  unique,  in 
ushering in the view that vision is an essentially active search for essentials. (p. 21) 
These more recent theories, made possible by technological improvements in the medical field, also 
explain that there are not specific areas devoted exclusively to the reception of  perceptual data arriving  
from the outside because each section is involved both in the reception and transmission of  these 
signals. The process, as mentioned above, is modular precisely because different parts of  the brain both 
receive and send data and information, and there is no apparent or substantial hierarchy among them.  
Their modularity can be more easily understood by looking at studies which focus on pathologies of  
aesthetic experience. Achromatopsia (colour blindness), prosopagnosia (inability to recognize faces) and 
akinetopsia (visual motion blindness) are severe pathological conditions caused by lesions in specific  
brain areas, each specializing in particular activities. Each specific pathology indicates how, for every  
single aspect of  visual perception, a specific area of  the brain is involved, a conclusion which would 
have been completely unpredictable for researchers active thirty years ago. Moreover, pathologies of 
visual perception provide a stimulating topic (or, perhaps, simply a different vantage point) from which 
to better examine the complex nature of  these topics. 
An image is a construction. It does not exist by itself, and it is the final product of  the process that  
starts with the opening of  an eye. Scientists and medical experts, supported by such machines as the 
fMRI or the CAT scan, have affirmed this complex nature of  images. The long path which started  
from Platonic theories about ideal forms existing in a separate world is arriving at its final turn. But 
there are other,  perhaps more relevant elements that are involved in this radical  revolution.  Digital 
images are a sort of  involuntary fruit of  developments in medical technology because they are part of  a 
bigger and theoretically more devastating process that involves the production of  images, not only their 
reception or perception. 
Instead of  considering images as extractions from the real, as visual reflections of  the defined shape of 15
things,  contemporary theoretical  problematizations of  digital  visual  technologies push us towards a  
different  position  in  the  spatial  relationship  between  the  self,  its  context  and  the  visual  domain. 
Historically, we have experienced a slow but gradual dissolution of  this concept of  “representation”, 
thanks  to  the  dissolution  of  the  humanistic  perspective.  The  notion  of  sameness,  the  logic  of 
resemblance – the transcendent values of  artistic codes – have relentlessly lost their prominence in 
correspondence  with  the  significant  developments  in  visual  technology  that  have  empowered  and 
enhanced the virtual capacities of  the medium and, consequently, have pushed physiological boundaries  
to  unthinkable  limits.  The  traditional  concept  of  mimesis has  slowly  disappeared  from the  cultural 
horizon throughout the twentieth century, even though there has been a sort of  cryptic reappearance 
linked to digital graphics and the cultural implications of  hyper-realism. Thus, digital images reaffirm 
the principle of  the “constructed image” that analogical photography had partially hidden.
The construction of  the image implies a different geography of  perception for our physical apparatus.  
The different condition and position determined by technological innovations is a transformed visual  
environment, a landscape which still contemplates the human perceiving subject but which posits this  
subject as utterly dispossessed of  its previous centrality. As Regis Debray (1992) acutely notes in his 
analysis of  what he calls the “videosphere”: 
we  were  in  front  of images,  now  we  are  inside the  visual.  The  flux-form  is  not  to  be 
contemplated anymore, it is but a parasite: a distraction for the eyes. The entire paradox of  
our third era [the videosphere] lies in the fact that it gives supremacy to the auditory and  
transforms sight into a modality of  listening. Once, the term “landscape” referred to the eye and 
“ambient” to sound. Now, the visual has become an almost resonant atmosphere, and the 
former “landscape” has evolved into an enveloping synaesthetic environment. […] Seeing 
means withdrawing from the seen, cutting oneself  off  from it, going back to a pre-visual 
condition. The eye is situated off-screen, while the ear is immersed in the field of  sounds,  
music or noises.  We watch from a distance,  but we hear from very  close.  Sonic  space 
absorbs, drinks in, penetrates; we are possessed by it, whereas we can possess beings and 
things through vision that are as “clear and distinct” as an idea. […] Visual perception is  
distanced, while sonic perception is a merging, if  not tactile, experience. (p. 229) 
The physical  position  of  the  body  in  the  visual  experience is  also the  metaphorical  presence and 
position of  the subject in the contemporary mediascape. The location of  the body profoundly alters 
our perceptual relations, and the “where” affects the “how”. Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days  (1995) is 
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perhaps the most relevant example (especially for its prophetic intuitions) of  a certain cinema that tries 
to reflect upon this renewed condition of  the characters and the viewer. 
The film begins with an eye, open, and a voice saying, “boot it”. The eye closes, the image blurs into a  
crowd of  confused pixels  and dissolves.  A new sequence starts.  It  is  a  long shot  involving a few 
criminals, their entrance into a restaurant, their violent behaviour (they have stocking masks on, they 
have guns, they want money) and the police chasing them. The point of  view of  the entire shot belongs  
to one of  the criminals, and the sequence becomes nerve-rattling while they try to escape. They reach 
the  roof.  They try  to  jump from one building  to  the  next,  but  the  character  whose  sight  we are  
borrowing fails in his jump and falls down to the street. We see this fall through a subjective shot, as  
happens throughout the whole sequence.  After he crashes to the ground, we see a distorted image 
followed by a man who pulls off  a headset and throws out the disc, complaining about the fact that he 
does not want to deal with snuff  images, that he does not like the moment “when they die”. 
At this point, the nature of  the image has changed: we have passed from a rough and gyrating point-of-
view perspective to a more professional cinematography and the perspective of  an omniscient narrator. 
The shift is from an internal and convulsive viewpoint to a more relaxed and narratively canonical third 
person perspective. Our position has been brutally shifted from the subjective to the objective. We have 
also experienced and explored the unconscious conventions implied in this particular point-of-view 
structure. Only at the end of  the shot, when we go back to Lenny shouting at his friend about the  
content of  the sequence, can we understand what we have seen: although during the long take we 
might catch a glimpse of  the invisible character whose eyes are “shooting” the scene when he looks at 
himself  in the mirror, it is not until after the lethal jump that we understand that Lenny’s eyes were  
filtering our vision. In brief, during a single take, we have shared the points of  view of  two different 
characters. So this conceptual movement lets us pass from a position of  an absolute lack of  knowledge 
(we do not know anything about the first shot) to a double awareness. We have inhabited two different  
points of  view, the first one linked to the eyes of  the robber, the second transmitted through the brain  
of  Lenny Nero.
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In Strange Days, our position continuously shifts, and we often share our vision with a doubled subject. 
The concept itself  of  the subjective shot is taken to its extreme, with an uninterrupted superimposition 
between different and variable points of  view. This is due to a sort of  enhancement of  what, in 1995,  
was “virtual reality”. The futuristic instrument imagined in the passage, set in the narrative between 
1999 and 2000, is a superconducting quantum interference device, or SQUID, first experimented with 
for police surveillance and then become widespread as an illegal technology. The SQUID records and 
“playbacks” an experience: this means that the SQUID records what the wearer perceives through lived 
experience on a disk, so that later a customer may buy the disk and playback it in order to live the same 
experience in the first person, through its transmission to the brain. Lenny, who smuggles this banned 
technology,  explains  to  a  new user  that  “This  is  not  ‘like  TV only  better’.  This  is  life.  Pieces  of  
somebody’s life. Pure and uncut, straight from the cerebral cortex”. 
By way of  a device worn on the top of  the head, all the physical sensations of  anything the user desires  
are available to be perceived as real. The visual effect, the recording of  cerebral cortex activity, becomes 
a  wearable  technology that  allows another  person to  re-experience  exactly  the  same event.  In  the  
recording phase, the eyes operate a camera and the storage of  images is activated by the coalescence of  
brain and SQUID technology. When the SQUID works as a visual device, the subject can experience  
exactly  the  same perceptions  lived by the  recorder  wearer,  as  if  they  were  produced by an actual  
circumstance. SQUID is not a hallucinatory tool, but rather permits people to share experiences. There  
is a double implication that erases two fundamental issues usually involved in a visual experience: time  
and context. The chronological connotation of  the re-lived experience is always the one belonging to 
the recorded event; the re-enactment of  the stored episode absolutely removes the now of  the SQUID 
user, allowing her/him to enter a time dimension that limits itself  to the eternal present of  the original 
event. Secondly, and more relevantly for the visual aspect of  the device, the context of  the second-hand  
experience is totally indifferent, given that Lenny recommends that his clients close their eyes during  
the SQUID experience in order to avoid unpleasant superimpositions of  the two fields of  vision. For a  
SQUID user,  opening  one’s  eyes  during  playback  would  mean to  merging  the  data  arriving  from 
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physical sight and that transmitted directly to the brain by the technological device into a single stream,  
obtaining a meaningless visual signal. Other visual superimpositions happen when some characters are 
exposed to signals which are too powerful: they do not actually die, but their sensory ability is enhanced 
to the point of  catatonic overload. The visual representation of  this mental death is shown through a 
subjective vision of  an indistinct visual chaos, with electric stimuli taking geometrical and unreadable 
shapes that visually communicate the void of  a disconnected brain.
So, what exactly is it that we are confronted with in a feature film like  Strange Days? A device that 
bypasses sight as a cognitive sense and interfaces directly with the brain, bombing the cerebral cortex 
with recorded information. The brain reads this information by visualizing them, but the eyes must stay 
closed. What are the implications of  this double erasure? What does it mean to live in a perpetual 
present which is always re-experienced? What happens when the body becomes a platform, available  
for any shareable experience,  totally  separated from the surrounding reality? In a challenging essay 
about Bigelow’s movie and the philosophy of  Georges Bataille, Karnicky (1998) writes: 
The SQUID user is the picture of  pure expenditure; Bigelow shows us a wired-in Lenny, 
eyes closed, groping at the air around him, moaning ecstatically in sexual abandon. These 
shots of  Lenny are intercut with shots of  his SQUID experience; the spectator can see and 
hear what Lenny is feeling, all from Lenny’s point of  view. We see Faith stripping off  her  
sweaty clothes and we see them fucking from Lenny’s perspective. The spectator becomes 
implicated in Lenny’s voyeurism, but not by means of  a simple one-to-one identification. It 
could be anybody jacked into the SQUID; memories have transgressed the limits of  the 
self. Through SQUID, sensations move from body to body producing ecstasies that cannot 
be individualized. Privacy and individuality are forgotten in the pure experience of  jacking 
in,  an  experience  whose  only  product  is  bodily  excitation.  You no  longer  have  to  be 
yourself.
Bigelow shows other possible damage that SQUID may cause: for instance, the perversion of  the killer  
who records himself  while raping and killing and, simultaneously, transmits the signal to the “jacked in”  
brains of  his victims. In the sequence that shows Lenny watching the murder of  his friend Iris, apart 
from seeing all of  Lenny’s violent reactions while wearing the SQUID and “experiencing” the slaughter,  
we also witness the rape and killing from the assassin’s point of  view. Taking his sadism even further, 
the murderer decides to put the SQUID onto Iris’s head, connecting it to the one he is wearing. The  
effect of  this prolongation of  mirrored perceptions is that the assassin allows her to experience his  15
brutal sensations while he is strangling her. Iris becomes the object and the subject of  this experience,  
simultaneously being the victim and the witness of  the event. Her double point of  view is complicated 
by the presence of  an additional spectator, Lenny, who is playbacking both of  the recorded experiences  
straight to his brain.
Even if  Strange Days inserts at this point a certain insistence about the ethics and morality of  the act of 
seeing (Lenny refuses to deal with death experiences, but is later forced to playback Iris’s death and  
other violent diskettes  intentionally made  for him  by the killer),  what is  more than evident is  that 
Bigelow and  James  Cameron  (author  of  the  screenplay)  are  showing  us  a  complex  and stratified 
metaphor of  the cinematic audience’s condition. Lenny and the other SQUID-addicts can virtually live 
any  possible  experience,  escaping  their  bodily  conditions  and  their  physical  and  psychological  
circumstances, but they can never interact with the content of  the disk. While the SQUID device allows  
them to really perceive things, what they miss in this delayed and postponed experience is the possibility  
of  intervening in order to change the flow of  the events. They can only close their eyes and playback.  
Moreover, there is a clear meta-cinematic reference in the rape sequence: during the violent act, the 
killer forms a frame with his hands, simulating the definition of  a cinematic frame. This suggested 
frame becomes the  actual  frame of  the  sequence when the camera  moves forwards  until  the  two 
framing  borders  are  fully  superimposed.  The  killer  is  actually  “directing”  his  brutal  actions  –  the  
representation of  the rape and murder does not come after the act but coincides with the act itself. 
The  main  reference  of  this  cinematic  quotation  is,  quite  obviously,  Michael  Powell  and  Emerich 
Pressburger’s Peeping Tom (1959), in which a psychopathic character kills young women with a strange, 
long knife mounted to the structure of  the camera he uses to capture the fear in his victims’ eyes. Both  
movies begin with an extreme close-up of  a human eye and with the main character “seeing” a filmed 
sequence. But in the first sequence of  Peeping Tom, the eye we see is opening (whereas Lenny Nero’s eye 
closes at the beginning of  Strange Days), forming a sort of  poetic declaration that associates these two 
great movies. And the sequence projected and watched by the protagonist is clearly marked by the  
visual signs of  the apparatus involved in its shooting: there is a sort of  internal  cadrage, a frame that 
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communicates how what is being shown to our eyes is an image taken by a camera. In contrast, no  
visual frames or signs mark the opening subjective shot of  Strange Days, apart from the pixeled blurring 
that  opens  and closes  the  long shot.  Both movies  tell  the  story  of  a  murderous  eye,  construct  a 
narrative  world  in  which  sight  carries  sexually  connotations  and  vision  walks  hand-in-hand  with  
perversion.  While Bigelow complicates her  movie with political  and social  implications,  they never 
manage to erase the importance of  its theoretical reflection about sight and its transformations. More 
importantly, whereas Peeping Tom is a vertiginous reflection featuring a technological apparatus reduced 
to the classical, traditional photographic cinematography, the visual experiences shared and worn by the  
characters  of  Strange  Days  tell  us something more articulated about the complex and differentiated 
visualscape in which we live. 
And  it  appears  evident  that  it  is  exactly  the  connection  between  the  human  body  and  evolving 
technologies that offers the most accurate idea about perception in the age of  electronic reproduction.  
The evocative coalescence of  psycho-sensory mechanisms and technological apparatus (the shareable 
images, but also vision through closed eyes) depicted in  Strange Days opens a field of  discussion and 
establishes a cultural debate about the new boundaries of  cinematographic spectatorship. This topic 
brings us back to Bergson (evoked through the adoption of  the term “coalescence”) and his thesis  
about images and technology. In the first chapter of  Matter and Memory  (1939/1991), he analyses the 
relation between sight and image, affirming that neither of  those theoretical poles exists autonomously,  
as  an  a  priori.  Bergson makes  a  pivotal  distinction when he writes  about  the  present  image  and the 
represented image, in which the latter is a real image determined by an activity of  diminution, making the 
representation of  an image “less than its presence; for it would then suffice that the images present  
should be compelled to abandon something of  themselves in order that their mere presence should 
convert them into representations” (p. 27). 
The simultaneity and convergent movement of  image and sight are barely relevant in our analysis:  
without technology, we would have what Bergson defines as a “present image”, and without human 
perception,  sight  would  be  considered  a  purely  mechanical  and  retinal  activity.  The  relevant  and 
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determinant  presence  of  technology  behind  the  image  leads  us  directly  into  the  realm  of  the 
aforementioned  represented  image,  derived  from  a  diminutive  movement.  But  where  does  this 
diminution takes place? Through which apparatus does the image lose a part of  itself  and abandon 
something that is a fragment of  its unity? As Fabio Denunzio (2004) points out: 
this activity of  abandonment occurs through the specific treatment that cinematographic 
technology operates upon images. In these terms, a represented image cannot be seen by a  
purely retinal, optical sight, by a mere function of  a sensory organ, but by a perception that 
begins to be produced when we create a distance, when we hesitate, delay, take our time 
upon the induced response. (pp. 130-131)
Strange Days tells us a lot about the uncertain and revolutionary nature of  contemporary images, but – 
pointing its camera towards us, looking at us and our way of  seeing  – it also explains the indefinite 
position of  spectatorial  activity.  Bergson explained that the cinematographic experience is a sort of 
liberation from the obligation of  the biological reaction that transforms our perception into an active 
movement thanks to the defined combination of  a manifest technology and our living consciousness. If  
the display of  the technological apparatus is powerful and evident, if  the metaphorical screen created 
by the manifestation of  the technological frame becomes thicker, then the consideration we take of 
sight  and its  power is  better  framed and intended.  The liberation  from the dictatorial  and merely  
biological  consideration  of  perception  helps  us  in  rethinking  the  position  of  the  eye,  and  a 
metaphorical blindness is not a condition transformed allegorically but a biological reconsideration that 
acquires its importance in a cultural transformation like the one we are experiencing. 
The long decline of  the dominance of  the eye and sight in western culture has ancient roots, and 
Bergson must be at the centre of  our analysis because his theories about perception and memory are 
strongly related to a re-reading of  the body’s position. In his book  Downcast  Eye,  Martin Jay (1993) 
identifies Bergson as one of  the key thinkers that helped philosophical analysis move toward a broader 
investigation  of  the  redefinition  of  sight  and the  mechanisms  of  vision  in  the  twentieth  century.  
According to Jay, this happened because: 
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Bergson helped redirect philosophical inquiry back toward the body as intertwined with 
consciousness before the separation of  mind from matter. In  Matter and Memory […] he 
challenged the positivist image of  the body as an object to be analysed from the outside, as  
merely one of  the innumerable “things” in the material world. Instead, he claimed that it  
was the ground of  all our perceptions. (pp. 192-194)
The centrality of  the body marks the great  comeback of  Bergson at the centre of  contemporary film 
theory. After the Eighties and their long aesthetic persistence, in recent years the body has changed 
position in the structure of  spectatorial experience. In films from the Eighties, the body is obsessively  
used as the pivotal object conveying the spectatorial gaze. The passive nature of  the body is reflected in  
its objectified nature, and, throughout the decade of  Ronald Reagan and John Rambo, the body reaches 
the point of  absolute centrality for the decisive model of  spectatorial construction defined by a certain  
brand of  Hollywood cinema. Nowadays, after a long and articulated shift that seems to have incubated 
during the Nineties, a new representation of  the human body has emerged that is linked to a redefined 
subjectivity, to the disappearance of  the extremely affirmative power of  the self  smuggled in during the 
Eighties. The body has become the critical place of  a subject who lives and perceives, and who reads the 
surrounding reality through a perceptual apparatus that appears fallible. The subject is exposed to all 
the risks of  an uncertain and unverifiable relationship with the outside world, a relationship that is 
always mutable: 
“As my body moves in space, all the other images vary, while that image, my body, remains 
invariable. I must, therefore, make it a center, to which I refer all the other images… My 
body is that which stands out as the center of  these perceptions” (pp. 46-47). 
Rather than constructing the body as an object of  contemplation, we should understand it instead as 
the ground of  our acting in the world: “Our body is an instrument of  action, and of  action only. In no  
degree, in no sense, under no aspect, does it serve to prepare, far less to explain, a representation”(p. 
225). (Jay, 1993, pp. 192-193, citing Bergson, 1939/1991)
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As Bergson wrote,  the hegemonic privilege given to the activity  of  seeing has been central  to the  
entirely of  Western thought. The spatialization of  time seems to be the rational result of  the technical 
nature of  this assumption, and the spatialization of  time itself  appears to be one of  the main reasons  
for the crisis in the visual sense around which Western thought has revolved over the centuries. 
Here  we  are  confronted  with  a  further  actualization  of  Bergson’s  theories,  namely  the  analysis  
conducted by Merleau-Ponty in  The Visible and the Invisible (1964/1969) that leads to a redefinition of 
bodily boundaries. According to the major thinkers and scientists of  the twentieth century, these bodily  
boundaries,  rather  than  being  indisputable  evidence  or  a  scientific  assumption,  are  cultural  and 
psychological constructions deriving from the “repetition of  (culturally and historically) specific bodily 
performances” (Barad, 2007, p. 155). 
Sight does not coincide with the exclusivity of  the self. As Merleau-Ponty (1964/1969) writes:
it is not I who sees, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of  us, a 
vision in general, in virtue of  that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here 
and  now,  of  radiating  everywhere  and  forever,  being  an  individual,  of  being  also  a 
dimension and a universal. (p. 142)
Moreover, sight does not depend exclusively upon the specific functionality of  the optics of  the eye or  
the neurological sites devoted to the processing of  visual data. As shown by numerous studies, our 
visual activity does not depend only upon the eyes, and, furthermore, the mind is neither a mirror nor a  
camera. In an extremely interesting essay about the intuitions of  Paul Cézanne, Jonah Lehrer (2007) 
explains how Cézanne’s almost abstract canvases comprise the most advanced depiction of  the “actual” 
functioning of  visual experience. The merely visual sensation absolutely needs the integration of  the 
brain functions in order to give a sense to the raw material that arrives through sight  with a lot of 
details that have to be added. Lehrer continues:
16
if  the mind didn’t impose itself  on the eye, then our vision would be full of  voids. For 
example, because there are no light-sensitive cones where the optic nerve connects to the 
retina, we each have a literal blind spot in the center of  the visual field. But we are blind to 
our own blind spot: our brain unfailingly registers a seamless world. This ability to make 
sense of  our incomplete senses is a result of  human cortical anatomy. The visual cortex is  
divided into distinct areas, neatly numbered 1 through 5. If  you trace the echoes of  light 
from the V1, the neural area where information from the retina first appears as a collection 
of  lines, to the V5, you can watch the visual scene acquire its unconscious creativity. Reality 
is continually refined, until the original sensation – that incomplete canvas – is swallowed 
by our subjectivity. (p. 117)
Lehrer analyses the recent discoveries of  neuroscience from a cultural point of  view, and bases his 
writing upon these discoveries. But, at the same time, we are somehow reading a sort of  scientifically 
updated repetition of  what Deleuze reads in Bergson when, discussing the interrelations between sight  
and the mind, between perception and its dynamics, he writes: 
As  Bergson says,  we do not  perceive  the  thing or  the  image in its  entirety,  we always 
perceive less of  it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what is  
in  our interest  to perceive,  by virtue of  our economic interests,  ideological  beliefs  and 
psychological demands. We therefore normally perceive only  clichés.  […] Sometimes it is 
necessary to restore the lost  parts,  to rediscover everything that cannot be seen in the 
image, everything that has been removed to make it “interesting”. (pp. 20-21)
While  it  evidently  insists  on  mechanisms  of  vision  that  are  constituted  by  deceptive  and illusory 
perceptions, that are framed by the gigantic misunderstanding of  our incomplete act of  vision, cinema 
could instead work in a paradoxically divergent way, trying to highlight the complex nature of  vision 
and begin a scientifically-aware reflection on these issues. 
Well before the advent of  the digital image, a few filmmakers worked on the concept of  the physical  
and psychological position of  the image. An image, so to say, caught in its double relation with the  
viewer  and  the  viewed.  Two  astonishing  examples  of  this  approach  can  be  identified  in  Stanley  
Kubrick’s  The  Shining  (1980)  and  Cronenberg’s  Videodrome  (1983).  In  both  movies,  the  narrative 
strategies obey a main conceptual frame that can be synthesized in the question: “Are the images real,  
or are we watching a hallucination/dream?” Deleuze (1985/1989), in a brief  reference to Kubrick’s 
masterpiece, asks, “And, in The Shining, how can we decide what comes from the inside and what comes 
from the outside, the extra-sensory perceptions or hallucinatory projections?” (p. 206).
What becomes decisive are the relations that we can identify between human and biological vision and 
16
the  functioning  of  cinema  (and  other  vision  substitutes).  The  extreme  implementation  of 
contemporary visual technologies dramatically increases the quantitative possibilities of  the visible but, 
at the same time, questions the actual persistence and cultural transformation of  sight as a human  
sense. From the eyes disseminated throughout our cities in order to control our societies and keep  
them under close surveillance to the eyes of  the web-cameras that are practically everywhere, all these  
visual instruments are profoundly transforming the visualscape and the epistemology of  vision: 
Vision,  once  substantial,  becomes  accidental.  Despite  the  elaborate  debate  surrounding  the 
problem of  the objectivity of  mental or instrumental images, this revolutionary change in 
the regime of  vision was not clearly perceived and the fusion-confusion of  eye and camera 
lens, the passage from vision to visualisation, settled easily into accepted norms. While the 
human gaze became more and more fixed, losing some of  its natural speed and sensitivity,  
photographic shots, on the contrary, became even faster. (Virilio, 1988/1994, p. 13)
The ultimate goal of  these transformations seems to be a radical rethinking of  our concept of  reality.  
As Franco La Polla (1997) acutely noted, one of  the untold missions accomplished by cinema during its  
more than one century of  life has been the obliteration of  reality: the constant pursuit of  a technology 
allowing the most perfect and faithful representation of  reality could be impressive evidence of  the 
sense of  inquietude that, throughout the twentieth century, collided with our notion of  reality. It seems 
that, with a subterranean but superficial strategy, cinema has worked as a complex mechanism able to 
both destroy and reconstruct the way in which reality is perceived and experienced. Developed as a 
vicarious  element  of  our  perceptual  system,  cinema  has  developed  into  an  autonomous  and 
multisensory apparatus that, at the same time, within the space of  any edited single frame shot, has 
simultaneously eradicated the sense of  a solid and reliable perception of  reality in order to substitute a  
structured and one-dimensional sensory relation with a protean simulation. A simulation in which the 
virtual has overlapped the actual in a confused structure in which nothing is clearly recognizable and  
our cognition of  reality lies on the same surface as its simulation. 
The subjectless reality  that contemporary cinema relentlessly offers our bemused senses is built upon 
the paradoxical condition of  an excess of  reality itself. The final effect of  this double movement of 
erasure and simulation passes through the eye. The eye is experiencing a continuous loss of  importance  
and relevance within the visual system, and that profound transformation is necessarily linked to a more 16
general and complex redefinition of  the systemic relationship between the subject and the surrounding 
world. 
If  reality  and virtual  reality  substantially  coincide,  the  conceptually  devastating  consequence  is  the  
impossibility for our sight to work as it once did. Sight is the measurement of  the distance between us  
and the world; an image, as Serge Daney (1991) wonderfully said, needs “the Other” to exist as such, 
and sight – if  the distance between the subject and reality is substantially eliminated, and if  the Other is 
no longer offered to vision – finds itself  completely lost in this uncertain status. Sight worked as a 
reliable instrument that offered a distance, detecting a presence in the world which passed through the 
awareness of  alterity. Now sight’s function has been downgraded by the significant superimposition 
between the eye and the world that inevitably leads to a reconsideration of  the status of  sight. If  there 
is  no more physical  and metaphorical  distance between the two poles  of  vision,  then vision itself 
brutally discovers the disappearance of  a codified visual space. The visual besiege experienced by sight 
is the final result of  this obliteration of  the distance between the eye and the world. Curiously, the  
disappearance of  vision as we have known it has happened in conjunction with the appearance of  a  
more defined level of  realism in the images created and represented. It is like a switching of  roles:  
when the eye finds itself  in the surprising position of  being a malfunctioning tool, cinema bypasses it  
and completes its long journey towards the substitution of  reality with itself. 
So what remains? As Marco Dinoi (2008) notes, cinema is confronted with a double option: on one  
side,  the  possibility  of  seeing  more,  of  abandoning  vision  to  the  overflow  of  images,  almost 
surrendering  to the  excessive  and disruptive power of  a  total  visibility  that  does  not  consider  the  
hypothesis of  something obscure or unseen. On the other side, there is the second option of:
seeing less,  interposing an interference between ourselves and the world in order to dilate the time of 
cognition, of  the gaze, and by doing so, reappropriating it and snatching it from clichés and 
the  iconic  proliferation  of  a  “civilization  of  images”.  […] In  both  cases,  we  have  to 
question the concepts of  objectivity and subjectivity,  continuing a path that cinema has 
explored since  its  early  years:  we  have  to  subjectivize  vision,  umasking every  assumed 
transparent objectification (the so called “global village”), or, on the contrary, we have to 
objectify it, unhooking it from a gaze […] atomized throughout the world or localized in 
one of  the many prosthetic apparatuses of  vision such as cinema. (p. 93)16
- With closed eyes: blindness as hallucination in the era of  digital cinema
A  long  dispute  regarding  the  always  increasing  importance  and  presence  of  digital  images  in  
contemporary cinema concerns the effects of  this situation. An extremely vigorous tendency in the 
approach to digital images and their substantial hegemony leads to a partial judgement that  puts the 
increase  of  digital  visual  effects  on  the  same  level  as  the  lack  of  aesthesis:  the  centrality  of  new 
technologies  and their  broad application in the process of  image production leads,  according to a  
conservative branch of  scholars, to an impoverishment of  the senses. The denial of  the external world 
as a reference point automatically leads, following this equation, to a petrified and immobile  mimesis. 
This  account  considers  digital  images  as  part  of  a  merely  self-referential  representation  (Montani,  
2007),  failing to understand that the digital  realm has transported images from a Platonic, specular 
mimesis to an Aristotelian one, more linked to a processual nature in the mimetic effort. The antithesis  
between icon and simulacrum, between a referential link to the “other” and a sensorial self-reflexivity that 
re-modulates the relationship with the external world and its imaginary footprint, needs to be updated.  
But, perhaps, there is more.
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Photodynamic, analogical images, derived from the imprinting of  something made of  matter onto a 
material support (something that once existed, that was  present, that has been captured and stored in 
time by the tool utilized) are fading into disuse. At the same time, the materiality of  the image itself  is 
losing its status. The stigmata of  the real, etched into the film, witnesses of  an ontology of  the tool, are 
now fading or changing form. Although this is an accepted and relevant fact, it is interesting to note  
that most of  the synthetic images created for cinema are struggling – in a continuous and paradoxical  
rush – to recreate a photodynamic and sensible world. This is a repetition of  a different process, a  
recreation of  the perceivable world, defined on a finer scale, with incredible sharpness and attention to  
detail, to the small details that human eyes often do not see and that the human brain rarely codifies as  
visual messages. Consequently,  the unbelievable definition of  these re-creations, though not entirely 
perceived by the viewers’ eyes, contribute to the “reality effects” that the completeness of  the images 
themselves confer. 
The digital  image seems to be used only as an enhanced version of  the  analogical  one,  a  sort  of  
updated process of  capturing moving elements for the screen. The sensible world gets re-imaged by a 
different  instrument,  but  always  for  the  same  purpose:  the  representation  of  a  real.  Naturally,  in 
narrative  schemes  in  which  dragons  fly,  men  transform  themselves  into  strange  machines,  and 
superheroes, extinct animals, aliens and time-travel technology exist, real means everything that can be 
logically connected to such characters and situations, even if  it belongs to something that does not exist  
in our ordinary daily reality. 
There has been a long debate about the so-called cyber movie, by which we mean the infinite series of 
technological innovations that brought synthetic images to an unthinkable degree of  perfection. But if  
we ask ourselves what we mean when we define this perfection of  the digital image, we find ourselves  
judging its resolution, considering this wonderful realm of  representation only in relation to sensible  
reality,  to the visible  world.  Thus people  consider all  the movies  in  which digital  images  copy the  
perceivable world with perfect adherence as innovative and ultramodern. Our jaws drop while watching 
the tyrannosaurus running in  Jurassic Park  (1993), the digital reconstruction of  the  Titanic  (1997), the 
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wonderful sharpness of  King Kong’s hair, and so on. Obviously, some of  these images could never  
have been created without the incredible skills obtained by their creators working with CGI. Similarly,  
movie critics  and film historians tend to consider  only films in which we watch robots,  replicants,  
cyborgs and other variations of  the human canon as  cyber movies.  But maybe this is not entirely the 
point.
Perhaps we should use the label “cyber” for the movies in which the very substance of  the image is  
caught in its evolution towards a new form of  being, for a cinema that, as the Italian critic Gianni 
Canova (1996) pointed out, “becomes the place of  hybridization, which merges real and virtual, natural 
and artificial”. Are “cyber” movies those in which the immateriality of  the virtual image is used only to  
replicate the materiality of  an ontological world (even if  we face robots and cyborgs)? One of  the main 
discoveries that Cyberpunk has brought to us has been the awareness of  this cultural transition from a  
material and real world to a virtual  reality in which the subject (whoever or whatever he/she/it is)  
disappears  in  front  of  a  mechanical  eye  that  records  their  state  of  being.  With  the  virtuality  and 
immateriality of  the digital realm, we enter into a situation in which images are self-generated and only  
refer  to  themselves  and not  to  the  outside  world  (as  was  the  case  with  the  analogical  system of  
capturing images from material objects). In this way, this new kind of  image makes clear how the being 
of  the virtual entails the disappearance of  the actual. As Enrico Livraghi (2006) writes:
There is a radical, ontological dissonance between the analogical and the digital image. The 
latter is the product of  an imaginative abstraction that realizes itself in vision, that somehow 
exposes its immaterial body from the inside. The analogical image, on the contrary, offers the 
vision of  a body that has left its real-material imprint on the image from the outside. (p. 53; 
but see also Jullier, 1997, p. 50)
Technology in contemporary cinema seems to be more interesting not as a set of  devices, but as a place  
of  theoretical conflict, a tight spot where conceptual issues related to (moving) images come together  
and create problems that need to be discussed. Technology becomes problematic when it ceases to be a 
representational instrument, necessarily linked to an “other” that has to be represented, to the “off-
screen” to which it refers as a  conditio sine qua non.  Technology  reveals itself  when it offers another 
perspective on the mechanisms of  vision, on the transformations that our points of  view undergo, and 
16
on the revolutions that deeply change the cognitive value of  our sense of  sight. 
In this way we can think of  the technological enhancement of  image-production in reference to its 
superfluous  relation  to  the  “real”,  three-dimensional  world  of  images.  
Digital,  self-generating  images  lose  their  need  to  work  as  representations  and  become,  to  our  
conscience, very similar to hallucinations as the space-time relation between the subjects involved in the 
process no longer exists.
Hallucination:
1:  false sense perception:  the  perception of  somebody or 
something that is not really there, which is often a symptom of 
a psychiatric disorder or a response to some drugs;
2:  something imagined: something that somebody imagines 
seeing, hearing, or otherwise sensing when it is not present or 
actually occurring at the time 
Hallucination, encarta.msn.com, Retrieved August 20, 2007, from 
http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861616279/hallucinatio
n.html
What if  we consider the hallucination as a perfect metaphor for digital cinema? As a matter of  fact, the  
strongest consequence of  the explosion of  digital images is the possibility of  creating images without 
the necessity of  an external stimulus. Digital images are created  ex novo, without originating from an 
exteriority. The creation of  a non-referential cinema replicates the experience of  the hallucination or  
the perceptual experience of  images (in the case of  visual hallucination) that we see even if  they are not  
before our eyes. These images are created by a dysfunction in the brain. Our relation with this particular 
kind of  hallucination is quite similar to our understanding of  the digital images we see each time we  
happen to watch a movie that contains digitally generated images, digital special effects, and so on. 
Our body works according to a bizarre relationship with the external world. The belief  in the reliability  
of  our sensory apparatus is metaphorized in the complex connection we establish between our gaze 
and the object of  our vision in the digital era. In a hypothetical (and, actually, unpurposeful) contest  
between the effectiveness of  the eye and the functionality of  the brain, it is certainly the latter that  
achieves the more effective result in the process of  relating to the external world. As Maturana (1978)  16
notes: 
In the absence of  an adequate environmental perturbation, the observer claims that the 
observed conduct is a result of  an illusion or a hallucination. Yet, for the operation of  the 
nervous  system  (and  organism),  there  cannot  be  a  distinction  between  illusions, 
hallucinations,  or  perceptions,  because  a  closed  neuronal  network  cannot  discriminate 
between  internally  and  externally  triggered  changes  in  relative  neuronal  activity.  This 
distinction pertains exclusively to the domain of  description in which the observer defines 
an inside and an outside for the nervous system and the organism. (p. 46)
During certain hallucinations (hypnagogic ones, for instance), the subject is usually aware of  the false 
nature of  the images,  but at  the same time he/she enters  into a perceptual  experience built  upon 
images.  If  we  look  at  the  dinosaurs  fighting  in  Peter  Jackson’s  King  Kong (2005),  we  obviously 
understand  that  these  images  are  created  with  software  that  generates  particular  moving  shapes;  
nevertheless,  at  the  same time,  we enter  into a perceptual  realm in which  the  distinction  between 
analogical  and  digital  images  becomes meaningless.  As  cinema viewers,  we  necessarily  rely  on the 
camera whose eye has  never actually  “seen” what we see.  Therefore,  something is  missing  in our  
perceptual experience.
Our approach to digital images in motion pictures appears to be similar to a visual hallucination. But 
the transformation of  the gaze is not only and exclusively related to digital images and their process of 
generation. Cinema itself, as a language, has undergone significant transformations in recent decades.  
Starting with Michael Snow’s 1971 experimental film, La Régione Centrale (in which a robotized camera 
mounted on a mechanical arm moves in all directions without the need of  a human to operate it), there  
has been an ever-increasing dissociation between the eye and sight. The invention of  new tools such as 
the Louma camera crane and the Steadycam makes the lack of  vision in contemporary cinema a sort of  
original sin which transforms the horizon of  cinema into a space in which the physical act of  seeing 
becomes more and more redundant. The camera is no longer the object that filters the director’s vision,  
and this important shift affects the metamorphosis of  the very concept of  “point of  view”. This is a  
concept that undergoes a deeper crisis if  we analyse, for example, the radical innovations of  Dayton  
Taylor and his Time Track (invented in 1994 but known worldwide thanks to the fight sequences in the  
Wachowski Brothers’ The Matrix), a virtual camera movement that freezes objects in time while creating 
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an illusion of  movement that exists only in the virtual act of  seeing. Our process of  vision appears to  
be intensely corrupted by a movement and an intention that do not belong to us. The virtual movement  
of  cinematic images (while the images are in fact still, set in motion by a mechanical support) has been 
augmented by the virtual movement of  point of  view.
As many movies suggest nowadays, we can observe a continuous defeat of  so-called objectivity and 
also, at the same time, of  any form of  solid and reliable subjectivity. It seems as if  we have all turned 
into the character of  Thomas, the photographer in Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow Up (1966), 
having taken a roll of  photographs of  a couple in the park, blowing up the images and, 
realizing that one of  the photographs reveals a dead body in the background, attemptin to 
figure out what happened. The more he blows up the image, the more diffuse and hard to  
read it  becomes. The film pivots around the impossibility of  attaining the truth in the 
indexical,  analogue  image:  the  particular  kind  of  grainy  diffuseness  of  the  blown  up 
photograph is, of  course, a function of  its analogue nature. Blow Up is about chasing down 
the  truth with  the  photographic  apparatus,  and  within  the  photographic  image.  While 
Thomas seems to believe that infinite zooming in will somehow gain him access into the  
depths of  the image, into its ‘truth’, he finds instead that it reveals the diffusion of  truth 
into surface. (Jones, 2008, p. 186)
We give great importance to the act of  seeing and to the billions of  images that mediate every single 
relation we have with reality. But in fact, we are slowly obliterating importance of  our sight, mainly 
because we do not rely on it anymore. The metaphor of  a photographer watching a mimed tennis  
match fits perfectly with the function of  the spectator in the era of  non-optical, non-referential images.  
After an initial hesitation, during which the photographer does not understand what is happening as he 
observes the mimes playing without rackets or a ball and pretending to play in a correct and ordinary 
way, he is asked to pick up the invisible ball that flew over the fence surrounding the court. In those 
few seconds of  indecision, while he asks himself  if  he should enter the unique version of  reality that 
he has just seen – right in the middle of  this suspension – lies the metaphor of  our actual condition.  
After a short pause, Thomas decides to pick up the ball and to throw it back to the mimes. He chooses  
to enter the particular reality inhabited by those who do not necessarily need eyes to see what they want 
to see. After having discovered that what he actually saw in the photos he took was beyond the realm of  
optical truth (the dead person and his investigation of  this apparent murder), Thomas accepts the fact  16
that his sense of  sight is not as reliable as it was before. And this loss of  reliability determines the lack 
of  any certainty about a subjectivity that could work as a Cartesian basis for other certainties related to 
the outside world. The presence of  the surrounding world becomes problematized by a blind use of 
sight that disempowers the cognitive sense par excellence. 
Here we face a radical  limit of  the Kantian assumption about human beings, one which ceases to 
consider the world as a system ruled by the laws of  optics and starts to consider the reception of  
external stimuli through different senses as the first moment of  a knowledge process that builds 
an image of  the world requiring the participation of  the whole being. The eye, then, is not 
an optical device that transmits already existing external images to the brain. Indeed, it is a 
codification/decodification  device  transmitting  information  that  always  needs  to  be 
interpreted and whose interpretation will totally change according to the kind of  received 
signals and internal dispositions of  the receiving being. (Milner, 1982, p. 69)
If  the aforementioned SQUID device is a contemporary extension of  the assumption contained in 
Blow Up,  we can also make reference to another device that annihilates the function of  the eyes as  
image-recording machines, the one created by the scientist played by Max von Sydow in Wim Wenders’s 
Bis and Ende der Welt  (Until the End of  the World, 1991). This special camera records the neurological 
event of  seeing rather than optical images. It is used to give a form of  partial sight to an old blind  
woman, but it also happens to cause an addiction that leads people to record and obsessively watch  
images from their nocturnal dreams. It becomes a terrible drug that,  literally,  glues the eyes to the  
unseen images  that  become visible.  What  was  initially  invented  to  impart  sight  to  a  blind  person 
becomes a device that actually causes people to close their eyes in order to compulsively watch and re-
watch images related to their inner dimension. Wenders holds out for an unmediated representation of 
reality,  which often leads  him to condemn the use of  many of  the  vision  machines  developed in  
modern  times.  While  it  is  difficult  to  completely  agree  with  his  out-of-date,  nostalgic  view  of  
representation, if  we consider the advertising campaign for a recent Sony digital video camera whose 
tagline was “Don’t think, shoot”, it becomes hard not to question the derailment of  the photographic 
shooting of  images in the contemporary mediascape. 
In his typical apocalyptic tone, Paul Virilio (1988/1994) questions the ultimate sense of  this crucial 17
shifting that is leading us towards a sightless vision: 
In two hundred years the philosophical and scientific debate itself  has thus similarly shifted 
from the question of  the  objectivity of  mental images to the question of  their  reality. The 
problem, therefore, no longer has much to do with the mental images of  the consciousness 
alone. It is now essentially concerned with the instrumental virtual images of  science and 
their  paradoxical  facticity.  To my mind,  this  is  one of  the  most crucial  aspects  of  the 
development of  the new technologies of  digital imagery and of  the synthetic vision offered  
by electronic optics:  the relative fusion/confusion of  the factual (or operational,  if  you 
prefer) and the virtual; the ascendancy of  the “reality effect” over a reality principle already 
largely contested elsewhere, particularly in physics. (p. 60) 
This brings us directly to our starting point: there is a similarity between our increasing use of  sightless  
vision and the enormous importance of  digitally created images in cinema. Exactly in the same way, it is  
not necessary for something to happen in front of  our eyes or in front of  the camera in order to obtain 
visible  images.  The  reality  effect  is  still  obtained,  and  the  illusion  of  presence  is  produced  by  a  
significant erasing of  the screen. Obviously, there is a clear difference from hallucinations: just like the 
viewer of  the SQUID diskettes, the audience of  contemporary DGIs is aware that they are watching  
something that has not been taken from reality. It is a projection, a kind of  “consensual hallucination”,  
empowered by the will of  image-creators driven to reach effects that are as real as possible with images 
that are in fact unreal, created with the aid of  a computer. Therefore blindness appears not only as a  
metaphor  of  but  also  as  an  effective  relational  model  for  debating  the  discursive  and  rhetorical  
practices of  contemporary cinema. The eye of  the camera, the same eye represented by Vertov and cut  
by Buñuel, is now reduced to a “celibate machine”, forced to surrender its now bypassed role. The 
camera, just like the closed eyes of  SQUID viewers in Strange Days, is forced to transform the internal 
part of  the eyelid into the screen on which images move and evolve. 
The real core of  this transformation seems to be the crisis of  the visible. Contemporary cinema needs 
to question the boundaries of  what is intended as visible, given that the line that once separated the two  
fields of  “the filmable” and “the unfilmable” has shifted tremendously. And this is certainly not a moral 
distinction (as it was for Bazin (1958/1967) and his idea of  love and death as unrepresentable) but a  
strictly  technical  one:  it  strongly  relates  to  the  innovations  that  have  led  viewers’  eyes  to  an 
unpredictable land where, literally, everything is possible, because every image can be virtually created. 17
But the “unfilmable” has little to do with resurrected dinosaurs, enormous gorillas, supernatural tricks 
realized by child magicians, and so on. The real limit appears to be the involvement of  the other senses 
to support or integrate the senses of  sight and hearing in a new hierarchy in which sight itself  is still  
predominant but does not have absolute power anymore. The condition of  blindness (not necessarily 
intended as a clinical  disease or an innate condition)  is the extreme and paradoxical  starting point 
because  it  represents  the  ultimate  limit  of  any  form of  visibility.  Therefore,  the  next  conceptual  
boundary for the “filmable” as a perceptual and aesthetic category is perhaps the visual representation  
of  the  crisis  of  sight  itself;  its  new position  and power in  the  visualscape where  the  Aristotelian 
conception of  sight and hearing as privileged cognitive senses needs to be re-evaluated. 
- The paradox of  digital realism: How human sight pretends to see
The photorealistic credibility of  images generated with the aid of  digital special effects is certainly one  
of  the factors contributing to the increasing success of  such an artistic practice, but it is also a crucial  
point that involves more theoretical reflections on the updated and redefined boundaries of  human 
sight  and  perception.  Of  course,  there  are  “invisible  visual  effects”  that  bypass  the  productive 
difficulties  in  many  situations,  digitally  replicating  and  simulating  circumstances,  phenomena  and 
actions that happen in our actual world. The flight of  some birds, the rain pouring with a specific  
intensity, the explosion of  a car: these are just a few examples of  many cinematic sequences in which  
the adoption of  digital special effects is a short-cut used in order to minimize costs and quicken the 
work rate of  the production.  These effects  are made in such as way as  to not  be noticed by the  
audience; often however, if  they are poorly made, film spectators will notice that something is wrong 
with a specific shot, a particular sequence which lacks credibility because of  the inadequate outcome of 
the digital creation. It means that the audience is used to judging the result of  such effects according to  
their adherence to the actual referent that is visible outside the screen. 
These reactions happen because of  the significant cultural and aesthetic turn identified by Andrew 
Darley in his Visual Digital Culture (2000). His close analysis of  the development of  computer imaging 
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technologies  shows how,  until  the  Seventies,  the  conjunction  between  visual  artists  and  computer 
scientists reached its peak, allowing the achievement of  an entirely redefined imagery and the creation  
of  images that had a lot in common with the experimentalism of  a certain visual  abstraction that 
characterized some avant-garde movements. This was a propulsive and stimulating phase that “seems 
congruent with theories that reason from the numeric grounds of  the digital to the separation of  image 
from concrete physical reality” (Rosen, 2001, pp. 309-310). This period reached its visionary pinnacle 
with  Gene  Youngblood  (1970),  the  Expanded  Cinema  and  his  theories  about  “a  Mythic  age  of 
electronic realities that exist only on a metaphysical plane” (p. 206). During the same decade, another  
tendency – dominated by such key-concepts as verisimilitude, accuracy, realism, depiction – took on an 
increasing importance and subsequently became enormously preponderant in the Eighties. This was a  
decisive  passage  in  which  the  increasing  adoption  of  the  term  “simulation”  meant  that  all  the  
transformations  happened inside this specific,  fundamental  artistic  and communicative plan.  If  the 
digital  is  connected with simulation,  then,  as Rosen (2001) points  out,  it  “had to mime previously 
known instruments that functioned as reliable imprints of  the world. Of  course, the camera-produced 
image,  which is to say the indexical  image, would be a leading candidate” (p.  310). Darley tries  to  
explain the reasons for such a radical and apparently irreversible inversion:
Beyond  the  ultimate  goal  of  producing  “photographic”  imagery  by  other  means,  the 
motives for such a fixation with realism are diverse and appear to depend upon imperatives 
that are active within the particular domain in which they develop. If  the factors shaping 
the representational and “realist” thrust in practical and scientific domains tended to have a 
functional  basis,  in  the  sphere  of  mass  visual  culture  –  the  domain  of  entertainment 
cinema – the support for realism was part of  a more general ideal, indeed, it comprised the  
predominant aesthetic regime. Clearly, computer imaging only really becomes interesting to 
the producers and distributors of  Hollywood cinema when it can operate effectively within 
the parameters of  its own established commercial aesthetic. (p. 17)
The  final  result  of  this  inversion  is  a  profound  transformation  in  the  practices  and processes  of 
determining and moulding the  imagery  if  cinema spectators,  accompanied by a significant  statistic 
claiming that almost 90% of  digital visual effects are “invisible”. It is an extraordinary phenomenon,  
suggesting that,  nowadays,  the almost infinite imagery virtually  offered by the digital  generation of 
images has been reduced to the status of  a mere replica of  work previously done by the analogical  17
camera.  This  strategy  of  vision  and recognition  exists  in  a  paradoxical  form when  spectators  are  
confronted with the so called visible special effects:
Visible special effects, on the other hand, simulate events that are impossible in the actual  
world (but which are possible in an alternative world), such as the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park  
and  The Lost World.  The crucial aesthetic point in relation to the digital special effects in 
these two films in  particular  is  that,  while  clearly  visible,  these  effects  attempt  to hide 
behind an iconic appearance (or photographic credibility); that is, they are visible special  
effects masquerading as invisible effects. What we mean is that the digital images in Jurassic  
Park and The Lost World combine the aesthetics of  both visible and invisible special effects, 
since they have the potential to replicate the realism and illusionism of  the photographic 
image by conferring photographic credibility upon objects that do not exist in the actual  
world. What this implies is that, while the digital images of  the dinosaurs are not produced  
optically,  which  means  they  are  not  real,  observable  events  in  the  real  world,  they 
nonetheless create the impression that they are produced optically and that, therefore, the 
dinosaurs are pre-existing referents simply being photographed. (Elsaesser-Buckland, 2002,  
p. 210)
We are shifting from an adherence to the referent, from the “being there” theorized by Barthes (1980),  
to its  polar opposite.  If,  according to Barthes,  the essence of  photography is  not the resemblance 
between the image-trace and the original referent but rather the actual existence of  something that has  
been  in  front  of  the  camera  while  its  trace  was  impressed,  then  authenticity  does  not  lie  in  the 
recognition of  a simile or a likeness but in the specific connection between the past and the present 
that links the two poles of  a photographic representation. Nowadays the dictatorship of  reference in 
the age of  digital image-production leads to the absolute preponderance of  resemblance issues over 
unverifiable aspects related to the actual being of  the photographic referent. Thanks to digital special  
effects, we are confronted with the theoretical paradox of  something that is visible even though it does  
not exist (and it never existed in front of  any mechanical eye of  the camera) – an image that is only for 
the senses. It seems quite evident that the estrangement from Bazinian ontology or Peircian indexicality  
is leading to a “perceptual realism” that is linked to a multifaceted apparatus of  connections that is 
implied in the experience of  cinema, an experience that needs to be unhooked from its similarities to  
the  visual  and  perceptual  experience  of  the  everyday  world  and that  is  increasingly  becoming  an 
autonomous circumstance. 
Stephen Prince’s (1996) pivotal essay about digital and perceptual realism starts from the great visual  
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innovations of  Hollywood cinema of  the Nineties and interprets the perceptual tendencies occurring in 
contemporary Hollywood. Moving from the equivocal nature of  a monolithic notion of  realism, Prince 
tries to enhance the value of  the concept, adapting it not only to the laws of  reference but also to the 
perceptual  realm.  In  the  era  of  digital  imagery,  the  absolute  difference  between  the  elasticity  of 
computer generated images and the solid rigidness of  analogical ones leads to the necessity of  a new 
modulation  of  traditional  categories.  Bypassing  the  essentializing  nature  of  both  Formalism  and 
Realism, Prince proposes to shift the analysis of  referentiality from the realm of  images to that of 
experience, trying to identify the correspondences between the extra-cinematographic experience of 
the audience and the specific display of  the audiovisual apparatus. He writes:
Unreal images are those which are referentially fictional.  The Terminator is  a represented 
fictional character that lacks reference to any category of  being existing outside the fiction. 
Spielberg’s  dinosaurs  obviously  refer  to  creatures  that  once  existed,  but  as  moving 
photographic images they are referentially fictional. No dinosaurs now live which could be 
filmed doing things the fictionalized creatures do in Jurassic Park. By contrast, referentially 
realistic images bear indexical and iconic homologies with their referents. They resemble 
the referent,  which,  in  turn,  stands in  a  causal,  existential  relationship to the image.  A 
perceptually  realistic  image  is  one  which  structurally  corresponds  to  the  viewer’s 
audiovisual experience of  three-dimensional space. Perceptually realistic images correspond 
to this experience because film-makers build them to do so. Such images display a nested 
hierarchy of  cues which organize the display of  light, color, texture, movement, and sound 
in ways that correspond with the viewer’s own understanding of  these phenomena in daily 
life. Perceptual realism, therefore, designates a relationship between the image or film and 
the spectator, and it can encompass both unreal images and those which are referentially  
realistic.  Because  of  this,  unreal  images  may  be  referentially  fictional  but  perceptually 
realistic. (p. 32)
Perceptual realism, as intended by Prince, implies a stronger responsibility of  the viewer who is called 
on to play an active role in image decryption. What is changing is the relationship with images; images 
must obey the principle of  credibility, not the law of  absolute, indexical realism. Audience acceptance  
depends on the visual system of  details that confirm an existing idea of  movement, light, shapes and 
spatial relations. The reference to reality of  such a character as the T-1000 of  Terminator 2 (1991) obeys 
only specific criteria of  cinematic perception and, obviously, is not determined by the visual equivalence  
of  this creature with all the other T-1000s we have met before. The effort made in order to obtain a 
perfect reflection on its body, the fluidity of  every shape change he undergoes – everything is involved  
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in a paradoxical, but actual, form of  realism.
Realism moves from the images towards perception, somehow endorsing the cultural and metaphorical 
transformation  we  are  discussing  in  this  chapter.  Such  movies  as  The  Matrix  or  eXistenZ  (David 
Cronenberg, 1999) are built entirely according to a principle of  the complete substitution of  the real  
which is achieved through the decisive aid of  digital simulations that can supplant the miseries of  our 
world, in a metaphorization of  the condition of  cinema that is witnessing the impoverishment of  the 
analogical and the increasing success of  the digital.
What  David  Rodowick (2007)  identifies  as  the  paradox of  perceptual  realism is  one  of  the  most  
significant  cornerstones  in  the  complex  process  our  culture  is  undergoing  in  its  nearly complete 
understanding of  digital  imaging.  In his interesting essay  The Virtual  Life  of  Film,  he discusses the 
peculiarities that need to be considered in any reflection on filmic processes and digital  capture or 
synthesis.  One of  the  main issues  raised by Rodowick relates  to the  apparently  paradoxical  effort  
behind most of  the digital creations in the last thirty years:
Since the early 1980s, if  not before, technological and creative innovations in digital image 
synthesis  have  been  driven  by  a  single,  though  somewhat  paradoxical,  goal:  the 
achievement  of  “photographic  realism”,  or  what  Lev  Manovich  has  called  “perfect 
photographic credibility”. Game design as well, though in less singular way, has been driven 
by  the  desire  to  attain  degrees  of  involvement  and  identification  in  game  worlds 
commensurate  with  those  of  cinematic  narrative,  especially  through  manipulating 
subjective point of  view as movement in space through time-delimited actions. Curiously, 
for  an  industry  driven  by  innovation  and  market  differentiation,  the  qualities  of  the 
“photographic”  and  the  “cinematic”  remain  resolutely  the  touchstones  for  creative 
achievement in digital imaging entertainment. The “new” has not been sought in digital 
imaging as much as fresh means for producing familiar effects with a long cultural history, 
though often in very novel contexts. (p. 131)
Rodowick  certainly  is  among the  theorists  that  have  begun  to  think  about  the  emergence  of  the  
“cinematic” as a visual and cultural issue that can be separated from cinema and its changing apparatus. 
The cinematic is a transversal concept that applies to all contemporary media that deal with a radically 
transformed image, an image that in any case needs to be looked at through entirely different lenses  
due to the constant updating of  the frame in which images are produced and experienced. The fact that 
most contemporary analysts still adopt such concepts as screen, space, movement and time as related to 17
images indicates that classical film theory pervades the theory of  the image. According to Rodowick the 
historical permanence of  these concepts is principally connected with the “perceptual realism” that still  
shapes the visual and cultural experience of  digitally generated images. Digital processing profoundly  
alters  the  concepts of  “representation” and “image”,  but the  audience and theorists  still  insist  on 
discussing those images according to categories that have overrun the enclosure of  cinema and spilled 
out  to  other  genres,  becoming  necessary  for  dealing  with  videogames,  3D  animations,  TV  and 
advertising. 
But  what  connections  need  to  be  identified  between  the  fictionalized  reality  and the  transformed 
patterns of  our reality (already modified, transformed in its social and cultural – visual – basis through 
the influence of  previous visual events or products)? The question that is raised is: is the stratification 
of  cinema,  videogames,  TV  products,  media  transformations  affecting  our  consciousness  and 
transforming our relationship with fictional images that we perceive as “real” even if  they are only 
realistic in respect to an unperceivable world? 
This  extremely  evident  transformation  involves  all  the  active  elements  involved  in  cinematic 
production. As digital imaging definitively transforms our awareness and interpretation of  the filmic  
event, all the moments of  filmmaking need to be redefined. And film theory should adapt itself  to this  
radically renewed cultural frame. 
The difficulties encountered by film theory in dealing with these aspects are connected to the complex  
rethinking of  the traditional categories of  film studies regarding the boundaries of  the production of 
cinematic experience. The objective reality that stands behind the camera does not transform into what 
Baudry (1975) defines as the “site of  inscription” without the selection or redefinition of  shapes and 
intrinsic relations among bodies, objects and space. So this movement is not neutral or autonomous,  
but rather refers to a work of  transformation. In the age of  digital imaging and image-creation, the 
alteration of  objective reality is a given, but what is becoming more important, and in more than just a  
symbolic way, is the capacity of  contemporary cinema to intervene in the second moment, the passage 
from the  recording  to  the  projection  of  images.  The  thickness  of  these  metaphorical  margins  is 
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becoming more and more evident, given that nowadays movies are mostly created during the post-
production phase.  Baudry  describes  the  camera  as  “equally  distant  from ‘objective  reality’  and the 
finished product”, and he claims that it “occupies an intermediate position in the work process which 
leads from raw material to finished product”. Perhaps it is necessary to update this position, to rethink 
the nature of  the camera itself. What must be profoundly rethought is the metaphorical and mechanical 
function of  the camera, as well as its physical position in the context of  filmmaking. 
The point of  arrival represented by the radical evolution of  shooting techniques (if  it is still possible to 
discuss “shooting”) that increasingly dissociates the eye of  the camera and the eye that stands before it  
is  evidently the substantial (and almost unnoticed) disappearance of  the camera from the cognitive 
frame of  movie-making.
This progressive dissociation of  the camera and human sight leads to an impressive result: the camera 
becomes a sort of  disembodied eye. This requires a total rethinking of  the spatial relations experienced 
by the perceiving eye as it relates itself  to a totally new kind of  visual act. Vision loses its directness and  
becomes a thick boundary that imposes a distance between the two poles of  the process. This distance 
can be intended both as physical and metaphorical, as the eye freely moves among levels of  perception  
that the materiality of  the body had avoided in the classical, analogical era. 
The use of  different technologies of  image-creation has led to the total virtualization of  the camera, in  
a process of  distinct separation between the eye and the camera as the latter is becoming more and 
more irrelevant. There are two visual experiences that are perhaps the most extreme examples of  this  
dissolution of  the mechanism of  vision. One can be found in the extra features of  the Polar Express  
(2004) DVD. The entire movie directed by Zemeckis is shot using Motion capture technology, widely 
used nowadays in both the film industry and in the creation of  videogames. The virtuality of  the actors’  
movements  and  their  visual  transformation  into  animated  forms  which  replicate  the  actors’ 
performances is less important, here, than the presence of  a virtual camera. A virtual camera is an 
actual  camera,  controlled by a  real  operator  that  moves  in  a  virtual  environment  provided by the  
creation of  a three-dimensional space. The effect pursued by Zemeckis and his collaborators is the  
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same one that is obtainable with the traditional, realistic cinema, but the possibilities offered by this  
innovation are very important. The point of  view becomes a virtual and mobile point of  view, with the  
camera starting to perform as a character amongside the others. 
On the other hand, in The Matrix, the astonishing Bullet Time effect subverts the dynamics contained in 
movies such as Polar Express. Here we move from the virtual set towards an actual (even if  somehow 
modified)  one,  but  the  camera  undergoes  a  process  of  incredible  dematerialization  or,  incredibly 
enough, of  total disappearance. The animated simulation created by the computer functions as model  
for  the  definition  of  the  actual  set.  The  movement  of  the  simulated  characters  determines  the 
construction of  the complex structure that is needed to achieve the “suspended time” images in which 
the movements of  bodies (the first sequence with Trinity’s prolonged jump) and objects (bullets, for  
instance)  occur  in  a  sort  of  temporal  void.  The  configuration  of  the  set  is  centered  upon  the 
composition of  the shape of  the rigging made up of  dozens of  photographic cameras. The geometrical 
structure of  the rig is totally free and depends upon the simulation and the desired movement of  the  
camera.  But,  actually,  there  is  no  cinematic  camera  moving  around  characters  who  are  falling  or 
jumping  or  shooting.  At  the  centre  of  the  stage,  the  movement  is  captured  by  the  surrounding 
photographic cameras  in  single shots,  each of  them synchronized with an exact  time lapse.  These 
individual  static  shots  become the  raw  material  for  the  subsequent  step.  Interpolation,  the  digital  
creation of  frames that are the byproduct of  actual frames, is the necessary further element that creates  
a complete sequence. This process creates new frames that fill the gap between the real frames captured 
by the cameras. In this way the shot material and the digitally created frames are merged in a unique  
visual element upon which it is possible to compress or decompress time. The final result of  this effect  
is that the movement off  the camera is virtual because the camera does not exist as such. The camera is  
virtually recreated through a movement of  single shots taken by photographic cameras, then these that  
are put in motion though a digital process that bypasses a significant amount of  digitally generated  
images.
These two examples show how the disappearance of  the camera does not imply the vanishing of  
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cinema,  especially  in  the  sense  of  the  experience  we  have  of  it.  But  it  remains  a  fact  that  the 
implications  between the  human eye  and the new perimeters  of  images  require  new strategies  of 
perception, new dynamics in the relationship between the subject and object of  the visual process. 
Images are created without any external referent; the eye of  the camera is a closed one; the camera 
itself  sometimes disappears while still allowing the audience the possibility of  “seeing” images. At a  
metaphorical level, we are moving through territories that are very close to constructionism because we 
have moved from the perceivibility of  an external world that does not exist as such and have arrived at 
an entirely constructed reality. Maturana’s experiment with frogs and other animals led to the radical  
discovery that animal (including humans) perceptual  systems construct a reality rather than register 
reality according to the schemata of  representation. As Katherine Hayles (1999) point out:
The  break  came  with  his  work  on  color  vision  in  other  animals,  including  birds  and 
primates. He and his coauthors […] found they could not map the visible world of  color 
onto the activity  of  the nervous system. There was no one-to-one correlation between 
perception and the world. They could, however, correlate activity in an animal’s retina with 
its  experience of  color. If  we think of  sense receptors as constituting a boundary between 
outside and inside, this implies that organizationally, the retina matches up with the inside, 
not the outside. From this and other studies, Maturana concluded that perception is not 
constitutionally representational. He argued that to speak of  an objectively existing world is 
misleading, for the very idea of  a world implies a realm that preexists its construction by an 
observer. Certainly there is something “out there”, which for lack of  a better term we can 
call “reality”. But it comes into existence for us, and for all living creatures, only  through 
interactive  processes  determined solely  by  the  organism’s  own  organization .  “No description of  an 
absolute reality is  possible,” he and Varela wrote in  Autopoiesis  and Cognition,  for such a 
description  “would  require  an  interaction  with  the  absolute  to  be  described,  but  the 
representation that would arise from such an interaction would necessarily be determined 
by the autopoietic organization of  the observer… hence, the cognitive reality that it would 
generate would unavoidably be relative to the observer” (p. 121). Thus he was led to a 
premise fundamental  to his theory:  living systems operate within the boundaries  of  an 
organization that closes in on itself  and leaves the world on the outside. (pp. 135-136)
The transformation of  the concept of  point of  view itself  is of  course empowered and accelerated by  
all the visual revolutions that have followed the advent of  virtual reality. If  philosophers such as Jean 
Baudrillard (1995/1996) can write that “the virtual camera is in our heads” (p. 26), it means that it is  
so-called “real life” that suffers the contagion spread by television and other media. It is the mediated 
environment  that  surrounds  the  mechanical  functions  of  the  eye  that  alters  the  nature  of  vision, 
redefining the functions of  the eye as an organ, the implications determined in the consciousness, the 18
same existence of  the point of  view. Derrick De Kerckhove (1995) wrote about shifting from the point  
of  view to the point of  being (from the place where we are to wherever our sensorial apparatus, thanks 
to the extensions technology, allows us to reach), somehow anticipating the radical subversion created 
by virtual reality. It is cyberspace, even in its more primitive and unrefined version, that represents one 
of  the decisive turning points in the long process of  the 
technological  construction  of  vision.  Instead  of  an  embodied  consciousness  looking 
through the window at a scene, consciousness moves through the screen to become the pov 
[point of  view], leaving behind the body as an unoccupied shell. In cyberspace point of 
view does not emanate from the character; rather, the pov literally is the character. If  a pov 
is annihilated, the character disappears with it, ceasing to exist as a consciousness in and 
out of  cyberspace. (Hayles, 1999, p. 38)
Laurent Jullier (1997), analyzing postmodern cinema, highlights how the most radical innovation of 
this is the erasure of  point of  view and how this absence forces the seeing subject to ask a question 
such as “where am I?” (p. 71), which often becomes a more dramatic “Who am I?”. The rhetoric of 
sight as the superior sense that is the only one able to certify the truth is completely subverted, and,  
moreover, the image seems no longer able to imagine the real – because it has ended up coinciding 
with it.
- Is digital cinema a blind cinema?
In  the  history  of  film  theory,  cognitivist  studies  have  structured  a  perspective  upon  cinematic  
spectators that seems to be only partially linked to the activity of  sight, asking how a spectator is able  
to generate a hybrid space that merges the mind and the eye and which is spatially bigger than the 
actual size of  the screen that hosts the projected image. Hochberg and Brooks (1978), the two scholars  
that opened this field of  studies, discuss the cognitive maps that help viewers make sense of  images. As  
Casetti (1995/1999) explains, 
the stimuli coming from the screen are interpreted according to a certain hypothesis, which 
will or will  not be confirmed by the rest of  the film, viewed through a well-structured  
process of  adjustment and comparison of  the elements at play. Thus, it is thanks to these  
“mental schemes” that the spectator decodes the situation before him, expectations, etc.  18
Also, thanks to these schemes, he “reconstructs” in his own mind what the film tells him, 
albeit little by little or only in part. (pp. 105-106)
But  the  hypothesis  we  are  discussing  here  is  trying  to  metaphorically  get  rid  of  the  eye  and  its  
theoretical implications. There are dozens of  movies that are dedicated to blind characters,  and of  
course, the history of  literature has included many blind characters, from Oedipus to Samuel Beckett’s 
Pozzo (Waiting for Godot) or Hamm (Endgame). But in the era of  images that have entered the realm of 
exclusive simulation, blindness assumes a metaphorical value that needs to be explored. 
Blink  (1994), directed by Michael Apted, depicts a character whose blindness is cured with a cornea 
transplant; after the surgery, the young woman (played by Madeleine Stowe) is affected by a confused 
form of  vision. She is always uncertain about what she sees because her brain reads and decodes what 
her eyes perceive with a significant delay. There is always a temporal gap between the actual event and 
her perception of  it. The two moments are separated by time, and the mental construction of  the 
viewed event always comes with a delay that prevents the woman from having any ability to intervene 
in, or interact with, what she, somehow, sees. As Canova (2000) acutely highlights:
Blink raises the problem of  the function of  time in the processes of  visual perception. It 
forces us to wonder about the lapse that always insinuates itself  between the moment of  
vision and the time in which what is seen is conceptualized. [Blink]  puts time to work 
within  the  sense  of  sight  and  hypothesizes  about  the  effects  caused  by  a  prolonged 
asynchronism between the eyes and the mind. Deferred vision,  as everybody knows, is  
typical  of  cinema.  Only  at  the  cinema  do  we  see  now (in  a  movie  theater)  what  has 
happened before (on the set). (p. 43)
Returning to the example of  Strange Days and the visual delay that is inextricably connected to the 
SQUID, Lenny Nero’s clients actually can see with their eyes closed, but only if  someone has recorded 
images before the act of  neural vision.
Gin gwai (The Eye, 2002), directed by Oxide and Danny Pang, is a Chinese movie that tells the story of  
another cornea transplant; here Mun, a young woman blind since the age of  two, becomes affected by 
a sort of  visual haunting. After the operation, she can finally see again, but she also begins to have  
frightening visions. It turns out that the donor of  her new cornea was a girl who was actually able to  
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foresee death, and this biological transfer makes Mun a sort of  visual receptor for ghostly bodies and 
invisible souls. A mechanical dislocation of  an extraordinary cornea transforms Mun into a woman 
who can extend her sight into places and times which are totally forbidden to other human beings in a 
sort  of  parallelism with the possibilities  of  a  cinema that  redefines its  own rules  and boundaries,  
extending the perimeter of  what is visible for our empowered eyes. 
Blindness is rapidly becoming a broadly exploited metaphor for a cinema that is experiencing a crisis  
regarding the visible and the credibility of  the unique image. The passage from analogical to digital  
contains this crisis too, as cinema must deal with a totally new paradigm of  images that have ceased to 
reproduce anything and that, instead, can create everything. We are deliberately leaving aside the great 
debate about the ontological differences between analogical and digital because the difference between 
them is not ontological but delimited by the use we make of  those images. Images can be ghosts, like  
the supernatural glimpses experienced by Mun in Gin gwai; they can be witnesses to the disappearance 
of  the external reference that determines their shape. But they can also be the product of  a techno-
cultural subjectivity that takes advantage of  the creative freedom unleashed by this separation from 
reality. Images can inhabit the metaphorical lapse determined by the illness experienced by the main 
character of  Blink, adopting the digital not only as a technique that can allow manipulation, but as a  
prolonged moment that alters the space/time relationship of  our enhanced sensibility.
Once again we are confronted with the complex and constantly changing connection between vision 
and the decoding of  images, between the mechanical act of  seeing and the bodily, neuronal event of  
vision. And this happens because of  the specific function of  the camera that, independently of  digital 
or analogical support, works as a consciousness, according to a theoretical link that combines Spinoza 
and his “spiritual automaton”, Bergson and, more recently, Stiegler: 
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Deleuze asserts that the camera is able to act “like a consciousness”. Of  course, it is set up  
and moved by human agency, but ultimately, its technological apparatus passively records 
the object before it in a way that exceeds human ocular capacity. Deleuze disregards the  
role of  the operative and argues that the distinct technological properties of  the camera-
consciousness are “inhuman or superhuman” rather than human. The camera’s inhuman 
automatism, then, free from idealism, perceives matter more directly than the human vision 
that it challenges. (Powell, 2007, p. 71)
Blindness  should not  necessarily  be  limited to its  sense  as  a  physical  condition,  as  an illness  that  
diminishes the effectiveness of  a bodily organ. Blindness is also the choice of  keeping the eyes closed, 
even if  they work perfectly; it is a rethinking of  the process of  seeing, a movement that originates in  
the  retina  and  that  is  defined  and  implemented  by  the  brain.  Another  form  of  blindness,  again 
metaphorically  intended,  is  the  one  caused  by  the  awareness  that  we  sometimes  we  feel  before 
watching, or, better, that we feel when we are not watching at all, as happens in M. Night Shyamalan’s 
The Village (2004).
- The Village: Metaphors of  blindness in non-digitally recreated reality 
It  is  1897,  in  a  quiet  village  in  Pennsylvania.  A small  community  lives  near  a  forest  inhabited  by 
mysterious and unnameable creatures (people refer to them as “those we don’t speak of ”). Nobody 
ever leaves or enters the village, because the very idea of  traversing the forest is literally unthinkable  
given the extreme danger presented by the invisible creatures. When young Lucius decides to go to the 
city and asks permission from the elders of  the village,  the mysterious creatures warn the villagers 
through cruel and brutal actions. The village fool, Noah, is jealous because Lucius and the beautiful –  
and blind – Ivy are in love, so he stabs Lucius, who needs some medicine in order to be saved. Ivy asks  
permission from her father, who tells her that the ferocious creatures that besiege the village do not  
really exist and that they are a creation of  the elders who want to preserve their way of  life apart from 
the brutal violence of  city life. She overcomes a number of  dangers and then finds herself  faced with a 
wall  to  climb.  She  cannot  see  her  goal,  but  she  understands  that  her  mission  is  close  to  being 
accomplished. But outside the wall she does not find the end of  the nineteenth century waiting for her:  
she leaves the protected zone and enters the present of  the year 2004. The village in which she was 18
born and raised is a creation of  the elders who decided to leave the violent cities of  the end of  the  
twentieth century and start an experiment: the construction of  a village separated from the rest of  the  
world, without a single airplane flying over, without any contact with the everyday life of  contemporary  
society, a village protected from the violence that dominates the world. The audience sees cars, clothes 
and newspapers which reveal the narrative truth, but Ivy is blind and misses this encounter with the 
unveiling of  the fictitious nature of  the life she has lived. So she takes the medicines and goes back to 
her 1897 reality. 
After having dealt with the partially visible persistence of  the dead in The Sixth Sense (1999), foreseeing 
the  future  in  Unbreakable  (2000),  and  the  paradoxical  visualization  of  aliens  in  Signs  (2002),  here 
Shyamalan reflects upon blindness on a double level.  The character of  Ivy is blind, and the entire  
community living in the village is also somehow affected by a blindness stemming from the lie told by 
the originators of  the experiment. The Village is also a movie about our blindness, about our spectatorial 
habits.  If,  in  The Sexth Sense,  Shyamalan builds towards the final  surprise by dispersing visual  signs 
throughout the movie that anticipate the narrative twist regarding the true nature of  the character  
played by Bruce Willis, in The Village, the audience’s perspective is superimposed onto that experienced 
by the uninformed young inhabitants.  They don’t  know,  so we follow in their  state of  unawareness, 
substantially seeing through their eyes. The paradox is disarticulated at the end, when the solution to  
the enigma passes through the experience of  the blind girl who allows us to see while she cannot share  
our discovery and our reconstituted knowledge. In the movie, there are very few traces of  the real  
situation covered up by the elders; there is, rather, a slowly increasing but unstoppable presence of  the 
colour red. Firstly we see small red flowers frenetically eradicated and hidden by two women. Then,  
apparition by apparition, we understand that in the depicted community, red is the colour of  what is  
forbidden, The colour of  fear, the colour of  fear of  the unknown. 
While many film reviewers have seen in it a powerful allegory of  the post-9/11 United States (with the 
fear of  the Other, the obsessive closing in on themselves), The Village remains a stimulating work that 
deals with the transformation of  vision. Everybody in the village is afraid of  “those they don’t speak 
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of ”, even if  nobody has actually seen them, and their visual lack of  knowledge seems to be affecting 
the language too, reaching the point of  the unnameability of  these nameless creatures. When Lucius 
asks  permission to leave the  village,  he  insistently  refers  to the  visual  and sensual  abilities  of  the  
mysterious creatures living in the woods, and he is sure that they will let him pass because “creatures 
can  sense emotion and fear. They will  see I am pure of  intention, and not afraid”. The extraordinary 
awareness of  the wicked people of  the city that even the young inhabitants have is a notable paradox  
for people who have never  seen someplace  outside the village.  And then there is Ivy, the sensitive, 
delicate girl whose sight is limited to the faint perception of  colourful forces surrounding people. She is  
blind, but she tells Lucius, showing a complete awareness of  who she is talking to, “You wonder how I 
recognized you? Some people – just a handful, mind you – give off  the tiniest colour. It’s faint, like a 
haze. It’s the only thing I ever see in darkness”. Hers is a different way of  seeing the world, as she tells  
Lucius when he asks her if  she is angry about not being able to see. And it is Ivy who tells her father  
that she does not see Lucius’s colour anymore,  given that he is  going to die if  nobody brings the 
necessary medicines from the town; and the father tells her “you see light where there’s only darkness”.
The dynamics of  vision centred upon Ivy’s blindness enter into a sort of  truthful vertigo during the  
epiphany that comes in her journey in the woods. When she encounters one of  the “creatures they 
don’t speak of ”, she initially says to herself  that the creature is not real; then we see that she is not  
recognizing that she is actually facing Noah (the village fool) wearing a terrifying costume of  the brutal  
creatures. Thus, there is a complete reversal of  perspective upon evil: the human desire to see only what 
is to be seen without any pain or difficulty is shown to be the real blindness. Ivy succeeds in her mission  
which, more than simply finding the necessary medicines, is  to carry our awareness away from the  
closed boundaries of  the village and the woods. 
Unveiling the truth does not necessarily imply that the character has to regain her sight: Shyamalan  
shows how the cognitive value of  sight loses its power when subjected to a will that does not want to  
see. On the contrary, all the villagers, indoctrinated by the founders, believe that they can see - and 
consequently know – what they actually do not see (or know). The consequence is that innocence, as  
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intended in the Manichean moral system structured by the elders of  the village, is directly coupled with 
not knowing. It is no coincidence that, when one of  inhabitants of  the village begins a dangerous and 
risky  journey through the woods,  the  Evil  forces  transgress the borders  of  the  village  and causes 
unexpected pain among the inhabitants. Murder, death and violence enter a place that was supposed to 
remain immune to these criminal  contaminations.  So if  the  borders can be transgressed,  it  is  also 
possible to escape the village, to follow the path towards the outside. 
The  elders  allow Ivy  to  traverse  the  woods  and give  her  a  glimpse  of  truth,  telling  her  that  the 
mysterious creatures do not really exist. They can concede this little awareness to Ivy because, even if 
she does not see with her eyes, she can see because of  her knowledge. So she can easily meet one of 
these  creatures  (actually  Noah  in  disguise)  and  somehow  confirm  her  familiarity  with  what  she 
continues to see with the paradoxical sight of  her awareness. She can also start her journey towards the 
present of  the 2004 world and not become aware of  anything. Her return to the village will maybe save 
the life or her beloved and will surely continue to preserve the chronological void in which the village  
has been erected. 
What  happens  in  such  a  simultaneously  simple  and  complex  narrative  as  The  Village is  the 
demonstration of  an assumption our culture needs to deal with: the substantial difference that exists  
between familiar images and the fear of  images that force us to question our certainties. Images stand 
at the subtle crossing where desire, knowledge and optical  data meet. Insisting on the multifaceted  
essence of  what  we  continue  to  define  as  “reality”,  Shyamalan’s  narrative  construction  brings  the 
audience’s  attention  to  the  complicated  relations  between  constructed  and  actual  reality,  between 
simulated truth and sensory data. The fundamental twist of  the blind main character works primarily as 
a tool for disturbing the audience, as an autonomous visual special effect that does not need explosions  
or synthetic images in order to create a manufactured reality. Movies such as The Village force us to pay 
attention to a redefinition and a rethinking of  the negotiation actually happening between our vision 
and our metaphorical blindness and the subtler level upon which a visionary cinema tends to insists. 
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What we call (with a useful generalization) “synthetic images”, and, more generally, the virtual system 
we live in, place cinema in a permanent situation of  crisis. Synthetic images create what we can call an  
iconic space in which our gaze is but one of  our activated senses. In this space, the viewer becomes an  
interactive  protagonist,  reversing  his/her  passive  position  and  thus  changes  status.  The  problem 
emerges in cinema, perhaps more so than other media, because if  we notice that art everywhere asks  
for multisensory perception, it is not enough to think about contemporary cinema, as Laurent Jullier  
does in his L’ecran post-moderne, as a sort of  big swimming pool where the viewer floats and swims while 
getting covered with images and sounds. The aforementioned crisis derives directly from the eye’s loss  
of  hegemony and from the reduction of  its possibilities of  knowing. When digital technologies reach  
the point of  total separation between filmable reality and filmed virtuality, cinema must come to terms 
with this small,  incoming catastrophe. There are many possible  ways to react to this condition,  to 
measure its power in relation to these new kinds of  images. One, of  course, is blind faith in these new 
technologies; another is the complete negation of  them. As long as there are those who worship the  
undisputed supremacy of  digital visual effects, there will also be those who will condemn it in order to 
return to an ontology of  the image that perhaps even André Bazin would consider differently today.
It is all too evident that we are experiencing a fundamental shift from the ontology of  photosensitive 
images  to  virtual  synthesis,  but  it  is  more  interesting  to  shift  our  attention  from  the  mode  of 
production of  these new forms of  cinematic images to their mode of  perception. Innovations in visual  
special effects, which always come in cycles, push the audience towards a redefinition of  the self  in 
relation to an other represented by a simulacrum of  something that does not exist, or something that 
once existed and no longer exists (the creation of  infographic simulations of  dead actors or other 
famous people). Questioned about their work, special effects technicians explain that they film what  
doesn’t exist.  Obviously, this answer is not completely true, because what they film doesn’t exist in 
“our” world but does in another world; it is something filmed, as Paul Virilio writes (1989), with a 
speed that doesn’t exist and that is completely invented by cinematographic engines. 
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The aquatic pseudopod of  The Abyss (1989) is the first entirely binary movie character, a character that 
functions as a mirror for the majority of  its screen-time, reflecting the images standing in front of  it.  
This seems to be the beginning of  a new era of  a peaceful sharing of  the frame and of  the field of  an  
expanded set both for humans and computer-animated beings. The T-1000 of  Cameron’s Terminator 2:  
Judgement Day (1991), made of  liquid nitrogen, works in a similar way, transforming itself  into whatever 
it desires and creating a feeling of  astonishment at the “never before seen”, or its sheer novelty. The  
birth of  the  morphing era marked the dawn of  a new age of  viewing images, because if  everything is 
possible and every creature is able to become something else, then nothing is real and everything is  
possibly a fake. This is what Philippe Quéau (1993) called “the open door for every kind of  revisionism”, 
or the possibility of  erasing the category of  truth as we have known it. Between the end of  the Eighties  
and the beginning of  the Nineties, a film crafted entirely with a computer, with no reference to an  
external  “real”  image,  became a reality  (and this is  indeed an ironic use of  this word). Baudrillard  
(1995/1996) writes about the definitive death of  reality, but again the focus is rarely on the viewer: 
there are no analyses that deal with the changing relation with a reality that is surely more fictitious than 
the one we have become accustomed to calling “real”.
If  the increasing importance of  visual special effects tends to enrich and exaggerate the capacities of  
narrative space, to create and penetrate new and unexplored dimensions (alien creatures, virtual worlds,  
space  adventures),  its  ultimate  goal  is  to  modify  what  we  call  “the  profilmic”.  This  is  a  double 
movement: on the one hand, the profilmic is reduced and becomes an invisible point, a dimension very 
close to invisibility, since it can be forgotten, unused, unnecessary. On the other hand, profilmic space  
can be virtually infinite, because it becomes a place where everything is possible and where the usual 
perceptual approaches lose their functionality, expanding toward the infinite. Titanic and The Matrix are 
perhaps the most radical attempts to use the gigantic power of  new technologies to re-create a real  
dimension, something that was real or that could have been real.  Titanic  finds its greatness in its classical 
style,  in its tending toward a classic  dimension in which each detail is recreated in order to live the 
illusion of  the erasure of  time (the time that passed between the sinking of  the original  ship and its 
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discovery in the depths of  the ocean). The Matrix needs to use every set as a starting point that has to be 
abandoned, because here the will is to erase the space in order to live different lives in different places, all 
of  them coexisting.
The motion capture technique, whose most relevant application we find in  Polar Express and in  King  
Kong, is the perfect expression of  this rush toward the perfect illusion. Motion capture, in fact, is a  
technique  of  digitally  recording  movements  of  real  humans,  animals  or  things.  It  has  become  a 
fundamental source of  motion data for computer animation, and is especially used for videogames and 
cinema. Mimesis has never been so accurate and close to the original image. But, again, and for the last  
time, does something change for the audience? We are still faced with the re-creation of  an  illusion. 
Digital special effects are only used to adopt the same relational approaches viewers have and have had  
with classic cinema, only this time shifting the focus from a reality that is re-created to an illusion of  
reality that exists only as a sequence of  numbers on the hard disk of  a computer. The much-praised  
interactivity, that is so difficult to apply to the cinematic medium, has nothing to do with it, and the  
only way to move toward this interactivity is to transform the spectatorial approach, to try to make the 
visual special effects happen also inside the head and the eye of  the viewer, not only in front of  his/her 
gaze.
I think that a certain tendency in contemporary cinema which brings together technologies of  visual 
effects  and  the  death  of  cinema,  and  which  reacts  nostalgically  and  violently  to  the  increasing 
importance of  technological applications, is only an apocalyptic reaction to a loss – the loss of  contact  
with reality. Perhaps the Danish group Dogma 95, guided by the director Lars von Trier, is the most 
radical supporter of  a cinema that is exclusively related to reality. This movement declares that cinema 
has to deny any use of  what they call “cosmetics”, trying to avoid the creation of  illusions covered by  
many veils of  cinematic make-up. They declare their war against the technologies that have transformed 
cinema into a bourgeois, illusionistic art, and at the same time they claim the right to be happy about 
the “technological storm” that gives everybody the chance to create a film and to find “the truth” 
behind the wall of  these mortal illusions. This is a very naïve provocation, and it may be simply a good 
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advertising strategy. But it is also true that blind faith in the power of  these new cinematic tools hides  
the emptiness of  an imagery that makes a great effort to find new myths and is always forced to recycle  
old stories, old characters, old tales. 
In between these two opposite tendencies, there is a group of  directors that is very interested in the  
virtual possibilities offered by new technologies. However they are only prepared to use them in a  
problematizing  way.  They  refuse  to  use  visual  special  effects  as  simply  funny  gadgets  or  amusing 
decorations that are only useful for putting trendy “make-up” on the face of  the story they are telling.  
For  them,  the  use  of  new  technologies  becomes  more  conscious  and  responsible  if  it  is  made 
considering the consequences that visual special effects have on the viewer’s perceptual system.
This is exactly what Brecht did in his theatre. As Dr. Future points out in his essay “Subject: New  
Media, Old Technology” (1998): 
What is technically innovative about Brecht’s theater? It is not cinema, it is not radio, it is  
not mass media. But it does change the relationship with its audience, not by using film or 
broadcasting  technology  directly,  but  by  adopting  their  “techniques”.  The  principle 
technique  is  montage,  the  ability  of  modern  media  to  fragment  perception  and  then 
recombine it. In Brecht’s theater this is absorbed in the form of  “interruptions” to the 
dramatic action in order to create “conditions” presented to the spectator that require a  
“dialectical” response. In this way montage is employed as an “organizing Function” as 
opposed to a “modish technique” used merely to stimulate the viewer’s fascination. So we 
see that the actual works that Benjamin is interested in use new techniques at a variety of 
levels which can include different media, perceptual modes, “organizing functions” and 
aesthetic considerations.
Contrary to using the latest technological means, Brecht is described instead of  returning 
to the ancient origins of  theatre,  turning the stage into a simple podium for exposing 
present behaviour and conditions. New technique does not mean new technology. 
Another  possible  example  of  this  constant  negotiation that  our  sight  is  undergoing,  besieged and 
surrounded by a completely artificial reality, could be the dramatic shift that Cronenberg made in his  
filmmaking stylistics in 1993, when he inaugurated a “realistic turn” by directing M. Butterfly. Before this 
movie, Cronenberg’s previous films continuously pushed the line of  visual experimentation, partly due 
to the innovative technologies he used over the years, from the exploding heads in Scanners (1980) to the 
living monitors (or the curious fusion between video recorders and human bodies) in Videodrome, from 
the animalization of  a man who becomes an insect in  The Fly  (1986) to the extraordinary twin-effect 
19
achieved in Dead Ringers (1988), and of  course to the nightmare visions of  Naked Lunch (1991). He has 
always forced the viewer’s gaze to recreate the perceptual horizon, building a metamorphic imagery, a  
narrative world full of  new devices and tools, and mutant and hybrid bodies. 
His dedication to visual effects turned out to be more intimate and less related to what are commonly  
defined as “special effects” after directing M. Butterfly. This is perhaps the most radical and subversive 
of  Cronenberg’s films, if  only because it shows the consequences of  special effects by telling the story 
of  a misperception. The story is of  René Gallimard, a French diplomat who falls in love with a Chinese  
woman, and who is happy when the latter tells him she’s pregnant. He risks and ultimately loses both  
his career and his own life for his love and, in the end, just before dying, he discovers that the woman  
he has loved for all those years is a man. Cronenberg could have used many technological tools to hide  
the real gender of  Gallimard’s lover. But instead of  using visual effects to transform a man into a 
woman, he decided to choose a well-known actor with a deep male voice, who plays the character of  a 
Peking Opera singer (and it is relatively common knowledge that all Peking Opera singers are men) and  
makes very little effort to hide his masculinity. The audience understands perfectly well that Gallimard, 
who  is  represented  as  successful  with  women,  sexually  active  and  charming,  is  embarking  on  a  
relationship with a man. However, the core, of  Cronenberg’s story is that we make our own special and 
visual effects whenever we see what we want to see, whenever we look at what we want to look at. We 
always love the image of  what we want to love. At the end, Gallimard admits: “What I loved is the lie  
[…] I’m a man who loved a woman created by a man”.
The very filmmaker who plunged the credibility of  cinematic images into a permanent crisis through an  
enormous deployment of  visual effects is the same one who has also created a film exclusively about  
the effects  of  the  trompe  l’oeil that  substantiate every  vision.  Gallimard loves the  projection of  his 
fantasy, he lives his sexuality as a fantastic creation that is completely separated from the real world he 
lives in. Is this any different, Cronenberg suggests, from other love stories? He remarks: 
What made me decide to make the film is the idea that female sexuality is invented by men. The 
idea that everyone’s sexuality is a mutual fantasy that is reciprocally created. This is something 
sweet and terrifying, because in a certain sense it means that true sexuality doesn’t exist. (Rodley,  
1992, p. 134) 
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Again we love the image of  what we choose to love. This is the most extraordinary effect we can see, as  
we can create something that doesn’t really exist out of  nothing. 
The line that links together such different movies as Strange Days, The Village and – going back in time – 
M.Butterfly  is connected to different visual and perceptual phenomena that seem to happen inside our 
eyes, or, so to say, behind them. According to this visual and theoretical perspective, some of  Philip K. 
Dick’s words come to mind again. Reflecting upon what happened in the cinema of  his day (a cinema 
that did not utilize today’s digital innovations), he wrote of  today’s films:
Science fiction films have put one over on us. Like the veil of  maya, your special effects 
department down there in Hollywood can now simulate anything the mind can imagine. . . 
and you thought it was all real. No, they really don’t blow up planets. It’s true; they make it  
up.  And  a  great  deal  of  skillful  imagining  is  going  on  these  days.  Not  content  with 
destroying whole planets, inventive scriptwriters and directors will soon be bringing you 
peculiar new universes with inhabitants to match. Watch for it. What you thought an alien 
looked like. . . well, it is going to look a lot worse. What burst through Kane’s shirt in Alien 
is not the end of  the line of  monsters but more the beginning. It takes megabucks to  
match the imaginations behind sci-fi films, and that money exists because the profits are 
there. Not for the story line of  the film; that isn’t what Hollywood goes for, now that 
Hitchcock has left us. Why do you need a story line if  your special effects department can  
simulate anything? Graphic, visual impact has replaced story. Authors of  science-fiction 
novels  know this and grumble; what they wrote is  not what you get when the film is 
finished. But this is as it should be. We are seeing a story, not being told it. (Dick, 1996, p.  
78) 
Questioning the hegemony of  vision, by means of  a dramatic turn in favour of  other senses, is an  
effort that admits how the broadly discussed balance among the senses needs to be discussed in order 
to obtain a culturally and socially updated cartography that offers a structured image of  our actual 
condition. As W. J. T. Mitchell (2002) points out, 
Vision has played the role of  the sovereign sense since God looked at his own creation and 
saw that it was good, or perhaps even earlier when he began the act of  creation with the  
division  of  the  light  from the  darkness.  The  notion  of  vision  as  hegemonic  or  non-
hegemonic is simply too blunt an instrument to produce much in the way of  historical or 
critical differentiation. The important task is to describe the specific relations of  vision to 
the  other  senses,  especially  hearing  and touch,  as  they  are  elaborated  within  particular  
cultural practices. (p. 175)
This relation, which needs to be delineated and described, is certainly the one between vision and the  
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other senses, but it is also complicated by the specific issues of  the digital realm: perhaps all theories  
regarding  cinema and ideology  are  forced  to  be  updated.  Digital  cinema is  rapidly  redefining  the  
perimeters of  the old boundaries between ideology and cinema because it  is  reshaping the mutual 
borders  between  reality  and  representation  thanks  to  a  substantial  deconstruction  of  any  “reality  
principle”. This progressive demolition is achieved both through a set of  narratives that question the 
uniqueness of  reality and through a total transformation of  the filmic space and image. A movie such  
as  Strange Days is  the perfect demonstration of  how contemporary,  post-postmodern cinema works 
when it tries to erect a “connecting space” (Pisters, 2003, p. 42) that endlessly opens the space of  the  
screen. It is quite entirely a matter of  how contemporary cinema communicates and and how it shapes 
the impression of  reality (or, better, realities) in the audience’s brains. As Casetti (1993/1999) notes, 
a camera elaborates a representation of  reality that is  its own, although derived from the 
world.  It  depends  on  a  code  that  both  rules  and  shapes  and  that  is  only  apparently 
“immediate” and “faithful”. If, therefore – as Althusser suggested – ideology has to do first 
of  all  with  representations,  cinema  inevitably  sides  with  ideology.  It  continues  and 
relaunches the “specular vision” that Humanism, in the 1400s, had developed to support 
the emergent bourgeoisie. (p. 186) 
Digital cinema, bypassing the dictatorship of  the referent, of  “derivation” from the world,  perhaps 
offers a form of  opposition to the perspective rule that, in a continuously mutating way, distinguished 
classical and post-classical cinema before the Eighties. The question that arises is about the potential of 
this re-ideologized cinema that is subverting exactly the root of  a perspective norm: so, is it a counter-
ideological cinema or, rather, is it just a cinema that contains another hegemonic ideology at the visible 
and cognitive level?
The choice adopted here regarding movies and their geographic and cultural provenience is maybe a  
signal of  the awareness of  the fact that contemporary Hollywood is reshaping the imagery of  the entire 
planet and an attempt to offer a more problematizing approach. If  what Jean-Paul Fargier (1969/1971)  
wrote about the political value of  cinema is somehow still true, it is because, even though everything  
has changed in the social  balances of  Western societies  since he wrote his most influential  works,  
cinema is still capable of  affecting how individuals structure their view of  the world, their specific  
configuration of  the sensible (see Rancière, 2001/2006). It is still possible to discuss cinema and its 19
ability to hide or reveal to its audience the structures of  what happens outside the screen, but it is less 
easy to identify a cinema that “reproduces the existing ideologies” (Fargier, 1969/1971, p. 134) because  
the mechanisms of  the multiplication and replication of  ideological or post-ideological structures is  
more differentiated given the multiple layers of  contemporary mediascape.  Yet it  is  still  current to 
consider that cinema “produces an ideology of  its own, the impression of  reality.  In the screen there is 
nothing but reflection and shadow, and yet the spectator develops at once the idea that there is reality as  
it really is” (Fargier, 1969/1971, p. 134). According to these words, we have to analyse with a great  
attention the effect of  a cinema that relentlessly tries to undermine the correspondence between the 
screen and reality, showing how complicated and fragile this symmetry can be. 
- The film screen and its outside: Medical images, CCTV  and software of  non-human vision
If  we think about the dramatically increasing use of  medical instruments that are able to offer a vision 
inside the body, we have to consider that many of  these devices involve a different way of  seeing,  
something entirely different from X-rays and their penetrative power which first transported the human 
gaze beyond the limits of  the skin and the body surface. If  X-rays (which, as it has been broadly noted,  
were born contemporaneously with the cinematic device) are an enhancement enabling us to expand 
the boundaries of  sight, 
The simultaneous emergence of  multiple optical  techniques in the medical  context has 
created an apparently monolithic new field in which only those with extensive training have 
access  to medicine’s  specialized  visual  knowledge.  In  other  words,  the  meaning of  the 
highly technical and abstract images of  our bodies produced in Computed Tomography 
(CT)  and  Positron  Emission  Tomography  (PET)  scans,  sonograms,  and  magnetic 
resonance images (MRIs) appear to be totally inaccessible to those of  us who are lay users,  
precisely because they function within cultural codes far removed from everyday forms like 
the photographic, the televisual, or the cinematic. These images can easily be decoded as 
compositions that metaphorically represent in familiar conventions the ostensible future of 
genetic technologies. (Cartwright, 1995, p. 220) 
Cinema is trying to make these highly coded images both more familiar and less abstract, and in this  
attempt, it is sharing with our gaze the possibility of  adopting visual machines in order to bypass the 
intrinsic limitations of  our biological sight. It seems that the constantly proliferating technologies of 
visualization are obliterating the necessity of  sight and transporting the visual into the realm of  the  19
disembodied eye that freely moves without obeying the necessities of  the body, offering paradoxical 
forms of  vision in which images are the result of  a process that nothing has to do with the logics of 
the skopein. 
The visualization of  nonoptical images, that is, images produced through devices whose final result is 
an image even if  nothing has been seen or watched, merits substantial attention and study. Ultrasound 
sonograms are the visible results of  investigating machines whose purpose is the surveillance of  the  
hidden parts  of  human  bodies,  but  whose  cultural  relevance  is  clearly  going  beyond this  limited, 
practical aim. If  the possibility of  seeing the unborn baby through prenatal ultrasound is changing the 
way contemporary culture deals with delicate topics such as fetal subjectivity or the psychological well-
being of  the mother, the focus put on the value of  the images themselves pushes us to think about the  
“blind vision” that is  evoked every time some acoustic  waves are transformed into optical  images.  
Cinema has widely adopted these forms of  visualization, broadly showing on the cinematic screen the 
electronic images of  ultrasound machines or biological vision (the most recent one is the “sonar effect” 
shown in  The  Dark Knight,  directed  by  Christopher  Nolan  in  2008),  but  what  seems  to  be  more 
important is that the cultural and psychological shift spurred by these visual devices is also readable in  
other kinds of  images. 
One of  the most important movies about watching something invisible – about the possibility offered  
by visual  technology  of  seeing  images  which  originate  from other  forms  of  communication  –  is  
Zemeckis’s Contact (1997). At the centre of  the narrative is the chance of  listening to the stars (instead 
of  watching them, as is typical human practice) and decoding an audio signal, transforming it into a 
visual event. The main character of  the movie is Allie, a young researcher who listens to the stars,  
waiting for a signal from outer space. She has to deal with the scepticism of  her colleagues who ridicule  
her for the hope she has of  making contact with other intelligence beings. But when a signal arrives  
from the distant star Vega, Ellie literally sees the radio message she is capturing: she is sitting calmly, 
listening  through  earphones,  when the  long-lasting silence is  broken.  Zemeckis  moves  the  camera 
towards Ellie’s face, zooming in for an extreme close up of  her opening eyes. She is listening, but what 
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she hears suddenly becomes something that she sees. Later, when the signal is almost deciphered into a 
series of  prime numbers and its intensity is becoming stronger, the technicians become aware that there 
is a hidden video source in the signal. So they transcode the radio signal into a visual one and they  
discover that, from a star that is 26 light years away, someone is transmitting Adolf  Hitler’s speech from 
the opening ceremony of  the 1936 Olympic Games. Zemeckis turns back the clock of  technological 
evolution and orchestrates a shift from sound (represented as a collection of  points) to video. But for  
Zemeckis, who is adapting a Carl Sagan novel, this is not enough. The signal also turns out to contain  
other messages, thousands of  pages that seem to be unreadable to the specialists; but reading is not the 
correct  means  of  decryption,  given  that  the  pages  need  to  be  viewed  as  a  three-dimensional 
configuration that, after being visually “translated”, discloses the secrets for constructing a spaceship  
that can allow one passenger to journey through space. 
Ellie actually makes this journey, and somewhere in distant space meets her dead father and records the  
encounter  with  cameras  that  form part  of  her  space  suit.  There  are  two  stunning  elements  that 
transform Ellie’s voyage into a perceptual  experience that questions the reliability  of  sight and the  
certainty associated with visual recordings. The interstellar mission seems to fail when the spaceship 
collapses sur place; there is no movement, no journey, no shifting in space according to the traditional 
way of  depicting science-fiction experiences of  space travel. Ellie enters a sort of  space tunnel that 
leads her through different visual elements that somehow remind the viewer of  the hallucinatory trip  
made by the astronaut Bowman in  2001: A Space Odyssey  (1968): a long trip through space and time, 
shot by Zemeckis with a semi-subjective sequence that keeps Ellie and what she perceives within the  
limits  of  the frame. But  Zemeckis  does something more:  while  showing Ellie  and her visual  field 
throughout her journey, he also shows one monitor connected to the camera she wears on her helmet.  
But the monitor shows nothing but visual interference. What she sees, and what the camera sees and 
records, are not the same data. 
In the eyes of  the witnesses and technicians who follow the experiment from the central station, the  
spaceship does not move at all. But even though she remains inside the immobile craft, we can see that  
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Ellie is taken somewhere else, to an apparently synthetic and artificial beach where a translucent sea  
glitters under a shiny dark sky. It is clearly an artificial environment, whose simulated nature shines with  
a very thick materiality that pushes Ellie to touch it. So to Ellie, the sky, the sea, the sand appear to be a  
virtual wrapping that she can feel with her hands (as happens when she reaches her hand out to push 
the soft vortex that floats above her in the sky, the forest of  palm trees that apparently is out of  reach, 
the incredibly blue sea). There she meets her long-dead father, and her dubious and rational approach is  
dismantled by the certainties he communicates. The  other,  the alien being who is the source of  the 
interstellar signal she heard, decides to appear in front of  her, taking on the appearance of  her father so 
that she can more easily deal with it. Once again, images need to be familiar, they have to confirm an  
assumed knowledge in order to have a more profound effect or a stronger emotional impact. So the 
natural environment, the face and voice of  Ellie’s father, the entire Vega experience features “a variety  
of  computerized elements that create both existing  and hypothetical realities – and that make those 
possibly different realities impossible to sort out reliably” (Craig, 2001, p. 162).
But, at the same time, these images escape the recording and reproduction systems. After regaining  
consciousness, Ellie insists that she has accomplished her mission, that she has reached the distant area  
of  space from which the signals arrived, while the members of  the NASA team assert the impossibility 
of  her words, given that the spaceship only revolved around its axis and, more importantly, the cameras  
worn  by Ellie  recorded  only  a  prolonged visual  noise.  Whereas  her  eyes  had  constructed  a  most 
impressive vision, the mechanized optical tools  saw the void, nothing, the black and white blur that 
testifies to the failed recording.  Without any visual  support,  lacking the images that can prove her  
journey actually happened, Ellie is not believed. When she asserts that the journey was several hours  
long, it turns out that the recorded event took only a few seconds to fail, so that space and time are the  
conceptual frame in which the eye and the recording machines mark their differences and the distortion  
of  their  relations.  Everyone  saw  Ellie  standing,  every  camera  recorded  a  visual  emptiness;  the  
perceptual hole that absorbs all the characters except Ellie has its invisible side in the events that the  
heroine felt and saw.
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Zemeckis, in this attempt at narrating the importance of  “believing” (a theological rather than religious 
act), traces the possible strategies for a complex redefinition of  sight. In Contact, space and time are the 
fundamental sites for the negotiation of  meaning, from the opening sequence that is built around a 
long  and  unceasing  journey  that  starts  from a  vision  of  planet  Earth  from space  and then  goes 
backward, transforming our planet into a distant object, the invisible point lost in the black abyss of  the  
galaxies. It is a backward movement during which we see planets, stars and empty space on the screen,  
hearing voices and increasingly confused sounds. While nothing is seen and nothing is heard, the long 
journey back though space shows us its real nature: a journey back in time, given that the exit point of 
this continuous and vertiginous movement are the eyes of  Ellie as a child, working on her instruments,  
always trying to listen (rather than see) the stars and cosmic space. Travelling through space, we have 
actually  been  reversing  the  time,  and,  moreover,  we  have  admitted the  possibility  of  a  substantial 
reciprocal belonging together of  Ellie’s body, her history and the body of  the universe. 
The betrayal of  images, their unverifiable nature, crashes against the certainty of  feelings, of  memory, 
in a movie that posits the foundation for the profoundest reflections upon destiny and the cultural  
meaning of  sight and the utopian necessity of  other spaces and places. Zemeckis has always worked 
with the malleability of  time and with the constant redefinition of  the process of  image-creation: but in  
Contact, he admits  that  cinema has reached its  extreme boundaries and that  images  are simply  not  
enough, because their exhaustion has led to their incapacity to restore the wholeness that surrounds our  
senses and perception. Sight is not enough, and other relational strategies need to be involved in order 
to momentarily contain the complexity that images fail to capture and record. 
The sensorial displacement our culture is undergoing seems to carry us toward a realm in which the 
status of  images needs to be reconsidered in order to readjust the balance with the prostheses that are  
currently  functioning in  the  process  of  a  programmed  perception.  Clearly  several  of  the  movies 
discussed above seem to invoke an updated consideration of  the substantial irreducibility of  mental  
objects to the strict constraints of  images per se. The mechanized modes of  observation permitted by 
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scientific instruments and industrialized visual tools lead to a radical rethinking of  the connection that  
ties a fading reality principle to the more invasive and powerful reality effect.
The incapacity of  our biological visual apparatus is strictly linked to the inadequacy of  images and to 
the  ascendance  of  technological  tools  that  see  (and  foresee,  Virilio  would  add)  on  our  behalf,  
dismantling two basic limitations of  our sensorial  structure. These machines do not operate with a 
depth of  focus that goes beyond that of  the human eye, but they exploit the difficulties that the human 
eye has in moving into the time dimension (the impossibility of  capturing extremely fast movements).  
They also inhabit the spatial dimension, allowing us to extend sight towards places otherwise invisible  
(the belly of  a pregnant woman, the deepest depths of  an ocean, the subatomic particles of  matter) and  
offering an entire new field of  vision and visibility. As Virilio continues in his argument:
Since  the  time-frequency  of  light  has  become  the  determining  factor  in  relative 
apperception of  phenomena and subsequently of  the reality principle, the vision machine is 
well  and truly an “absolute-speed machine”,  further undermining traditional  notions of 
geometric optics like observables and non-observables. Actually, if  photo-cinematography 
is  still  inscribed  in  extensive  time,  promoting  expectation  and  attention  by  means  of 
suspense, real-time video computer graphics is already inscribed in intensive time, promoting 
the unexpected and a short concentration span by means of  surprise. Blindness is thus very 
much at the heart of  the coming “vision-machine”. The production of  sightless vision is itself 
merely the reproduction of  an intense blindness that will become the latest and last form 
of  industrialization: the industialization of  the non-gaze. (pp. 72-73) 
How  is  cinema  dealing  with  these  transformations  of  the  visible  and  the  observable?  How  are 
cinematic language and rhetoric redefining their limits and specificities according with these profound 
revolutions? The adjustments involve both stylistic and narrative implications which perhaps lead us to 
a  new  way  of  orienting the  cinematic  medium,  its  grammar  and  syntax,  even  the  possibility  of 
conceiving visual objects that challenge the possibility of  communication and experience. 
Conclusion
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As  this  research  has  demonstrated,  the  recent  trend  in  contemporary  American  cinema  toward 
featuring perceptual disorders, particularly memory and sight afflictions, goes far beyond their use as  
metaphors of  the human condition in the age of  digital technology. Indeed, as Benjamin (1936/2008) 
argued long ago and McLuhan (1964) more recently reminded us, communication media are not only  
produced from within their contemporary environment but themselves participate in the production of 
this environment, as well as the audience’s perceptual habits and abilities.  The rise of  digital media  
technology thus alters not only the possibilities for cinematic practice and innovation but the very ways  
people watch, process and interpret them. However, this transformation is not restricted simply to how 
people watch films or interact with various media, but reconfigures perceptual processes more generally 
due to the way it reconditions subjectivity and identity. 
The reciprocal  dynamic of  the  relations between media  and consciousness  means  that  changes  in 
cinematic technology can bring about changes in the spectator’s mind, but at the same time minds that 
develop under, and which are affected by, these new technologies are more adapted to understanding 
their  full potential  and can more easily  exploit these possibilities in the making of  films and other 
media  products.  Furthermore,  this  transformation  of  consciousness  determines  new  forms  of 
narration which are then incorporated into films as they explore new ways of  telling stories to and for  
the contemporary audience.
One reason behind the contemporary interest in brain and sensory disorders and their representation in  
film is that the current generation of  film-makers has grown up or spent a considerable portion of 
their lives under the influence of  digital technology, and their imaginations are not constrained by the  
limitations and possibilities of  the previous generation of  technology. These directors and writers are 
able to not only envision new approaches to story-telling but to adapt them to—and play with—the 
audience’s new perceptual processes, using cinema as a creative instrument to redefine the relationships 
among  the  senses,  consciousness  and  the  world  of  reality.  Thus,  directors  are  able  to  exploit  
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phenomena such as the  audience’s  capacity  to deal  with  fragmented and non-linear  narratives,  the  
participatory ethos of  the digital age, and contemporary tolerance for ambiguity about the nature of  
“reality” in the creation of  complex, immersive and participatory films which put the spectator directly  
into the subject position within the film narrative rather than relying on identification with the on-
screen subject. 
And what better way could there be to create this sense of  direct involvement than to thwart the  
viewer’s  very  ability  to  easily  process  sensory  information?  In  fact,  one  of  the  most  striking  and  
effective tendencies of  the period is the development of  a performative dimension that places the  
spectator in the position of  the afflicted subject, exploiting the sensory deprivation as a source of  both  
participatory  investment  in  the  narrative  (to  make  sense  of  the  narrative  despite  the  limitations 
imposed) and emotional and sensory impact. Moreover, it can also subsequently stimulate intellectual 
reflection upon the experience,  pushing the spectator to consider their own cognitive processes in  
relation to those dramatized within and cultivated by the film. For example, a film like Memento not only 
thematizes  the  constructedness  and  retroactively  determined  nature  of  memory  through  the 
protagonist’s struggles within the narrative, but it also forces the spectator to share the effects of  his 
disorder,  to  create  his/her  own  retroactive  (re)construction  of  past  events  as  the  chronologically 
backwards  sequencing  of  the  scenes  makes  the  viewer  constantly  revise  and  reconsider  his/her 
interpretation of  the events and their meanings. 
From the earliest cinematic shocks as montage seemed a monstrous rending of  the human body or  
even the very tissue of  reality itself, to German Expressionism’s deforming of  naturalised expectations 
of  cinematic realism, to Vertov’s displacement of  the human eye as the central locus of  cinematic 
perception  and  Eisenstein’s  reconceptualisation  of  the  role  of  the  spectator,  certain  early 
cinematographic approaches sought to undermine the mimetic potential of  cinema in favour of  a more 
performative and metaphoric exploration of  the dynamics and possibilities of  human perception and 
meaning-making. Perhaps more than anything, what these experiments underlined was the way that the 
mechanical  tools  involved  in  producing  motion  pictures  did  not  need  to  be  used  to  (seemingly)  20
reproduce the visual experience of  the human eye but rather could enhance and expand the perceptual 
possibilities  of  the  spectator,  moving  him/her  outside  of  the  frame  and  thereby  altering  the  
possibilities of  subjectivity. 
But if, as Benjamin argues, the rise of  new technologies brings new possibilities for self-formation by 
altering the relations between the perceiving self  and the objects of  that perception, what happens 
when the status  of  those  objects  changes  radically  with  the  rise  of  digital  technology?  When the  
materiality of  objects themselves—or at least the spectator’s faith in it—can no longer be taken for 
granted or guarantee their existence as concrete referents that are present in the material world of  
(extra-cinematic) reality, what happens to the experience of  the spectator? Or, perhaps more to the  
point, what new possibilities of  spectatorship are opened up by such changes in technology?
In recent decades, the film as cultural object has gone through a series of  radical transformations with  
the appearance of  various technologies (from VHS to online streaming) that have profoundly modified 
its nature and existence. For example, the DVD—itself  now approaching obsolescence—has radically 
altered the possibilities for both film producers and consumers. As Elsaesser (2009) affirms: 
for a feature film to be not only recordable, storable, and playable as a DVD, but in some 
sense,  particularly  “DVD-enabled,”  it  would  have  to be a film that  requires  or  repays 
multiple viewings; that rewards the attentive viewer with special or hidden clues; that is 
constructed as a spiral or loop; that benefits from back-stories (bonuses) or para-textual 
information;  that  can  sustain  a-chronological  perusal  or  even  thrives  on  it.  All  these 
conditions chart  the type of  textual  organization which responds to the conditions  of 
distribution,  reception,  consumption,  cinephilia,  connoisseurship,  and  spectatorship 
appropriate for the multi-platform film, which can seduce a theater-going public with its 
special effects and spectacle values, engage the volatile fan-communities on the internet by 
becoming a sort of  “node” for the exchange of  information and the trade in trivia and 
esoterica in social networking situations, as well as “work” as a DVD and possibly even as 
a game. (p. 38) 
That  such  a  seemingly  simple  digital  storage  device  could  so  profoundly  expand the  horizons  of 
cinema,  encouraging  narrative  complexity  and  fragmentation  as  means  of  both  artistically  and 
economically capitalizing upon the capacities of  the medium as well as inviting spectator involvement  
as  participants  in  the  reconstruction  of  these  narratives,  clearly  attests  to  the  key  role  played  by 
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technological innovation in reconfiguring the relationship between film and audience.
As Barbara Klinger (2001) has noted, the fleeting, distant and inherently public experience of  watching  
a film in the analog era has been transformed into a lasting, familiar and increasingly private one: 
Today cinema can be contained in small boxes, placed on a shelf, left on the coffee table 
or  thrown on the floor.  Spectators can pause,  fast-forward,  rewind or  mangle images 
through the VCR; they can program a laserdisc player so that it shows only the desired 
scenes. In these alternative formats, films can be viewed repeatedly at the spectator’s whim 
and achieve an indelible place in everyday routines. This previously remote, transitory and 
public medium has thus attained the solidity and semi-permanent status of  a household 
object, intimately and infinitely subject to manipulation in the private sphere. (pp. 133–
134)
Moreover, the tendency toward a cinema of  “immersion” as new sound and visual technologies permit  
a stronger experience of  being bodily enveloped within the unfolding spectacle, of  experiencing it first-
hand, in the first person (rather than having the distance of  the third-person observer from outside the 
frame), has redefined the process of  cinematic identification, bypassing identification with a character 
who mediates the experience of  the narrative for a more direct and immediate sense of  being inside the 
narrative.  At  the  same time,  though,  the  sensory  stimulation  goes  beyond the  capacity  of  human 
sensory organs as various digital effects and manipulations serve to “augment” the senses: unnatural 
and inhuman camera movements and angles, manipulating the speed of  time even to the point of  
stopping it, zooming in and out to resolutions beyond the limits of  the human eye and other such 
techniques highlight the unreality of  the experience which, all the same, “feels” very real.
Finally,  and  perhaps  most  crucially,  at  the  very  moment  of  being  absorbed within  the  immersive  
cinematic narrative, drawn into and feeling a part of  the reality presented, the privileged status of  that  
reality itself  is taken away. The ontological link taken for granted between the image and an external 
reality  disappears  with  the  advent  of  digital  film  technology,  undermining  or  at  least  seriously  
questioning the possibility that film could provide us with some kind of  image of  an ontologically  
stable “reality”. 
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These issues are precisely what the contemporary cinematic emphasis on perceptual disorders engages  
with as it explores the experience of  subjectivity in the digital age. At the very moment when cinema  
can no longer promise the spectator a perception of  reality, cinema begins an intense and extended 
investigation of  misperceptions of  reality, of  cognitive and sensory failures that require significant effort 
and investment on the part of  both characters and spectators to sort out. 
One of  the most important thematic and structural influences of  contemporary cinema is the radically 
changed concept of  memory that has emerged in the last few decades. Moving far beyond classical 
concepts of  memory as a sort of  private property, a stable ground upon which identity is founded and 
grounded, the increasing realization that memories are not facts or data perfectly preserved, but rather  
mediated, subjective and ever-changing narrativizations of  an ontologically dubious past, has generated 
new approaches to the cinematic representation of  the relations between past and present and the link  
between memory and identity. This concept of  memory as a dynamic, productive activity of  selection 
and recomposition,  influenced by various emotional,  cognitive and material  circumstances, has had 
great  epistemological  consequences  for  contemporary  representations  of  the  processes  of 
remembering. 
No longer does the classical cinematic device of  the flashback suffice when the linear relation between 
memory, recollection and the representation of  images linked to specific mental processes has changed. 
If  the  classical  flashback  (often  coupled  with  voice-over)  was  tied  to  the  stable  subjectivity  of  a 
remembering character who functioned as a reliable  point of  reference for audience identification,  
many contemporary uses of  the flashback,  such as those analysed in Chapter 2,  are not anchored 
within  a  stable,  reliable  subject  but  emanate  from the  unique,  idiosyncratic  mental  wanderings  of 
unreliable, unstable, or even “defective” subjects. Exploring the periphery of  what would be considered 
“normal” functioning allows these directors to interrogate traditional ideas and representations of  how 
memory  works  while  at  the  same  time  drawing  the  audience  into  the  experience  of  a  different 
conception,  confronting them with the instability,  unreliability  and subjective nature of  memory in  
general. 20
The primary memory disorder used to explore these issues is amnesia, depriving the subject of  his/her 
memories which were the traditional Lockean support for identity. These films engage head-on with 
the  crisis  of  contemporary  subjectivity,  presenting  characters  without  any  pretense  of  stable 
foundations  who must cobble together a sense of  identity  from the myriad fragments  they gather  
together in what turns out to be an explicitly narrative construction. Directly dramatizing the condition 
of  the subject in the digital age, these films show characters actively participating in the construction of 
their  memories,  making  motivated  selections  based  on  their  context,  aims  and  needs  to  produce 
memory-narratives that can, to some degree, provide meaning to their actions and existence. Whether it  
be Joel in Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind, trying to hold on to a memory that is really only a story he 
has told himself, Leonard Shelby in Memento, constantly supplementing his faulty memory with external 
supports that are far from reliable (including lies he intentionally tells himself) in order to follow the  
narrative path he has chosen for his life, or Spider, aimlessly transported from moment to moment,  
“remembering”  things  he  has  not  even  experienced  as  he  attempts  to  string  together  disparate 
fragments of  dubious reality, these films insist upon and emphasize the affective, emotional dimension 
of  memory rather than a sense of  accurate, mechanical recall. Memory is rendered as an active process  
of  interpretation rather than factual  recall,  freed from any direct  association with actual,  verifiable 
objective events of  the past.
At the same time, these films also manifest a performative dimension that engages the spectator within  
these  very  dynamics  of  the  remembering  subject,  using  the  film’s  narrative  structure  and various  
technical effects to place them in the same precarious situation as the character on screen, forcing them 
to engage in the same process of  narrative construction from various unreliable fragments as does the 
protagonist while at the same time being aware of  the artifice of  this process. 
Indeed,  this  inevitable  and  instantaneous  falsification  of  reality  that  blurs  even  the  possibility  of 
making a distinction between fact and invention, between truth and fiction dovetails with the prevailing  
contemporary  uncertainty regarding the status of  “reality” itself  and how the subject  can possibly 
know it that arrives, at least in part, from technological advances in digital technology. The idea of  the 20
imperfection and unreliability of  memory has only been reinforced by modern digital data storage and 
the rise of  computer technologies, with their promise of  non-selective, perfect mechanical recordings 
of  events  which  cannot  be  forgotten  (though  they  can,  or  course,  be  intentionally  erased).  Such 
technical capacities make human memory seem all the more inferior, yet at the same time, they also 
offer  prosthetic  support  to  human  memory,  freeing  us  from  concern  regarding  issues  of  factual  
accuracy to focus on what human memory really is all about: constructing meaning for the past in  
relation  to  the  moment  of  remembering,  retaining  or  re-invoking  subjective  traces  of  the  lived,  
embodied experience.
Though mechanical memory prostheses and external storage capacities remain the stuff  of  science-
fiction, their themes of  invented, artificial and implanted memories clearly engage with contemporary 
concepts of, and anxieties regarding, the threatened or compromised autonomy of  the subject and the 
increasing impossibility of  maintaining distinctions between the authentic and the falsified in an age of 
media-generated memories. Indeed, cinema itself  can be considered a sort of  prosthetic (and possibly 
collective) memory as it furnishes its audience with felt recollections, all the more memory-like with the  
immersive style of  film-making which involves the subject in the narrative with whole-body sensory 
stimulation, making it an experience that is capable of  producing memories of  it.
The second important trend in contemporary cinematic representations of  perceptual deficits relates to 
issues of  blindness and the problematic of  visuality in the digital age, when the link between the image 
and the real  becomes weakened or disappears altogether.  One consequence of  the  realization that 
images are not extractions from the material  world or reflections of  actual  things,  but,  rather,  are 
constructed, is a transformation of  the dynamics of  perception. Vision loses its privileged place among 
the senses as it is no longer able to establish the basis for the sense of  mimetic realism of  an image or  
film. Without the stable and authoritative eye—and its correlate, the autonomous perceiving subject—
to anchor the  relation  between the  perceived  and the real,  the  fallible  perceiving  subject,  with  an 
unreliable  perceptual  apparatus,  is  exposed  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  outside  world;  consequently, 
moving from a logic of  correspondence to one of  resemblance, the idea of  referentiality passes from 20
the visual image to a more diffused sense of  experience. As Prince (1996) puts it,  images are now 
“referentially fictional but perceptually realistic” (p. 32); the image need only be credible to the overall  
perceptual experience of  it, not in direct correspondence to a material original. 
All  this  dramatically  changes  the  dynamics  of  spectatorship  which  become  increasingly  like  the 
experience of  a hallucination in which the immaterial and virtual images of  digital technology, freed 
from space and time and possibly from even a locatable point of  view, create a certain reality effect,  
even as the spectator is keenly aware that what he/she is watching has no actual referent in the material  
world. The sense of  reality of  the cinematic image is rendered solely perceptual, not material, with the  
irony that the inventive capabilities of  digital effects tend to be used to make images that look like  
analog images, only with much greater—even impossible—levels of  visual detail as if  to compensate  
for their fundamental lack of  materiality. 
In this ontologically unstable and epistemologically confusing relation between the spectator and the 
image,  blindness  becomes  a  central  metaphor  for  this  situation  as  representing  the  very  limit  of  
visuality  itself.  And while  representations of  blindness work as meditations on the crisis of  visual  
representation  and  viewership,  some  go  further  to  reflect  more  profoundly  upon  the  nature  of 
spectatorship in our altered visualscape. A film like The Village not only dramatizes the situation of  the 
contemporary perceiving cinema spectator—moving through the virtual world of  cinematic images,  
aware of  certain unrealities on the screen while negotiating the narrative, yet also suffering from a  
double  blindness  to  the  fundamental  reality  of  what  the  image  itself  truly  is—but  positions  the  
spectator so that he/she follows the unawareness of  the characters,  seeing through their (unseeing 
and/or unperceiving) eyes. As in the films focused on memory disorders, visual disorders can also  
manifest  in  a  performative  dimension,  forcing  viewers  to  experience  the  same  limitations  as  the 
characters in order to force them to reflect upon and perhaps come to grips with their unsettled and 
unsettling position as spectators experiencing reality effects rather than glimpsing traces of  materiality. 
The  meditations  on  contemporary  spectatorship  found  in  films  featuring  perceptual  and memory  
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disorders underline the active, dynamic and processual nature of  sight and memory, calling attention to 
the subjective and contextual influences on how they select, organize and represent experiences in a 
fundamentally  narrative  structure.  Such  films  encourage  reflection  not  only  upon  the  way  our  
perceptual  processes have been altered by the technological changes in visual  media but some also 
position  us  squarely  in  the  middle  of  the  crisis  of  subjectivity  and representation  created  by the  
disappearance of  the real as a support to our identifications and perceptions, forcing us to work our 
way  out  of  the  precarious  situation  of  the  contemporary  spectator.  Perhaps  in  an  ironic  way,  at  
precisely the moment when cinema, ontologically,  can no longer provide the promise of  traces or 
perceptions  of  reality,  having  the  audience  follow  in  the  perceptual  processes  of  characters  who 
misperceive reality is perhaps the most “realistic” experience that cinema can offer. 
20
Filmography
Birth of  a Nation (David Wark Griffith, 1915)
Das Kabinett des Dr. Caligari (1920)
La Roue (Abel Gance, 1923)
Napoleon (Abel Gance, 1927)
La coquille et le clergyman (Germaine Dulac, 1928)
Un Chien Andalou (Luis Buñuel, 1929)
Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 1941) 
Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944)
Stagefright (Alfred Hitchcock, 1950)
Rashomon (Akira Kurosawa, 1950) 
Nana (Christian Jacque, 1954)
Hiroshima Mon Amour (Alain Rensais, 1959)
Peeping Tom (Michael Powell and Emerich Pressburger, 1959)
L’année dernière à Marienbad (Alain Rensais, 1961)
La Jetée (Chris Marker, 1962) 
Blow Up (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1966)
Je t’aime, je t’aime (Alain Resnais, 1968)
2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, 1968)
La Régione Centrale (Michael Snow, 1971)
Network (Sydney Lumet, 1976)
Alien (Ridley Scott, 1979)
Scanners (David Cronenberg, 1980) 
The Shining (Stanley Kubrick, 1980)
Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982)
Videodrome (David Cronenberg, 1983)
The Fly (David Cronenberg, 1986) 
Dead Ringers (David Cronenberg, 1988)
Speaking Parts (Atom Egoyan, 1989)
The Abyss (James Cameron, 1989)
Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, 1990)
Crimes and Misdemeanors (Woody Allen, 1990)
JFK (Oliver Stone, 1991) 21
Naked Lunch (David Cronenberg, 1991)
Terminator 2: Judgment Day (James Cameron, 1991) 
21
Bis and Ende der Welt (Wim Wenders, 1991)
Groundhog Day (Harold Ramis, 1993)
Jurassic Park (Steven Spielberg, 1993)
M. Butterfly (David Cronenberg, 1993)
The Lost World: Jurassic Parc (Steven Spielberg, 1997)
Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994)
Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis, 1994)
Sátántangó (Béla Tarr, 1994)
Blink (Michael Apted, 1994)
The Usual Suspects (Bryan Singer, 1995)
To Die For (Gus Van Sant, 1995) 
Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 1995)
Twelve Monkeys (Terry Gilliam, 1995)
Johnny Mnemonic (Robert Longo, 1995)
The Sixth Sense (M. Night Shyamalan, 1995)
The Blackout (Abel Ferrra, 1997)
Titanic (James Cameron, 1997)
Contact (Robert Zemeckis, 1997)
Sliding Doors (Peter Howitt, 1998)
Following (Christopher Nolan, 1998)
Lola Rennt (Tom Tykwer, 1998)
New Rose Hotel (Abel Ferrara, 1999)
eXistenZ (David Cronenberg, 1999)
Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999)
The Matrix (Larry and Andy Wachowski, 1999)
Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000)
Unbreakable (M. Night Shyamalan, 2000)
Donnie Darko (Richard Kelly, 2001)
Amores Perros (Alejandro González Iñárritu, 2000) 
Spider (David Cronenberg, 2002)
Signs (M. Night Shyamalan, 2002)
Gin gwai (The Eye, Oxide and Danny Pang, 2002)
Minority Report (Steven Spielberg, 2002)
The Bourne Identity (Doug Liman, 2002)
Femme fatale (Brian De Palma, 2002)
21
Finding Nemo (Andrew Stanton, 2003)
Paycheck (John Woo, 2003)
Elephant (Gus Van Sant, 2003)
Eternal Sunshine of  the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, 2004)
50 First Dates (Peter Segal, 2004)
The Village (M. Night Shyamalan, 2004)
Polar Express (Robert Zemeckis, 2004)
King Kong (Peter Jackson, 2005)
Last Days (Gus Van Sant, 2005)
Batman Begins (Christopher Nolan, 2006)
Déjà vu (Tony Scott, 2006)
Paranoid Park (Gus Van Sant, 2007)
The Dark Knight ( Christopher Nolan, 2008) 
Avatar ( James Cameron, 2009)
Tv Series
X-Files (Chris Carter, 1993-2002)
Lost (J.J.Abrams, Damon Lindelof, Jeffrey Lieber, 2004-2010)
Fringe (J.J. Abrams, Alex Kurtzman, Roberto Orci, 2008-2013)
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